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1 
Introduction 
On the night of June 17, a posse of armed Zulus crept out of a migrant workers’ hostel near a 
township called Boipatong, south of Johannesburg, and in an orgy of slaughter hacked, 
stabbed, and shot thirty-eight people to death in their homes. Among the dead were a nine-
month-old baby, a child of four, and twenty-four women, one of them pregnant. After the 
massacre, residents refused to give statements to the police because they were convinced the 
authorities were involved.  
Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country, 19941 
 
Events in the dusty hitherto obscure Vaal township of Boipatong on the night of 
17 June 1992 have been widely recognised as a watershed moment in South 
Africa’s negotiated transition.2 The Boipatong massacre sparked popular outrage 
unprecedented in the transition period, beginning in February 1990 with the 
unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and release of its leader 
Nelson Mandela and ending with the country’s first democratic elections in April 
1994. The outcry over the massacre was overtly political. Boipatong was pre-
dominantly ANC-aligned. Its attackers came from KwaMadala Hostel, a Vaal 
stronghold of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), a predominantly Zulu political 
movement opposed to the ANC since the 1980s. Evidence of prior IFP-state 
                                                            
1  Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Negotiated Revo-
lution, Struik Book Distributors (Sandton, 1994).  
2  Adrian Guelke, ‘Political Violence and the South African Transition’, Irish Studies in International 
Affairs, 4 (1993), p. 61; Martin J. Murray, The Revolution Deferred: The Painful Birth of Post-Apart-
heid South Africa, Verso (London, 1994), p. 182; Timothy D. Sisk, Democratisation in South Africa: 
The Elusive Social Contract, Princeton University Press (New Jersey, 1995), pp. 213-215; Rupert 
Taylor and Mark Shaw, ‘The Dying Days of Apartheid’ in David R. Howarth and Aletta Norval (eds), 
South Africa in Transition: New Theoretical Perspectives, Macmillan (London, 1998), p. 23; Stephen 
Ellis, ‘The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force’, Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 24, 2 (1998), pp. 289-290; Max Coleman (ed.), A Crime Against Humanity: Analysing the 
Repression of the Apartheid State, David Philip (Johannesburg, 1998); Richard A. Wilson, The Poli-
tics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid State, Cambridge 
University Press (Cambridge, 2001), p. 67; Daryl Glaser, Politics and Society in South Africa, Sage 
Publications (London, 2001), p. 213; Philip Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien, ‘The Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission and the Pursuit of “Social Truth”: The Case of Kathorus’, in Deborah Posel and 
Graeme Simpson (eds) Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission, Witwatersrand University Press (Johannesburg, 2002), p. 194. 
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collusion in the Vaal and elsewhere, as well as an array of allegations of police 
complicity in the Boipatong massacre led to local outrage, national and inter-
national reproach. After playing a key part in raising this chorus of censure, the 
ANC suspended negotiations, already deadlocked over power-sharing with mi-
nority groups since May. President F.W. de Klerk, who had sought to secure 
power-sharing in a democracy with extensive minority powers, whilst at the 
same time pursuing the glittering prize of majority support, now found himself 
under considerable pressure. As unrest and alarm escalated, he was forced into 
submission. His capitulation was codified in the September Record of Under-
standing, an ANC-government bilateral, which paved the way for the ANC to 
take power by majority rule in April 1994.  
While the Boipatong massacre is commonly regarded as a key transitional 
moment, there is almost equal unanimity over the question of security force 
involvement in the massacre. Cawthra writes that security forces ‘covered them-
selves in infamy by carrying out a massacre of ANC supporters at Boipatong.’3 
Citing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC) Report, Nelson Man-
dela’s authorised biographer Anthony Sampson states that ‘police clearly col-
luded’ in the Boipatong massacre.4 Stephen Ellis finds it ‘most probable’ that the 
massacre was ‘organised by one or other of the state security forces’.5 If so, ‘it 
was clearly intended as a provocation to the ANC’, which had embarked on a 
mass action campaign after negotiations deadlocked. According to Taylor & 
Shaw, the massacre solidified a growing realisation among ANC leaders that the 
country’s ‘violence was a direct result of the state’s political agenda’.6  
More particularly, the Boipatong massacre is widely regarded as evidence of a 
third force, which comprised elements within the state security system working 
covertly and illegally to destabilise the ANC and its allies. Bonner & Nieftago-
dien state that Boipatong residents were attacked by ‘IFP-aligned KwaMadala 
hostel dwellers and the third force’.7 Wilson goes so far as to argue that ‘[m]uch 
of the validity of the Third Force theory rests upon the involvement of the 
security forces in planning and participating in the random attack on Boipatong 
residents.’8 Much has been made of the apparent randomness of the massacre. 
Murray writes that Boipatong residents were ‘randomly slaughtered’ by IFP 
attackers ‘assisted by elements in the security forces’.9 Discussing violence in 
                                                            
3  Gavin Cawthra, Policing South Africa: The South African Police and the Transition from Apartheid, 
David Philip (Johannesburg, 1993), p. 1.  
4  Anthony Sampson, Mandela, the Authorized Biography, Jonathan Ball (Jeppeston, 1999).  
5  Ellis, ‘The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force’, p. 289.  
6  Taylor and Shaw, ‘The Dying Days of Apartheid’, p. 23.  
7  Bonner and Nieftagodien, ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Pursuit of “Social 
Truth”: The Case of Kathorus’, p. 194.  
8  Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, p. 63.  
9  Murray, The Revolution Deferred, p. 182.  
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South Africa’s transition, Bennun argues that by ‘attacking individuals at random 
within a community known to support a particular organisation, a form of 
collective punishment is imposed and people are terrorised into avoiding any 
support or contact with that which brings them such misery’.10 As Taylor & 
Shaw put it, massacres such as that of Boipatong indicate ‘a calculated pattern of 
terror, where the very randomness of terror is part of the overall strategy.’11  
The prevailing conviction that a third force was complicit in Boipatong is 
tinged with doubt. Some researchers discuss the political importance of the 
massacre without pronouncing upon the question of state complicity.12 Seegers 
mentions that the Boipatong massacre and the later Bisho massacre would 
eventually bring ‘negotiators back to the table in shame’.13 Adam & Moodley 
allude to the ‘much-exploited tragic Boipatong massacre’.14 More recently, 
Jeffery’s People’s War goes against the grain of scholarship by weighing in from 
the other extreme. Jeffery attributes dominant understandings of Boipatong to a 
‘false theory of violence’, emanating from the ANC as part of a highly propa-
gandised and violent ‘People’s War’, waged with great success against the state 
and Inkatha since the early 1980s and culminating with ANC ascendancy during 
the transition.15 
This book is not concerned with proving or disproving state complicity in the 
Boipatong massacre. Rather, it aims to show that charges of state complicity 
were highly contentious at the time that they were made and that they remain so. 
While evidence of state complicity in the massacre as well as security force 
collaboration with Inkatha in the Vaal indicates that further investigation is 
needed to uncover the event’s hidden truths, this evidence remains decidedly 
inconclusive. It is submitted that the tendency to overlook this uncertainty is 
attributable to a political context, progressively more prominent after the mas-
sacre, in which the ANC came to enjoy persuasive moral ascendancy over 
government. Despite its reformism, de Klerk’s government came increasingly to 
resemble the Apartheid regime from which it had sprung. Popular beliefs about 
the Boipatong massacre spoke to a context in which the white minority govern-
ment had sought to cling to power whilst benefitting from the same underhand 
security force methods that sustained it before the transition period. Indeed, 
                                                            
10  Mervyn E. Bennun, ‘Boipatong and After: Reflections on the Politics of Violence in South Africa’, 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 21, (1993), p. 63.  
11  Taylor and Shaw, ‘The Dying Days of Apartheid’, p. 20.  
12  Guelke, ‘Political Violence and the South African Transition’, p. 61; Sisk, Democratisation in South 
Africa, pp. 213-215;  
13  Annette Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, Tauris Academic Studies (Lon-
don, 1996), p. 276.  
14  Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-Apart-
heid South Africa, Jonathan Ball (Johannesburg, 1993), p. 101.  
15  Anthea Jeffery, People’s War, Jonathan Ball (Johannesburg, 2010), pp. xxxiii-xxxv.  
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perhaps because of the murkiness of its waters, the Boipatong massacre was 
seized upon as a symbol of the period’s inequities. In consequence, ‘Boipatong’ 
amassed an iconic status that drew focus away from its own forensic truths.  
In considering the Boipatong massacre as an iconic moment of the South 
African transition, this thesis explores the character of South Africa’s transition. 
In simple terms, the transition was a process for the democratization of South 
Africa, a shift from minority to majority rule. In discursive terms,16 and as Laclau 
might put it, the transition arose through a dislocation of social structure.17 This 
dislocation was heralded in February 1990 with de Klerk’s unbanning of the 
ANC, along with a string of other reforms. While its causes were manifold and 
the topic of continued debate,18 the dawn of the transition saw the Apartheid era’s 
discursive configurations come apart at the seams. In a new context of negoti-
ation and reform, integral meanings were lost. The National Party was no longer 
the Apartheid government and the ANC was no longer a revolutionary move-
ment. Nor was it clear what they were becoming. This common experience of 
floating obscurity is the essence of dislocation. As Howarth puts it, following 
Laclau, subjects in such a state ‘are literally compelled to become collective 
political agents intent on reconstituting a new order within which identities can 
be stabilised.’19 A dialectical relationship is present in social transformations 
between two forms of subjectivity, one which makes decisions about the struc-
ture and one which makes decisions within the structure.20 Those subjectivities 
that create the rules of a new order make the former decisions, but their influence 
depends on the subjectivities that make the latter, on those that are interpellated21 
into the discourses they posit. The Boipatong massacre was a moment through 
                                                            
16  For an introductory discussion of discourse theory, see David R. Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, 
‘Introducing discourse theory and political analysis’, in David R. Howarth, Aletta Norval and Yannis 
Stavrakakis (eds), Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social 
Change, Manchester University Press (Manchester, 2000), pp. 1-23. 
17  Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, Verso (London, 1990), pp. 39-40.  
18  For discussion on the origins of the transition period, see Adam and Moodley, The Negotiated Revo-
lution, pp. 39-58; Sisk, Democratization in South Africa, pp. 56-87; Anthony Butler, Democracy and 
Apartheid: Political Theory, Comparative Politics and the Modern South African State, Macmillan 
Press (London, 1998), pp. 86-104; Adrian Guelke, South Africa in Transition: The Misunderstood 
Miracle, I. B. Tauris (London, 1999), pp. 1-44, 181-200; Glaser, Politics and Society in South Africa, 
pp. 202-212; Gretchen Bauer and Scott D. Taylor, Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in 
Transition, Lynne Rienner Publishers (London, 2005), pp. 245-248. 
19  David R. Howarth, ‘Paradigms Gained? A Critique of Theories and Explanations of Democratic 
Transition in South Africa’, in David R. Howarth and Aletta Norval (eds), South Africa in Transition: 
New Theoretical Perspectives, Macmillan (London, 1998), p. 201. 
20  Ibid.  
21 Althusser’s term ‘interpellation’ provides a useful supplement to the discussion of social trans-
formation. Interpellation refers to drawing subjects into an imagined designation, which they would 
not have otherwise imagined themselves to be in. Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and the State’, in Lenin 
and Philosophy, NLB (London, 1971), p. 162. 
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which new rules were successfully created. The study of this moment provides a 
telling picture of the discursive struggles that animated the transition.  
A further aim of this thesis is to consider contemporary knowledge of the 
Boipatong massacre in light of the power struggles that defined it and which it 
defined. This task involves the unearthing and analysis of a composite layering of 
discourses which addressed the massacre. The Boipatong massacre first took on 
meaning with its enactment, a complex of diverse interactions amongst the 
attackers, those they targeted, and various observers. Far from being random, 
these interactions were rooted in a history of localised conflict. They created a 
ripple effect as interpretations of the event were transmitted outward across a 
range of media to the rest of the country and the world. Competing narratives, 
with different interested parties as their authors, constructed different prota-
gonists and antagonists out of the same historical moment. In doing so, they 
advanced discrepant contentions about the forensic truths that lay behind the 
massacre, truths that remain contentious. They tended to address the same 
audiences, people whose actions might help change or sustain the power dif-
ferentials that defined South Africa’s political landscape. And they constantly 
addressed each other. In the months after the Boipatong massacre, popular 
understandings of the event evolved as the meaning of ‘Boipatong’ was re-
peatedly contested. The conviction that government was somehow complicit 
remained hegemonic. The massacre resonated as a symbol of government ille-
gitimacy, providing a crucial asset to the ANC during negotiations. Contestations 
over the meaning of the Boipatong massacre have continued into the post-
Apartheid era. While the ANC and its allies have repeatedly sought to maintain 
the massacre’s meaningful contribution to the new national narrative, other in-
dividuals and groups have moved to recreate the meaning of the event. The study 
of the Boipatong massacre is inevitably a study of these processes and their 
tensions.  
In exploring these contestations, I draw on Luise White’s The Assassination of 
Herbert Chitepo which analyses a series of narrative texts pronouncing upon the 
murder of a prominent Zimbabwean nationalist in 1975. These texts span more 
than a decade, yet the true identity of the assassins remains contested. White 
argues that to ‘look closely at any event requires looking carefully at the texts it 
generates, both days and years after the event.’22 Significantly, her work avoids 
judging the veracity of each text. Instead, White focuses on the construction of 
different texts, their relationships to each other, and their effects on Zimbabwean 
politics. The notion of politics as performance is central to White’s analysis. 
Texts are ‘scripted’ and ‘staged’ for certain audiences, thereby coming to bear 
                                                            
22  Luise White, The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe, Indiana Univer-
sity Press (Bloomington, 2003), p. 3.  
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upon power relations.23 Whilst White’s approach informs the analysis that fol-
lows, there are also important departures. Firstly, White’s distinction between 
authors and audiences is too dichotomous for the purposes of this study. Her 
focus is on commissions, letters, confessions and political memoirs, where a top-
down dichotomy seems workable. The case of Boipatong reveals a greater 
fluidity between decisions about structure and decisions within structure. The 
stage is lowered into the surrounding crowd. Party leaders are led by their 
followers. Authors are part of the audience. Secondly, this study does not hold 
back from judging the veracity of different contentions. The analysis of meaning 
and its contestation is grounded in speculation about hard truths.  
The first chapter provides the context and an outline of politics on the eve of 
the Boipatong massacre, thus describing the political setting that would allow the 
massacre to take on the meanings and significance that it has. Chapters 2 and 3 
plot the ways in which the Boipatong massacre changed the course of negoti-
ations. In doing so, they show how the massacre re-shaped the political context in 
which it arose. Chapter 2 considers the actions of government, the ANC and its 
allies, other public figures, and ANC-supporters on the ground, particularly 
residents of Boipatong, in the days immediately after the massacre. Chapter 3 
picks up five days after the massacre, on the day the ANC suspended nego-
tiations. It examines the new demands put to government by the ANC and the 
international reaction. It also charts the country’s steady decline into a period of 
crisis. The final chapter explores how the meaning of the Boipatong massacre has 
been repeatedly contested in the course of investigations, hearings and reports 
that have been conducted into the event. The period covered in this chapter 
begins in the days after the massacre and ends in late 2000 with the TRC’s 
decision on the granting of amnesties for the perpetration of the massacre. The 
conclusion points to the ongoing significance of the Boipatong massacre for 
South Africa’s fledgling democracy. 
 
                                                            
23  White, The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo, p. 10.  
  
2 
Political context: 
2nd February 1990 – 16th June 1992 
The prospect of negotiations has already prompted a renewed scramble for political territory, 
especially by Inkatha, which in mid-1990 began to construct an organized following among 
Transvaal migrant hostel dwellers well beyond its Natal base. ... As the era of negotiated 
transition begins, South African politics have never been so complex or so violent. 
Tom Lodge, 19911 
 
The annual opening of Parliament on 2 February 1990 marked a dramatic shift in 
South Africa’s political landscape. President de Klerk gave his address amid 
speculation that significant reform was on the cards, not least of all the release of 
ANC leader Nelson Mandela. However, few anticipated the extent of the reforms 
he would announce. As several thousand people assembled outside to demon-
strate against his undemocratic rule, de Klerk lifted the ban on the ANC, its 
military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), 
and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Those imprisoned for belong-
ing to the ANC, MK, the PAC and the SACP would be released. The nationwide 
state of emergency was lifted, with the exception of Natal. Emergency media 
regulations limiting coverage of black political activities were lifted. Detention 
without trial was limited to six months, with provision for legal representation 
and medical treatment. A moratorium was placed on hangings. The Separate 
Amenities Act of 1953, which maintained the segregation of public facilities, was 
repealed. Mandela would be released ‘unconditionally’ and ‘without delay’. He 
was expected to play an important part in a new era of negotiations in which 
black nationalists need not resort to violence. ‘Walk through the door and take 
your place at the negotiating table together with the government. The time for 
negotiation has arrived.’2  
                                                            
1  Tom Lodge, ‘Rebellion: The Turning of the Tide’, in Tom Lodge and Bill Nasson (eds), All, Here, 
and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s, David Phillip (Claremont, 1991), p. 204.    
2  David Ottoway, Chained Together: Mandela, de Klerk, and the Struggle to Remake South Africa, 
Times Books (New York, 1993), p. 78.   
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As news of de Klerk’s speech filtered through, the demonstration outside 
Parliament came to a standstill and quietly dispersed.3 De Klerk’s address 
heralded the beginning of what is popularly remembered as the South African 
transition. The political playing fields were significantly levelled, allowing for 
national politics to enter a period of negotiation. However, these developments 
took place against the backdrop of escalating political violence, which would 
resonate increasingly with a lapse of negotiations in 1992. This contextualising 
chapter begins with an outline of the political violence. Specific attention is given 
to its origins, particularly in the Vaal, and to its different relationships with the 
dominant political parties. The outline is followed by a brief account of the 1992 
breakdown in negotiations, and the subsequent return of national politics to mass 
politics. At this juncture, national politics and localised political violence became 
increasingly entwined, allowing for an event such as the Boipatong massacre to 
have exceptional impact.    
Political violence during the South African transition 
Mandela’s release brought widespread relief, a feeling that the freedom of the 
struggle’s icon marked the culmination and victory of the struggle. Yet the 
ensuing period of transition, till South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, 
was a time of unprecedented political violence. As negotiations strained towards 
a new constitutional dispensation, 16 000 people lost their lives in politically-
related incidents occurring mostly in KwaZulu-Natal and the Transvaal.4 Indeed, 
Apartheid’s most violent period came when conditions were expected to im-
prove. 
The unbanning of exile groups signalled the prospect of a new political order, 
setting in motion a plethora of forces that vied to shape it. As an exile movement, 
the ANC had operated outside South Africa as a proto-state structure.5 Within 
South Africa, the organization existed as a popular symbol of resistance with 
minimal structural presence. Now unbanned, the ANC embarked on a process of 
re-insertion. Its advances were met with opposition from the Zulu cultural 
movement Inkatha. Founded in 1975, Inkatha perpetuated a largely European 
adumbration of Zulu-ness, drawing in groupings more disparate than those who 
would have considered themselves Zulu in pre-colonial times.6 That the majority 
                                                            
3  Ibid.    
4  Rupert Taylor and Mark Shaw, ‘The Dying Days of Apartheid’, in D.R. Howarth and A. Norval (eds), 
South Africa in Transition: New Theoretical Perspectives, St. Martin’s Press (New York, 1998), p. 13.  
5  Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, 
Princeton University Press (Princeton, 1996), p. 273. 
6  Patrick Harries, ‘Imagery, Symbolism and Tradition in a South African Bantustan: Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi, Inkatha, and Zulu History’, History and Theory, Vol. 32. No. 4. (December 1993), pp. 105-
115.  
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of ANC leaders were Xhosa-speaking served to invigorate its Zulu nationalism.7 
Inkatha offered its followers the mythical solace of an idealised rural past and a 
defiant Zulu warrior identity. Even so, the organisation complied with Apartheid. 
Its leader was Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Chief Minister of the KwaZulu homeland 
since 1976.  
While ANC-Inkatha hostilities existed in KwaZulu-Natal for much of the 
1980s, the early 1990s saw this violence intensify and spread to the Transvaal. 
Violence first erupted on the Vaal, where competition over employment stoked 
political enmities. While political leaning influenced employability, a more 
essential aspect was housing.8 With the outbreak of violence, the control of 
migrant hostels became pivotal. After Vaal rivalries came to a head in early July 
1990,9 Inkatha declared itself a political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), 
and set about galvanising militant support in Transvaal hostels. Fighting first 
broke out at the IFP’s inaugural Transvaal rally, held in Sebokeng on 22 July. 
While it is difficult to say which side sparked the outbreak,10 the event was 
clearly indicative of Vaal South African Police (SAP) partialities. Police escorted 
rally-goers marching together back to the local Sebokeng and KwaMazisa 
hostels. A large crowd of Xhosa hostel residents reinforced by township youth 
were waiting for them on arrival. The first casualty was Warrant Officer Petrus 
Jooste, struck by a sharpened steel pole thrown by a Xhosa steelworker.11 
Subsequent struggles over control of the hostels led to substantial loss of life and 
the eventual exodus of Zulus to KwaMadala (Place of the Old), a dilapidated 
                                                            
7  Grant Farred, ‘Unity and Difference in Black South Africa’, Social Text, No. 31/32, Third World and 
Post-Colonial Issues. (1992), p. 225.  
8  Inkatha’s union wing, the United Workers’ Union of South Africa (UWUSA), distinguished itself 
from ANC-aligned unions with its pro-capitalist, anti-sanctions stance. Its members were less inclined 
to demand higher wages. The management of Iscor, a big employer in the area, was known to prefer 
Inkatha workers. According to Vaal ANC leader Ernest Sotsu, Inkatha sought to establish ‘an IFP 
stronghold and bring people here from KwaZulu to take the jobs of those they drove out of the hostels, 
and give Inkatha a constituency.’ See Daniel Reed, Beloved Country: South Africa’s Silent Wars, 
Jonathan Ball (Johannesburg, 1994), pp. 34 and 62.   
9  The Tripartite Alliance, comprising the ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU), and the South African Communist Party (SACP), held a stay-way to protest violence 
waged against it in KwaZulu-Natal by Inkatha and the KwaZulu Police (KZP). At the stay-away’s 
opening rally in the Vaal on July 2, township ‘comrades’ (ANC-supporting youth) were exhorted to 
purge the region of Inkatha. Several houses belonging to Inkatha members were subsequently burnt 
down. See Phil Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien, ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Pursuit of “Social Truth”: The Case of Kathorus’ in Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson (eds) Com-
missioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Witwaters-
rand University Press (Johannesburg, 2002), pp. 184-185, and Reed, Beloved Country: South Africa’s 
Silent Wars, p. 33.  
10  COSATU intelligence in local factories had warned that the rally was being planned with violent 
intentions. Comrades attempted to offset the violence they anticipated with their own belligerence. An 
IFP member was shot dead on his way to the rally. Rally organiser Bhula Khubeka’s house was set 
alight. Comrades stoned those who took part in the rally and were waiting for a fight at the venue 
entrance. Police drove them off with teargas. Ibid, pp. 33-34.  
11  Ibid, p. 34.   
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Iscor-owned complex last used for housing in 1978. Located on the periphery of 
an Iscor refinery, KwaMadala also neighboured the township of Boipatong 
(Place of Safety). After July 22, violence spread outward across the Transvaal 
Reef, particularly to the East Rand where earlier disputes between competing 
migrant and urban taxi operators evolved into fierce IFP-ANC conflict.12 
As police actions on 22 July 1990 suggest, Inkatha’s influence in the early 
1990s drew considerable vigour from its relationship with the state. Taylor and 
Shaw argue that de Klerk unbanned the ANC with a winning plan in mind, ‘a 
twin-track negotiations and destabilisation strategy’.13 The National Party (NP) 
would negotiate for a compromise agreement committed to power-sharing rather 
than majority rule, whilst covertly attacking and undermining the ANC. With a 
sufficiently protracted transition, it might have time to form a right-of-centre 
alliance, with Inkatha, several minor parties and conservative homeland leaders, 
which could beat the ANC at the polls of a democratic election.14  
State support for Inkatha was exposed with the July 1991 ‘Inkathagate 
Scandal’. After government documents were leaked to the Weekly Mail, it was 
disclosed that the SAP had secretly funded Inkatha’s union wing UWUSA (to the 
tune of R1.5 million), as well as rallies in November 1989 and March 1990 
(R250,000).15 However, Inkatha was more than a political ally; government had 
also nurtured it as a counter-revolutionary surrogate. The Weekly Mail added that 
Inkatha hit squads had received training in 1986 at a South African Defence 
Force (SADF) base on the Caprivi Strip in northern Namibia. The State Security 
Council had taken a decision, codenamed Operation Marion, to set up a para-
military unit that would ensure Inkatha could put an end to ANC-Inkatha conflict 
in KwaZulu-Natal.16 200 Inkatha members were trained as paramilitaries. While 
de Klerk claimed that he had not known about Inkathagate, the scandal forced 
him to remove Defence Minister Magnus Malan and Law and Order Minister 
Adriaan Vlok from their positions. They nevertheless remained in Cabinet. In 
Waldmeir’s opinion, somewhat less radical than Taylor and Shaw’s, de Klerk’s 
disposition had been one of ‘negligent ignorance’.17  
De Klerk was reluctant to rein in developments that preceded his presidency. 
The mid-1980s had seen the rise of a revolutionary war within South Africa. In 
                                                            
12  Bonner and Nieftagodien, ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Pursuit of “Social 
Truth”: The Case of Kathorus’, p. 179.  
13  Taylor and Shaw, ‘The Dying Days of Apartheid’, p. 17.   
14  Stephen Ellis, ‘The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force’, Journal of Southern Afri-
can Studies, 24, 2 (1998), p. 283.  
15  Max Coleman, A Crime Against Humanity: Analysing the Repression of the Apartheid State, David 
Phillip (Johannesburg, 1998), p. 195.  
16  Taylor and Shaw, ‘The Dying Days of Apartheid’, p. 18.  
17  Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa, 
Viking (London, 1997), p. 186, in Ellis, ‘The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force’, 
p. 287.   
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September 1984, rent boycotts and other protests broke out along the Vaal and 
quickly fanned outward. The ANC-aligned United Democratic Front (UDF) gave 
national focus to these local conflicts, while the ANC called upon South Africans 
to make the country ‘ungovernable’.18 Two states of emergency were declared, 
and security forces were mobilised extensively to crush the popular insurrection. 
It was in this climate that government first conceived of a third force, what Ellis 
terms ‘an organised network of illegal repression’.19 Predictably, the minutes of a 
1986 State Security Council meeting were more subtle,  
 
The third force must be mobile with a well-trained capacity to effectively wipe out terrorists. 
It must be prepared to be unpopular and even feared, without marring the image of the 
Defence Force or the police. The security forces must work together in the setting up of the 
third force in order that those who undermine the state are countered with their own 
methods.20 
 
A kingpin in the third force initiative was the Civil Cooperation Bureau 
(CCB), set up as a front company in 1986 by Special Forces with the approval of 
Magnus Malan. CCB activities were exposed after former police captain Dirk 
Coetzee came forward in 1989 with information about covert ‘death squad’ 
initiatives concealed within the security force bureaucracy.21 Bowing to pressure 
in 1990, de Klerk appointed the Harms Commission, a toothless probe which 
ended without indictments despite stumbling across evidence of the CCB. The 
CCB had a list of 200 targets, including Nelson Mandela, trade union leaders, 
journalists and clergy. It had over 150 personnel, more than 40 covert cells 
established across the country, and spent R27 million annually.22 In response to 
the Commission, the ANC sent government an open letter in April 1991 threat-
ening to suspend negotiations if security forces were not dealt with. As Seegers 
writes,  
 
The ANC was moved by almost daily reports of the appearances of aggressive groups, armed 
with automatic weapons, who cut a path of destruction on trains, in rural areas as much as 
townships, and even in inner cities, then seemed to vanish into thin air. The pattern was not 
all that different from the state-supported violence of the 1980s; hence the suspicions.23  
 
A compelling illustration of continuity between state-sponsored violence in 
the 1980s and political violence in the 1990s was the SAP C-10 counter-
                                                            
18  Ellis, ‘The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force’, p. 272.  
19  Ibid.  
20  Special Hearing of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the Caprivi Trainees, August 1997 in 
Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid’s Assassins, Jonathan Ball (Jo-
hannesburg, 1997), p. 127.  
21  Argus, 31 January 1991 in Martin J. Murray, The Revolution Deferred: The Painful Birth of Post-
Apartheid South Africa, Verso (London, 1994), pp. 83-84. 
22  Sunday Times, 13 January 1991 in Murray, The Revolution Deferred, p. 84.    
23  Annette Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa, Tauris Academic Studies (Lon-
don, 1996), p. 273.  
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insurgency unit, based at Vlakplaas outside Pretoria. Founded in 1979, C-10’s 
rise to infamy began in earnest after 1985 when it was put under the command of 
Eugene de Kock. C-10 was composed mostly of askaris, ‘turned’ guerrillas from 
MK, the PAC, ZIPRA (armed wing of ZAPU, the Zimbabwe African People’s 
Union), the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), and other 
guerrilla armies the SADF had encountered in southern Africa.24 ‘[A]skaris were 
well-suited to the grisliest acts of war’ according to Ellis, ‘Battle hardened, 
psychologically and socially divorced from their communities of origin and com-
promised by their treachery’.25 C-10 thrived as a ‘general-purpose’ death-squad 
in the mid-1980s. The rise of vigilantism during this period saw a heterogeneous 
composition of groups with vested interest in the status quo, including homeland 
despots, town councillors, and a small propertied township petty bourgeoisie, 
turn upon their own communities.26 In this climate, state-sponsored counter-
revolutionary activity could flourish under the guise of so-called ‘black-on-black’ 
violence. After the CCB exposé, C-10 was ostensibly reorganised and redeployed 
to investigate the illegal weapons trade. Under this new facade, de Kock and his 
associates were able to participate in and profit from the trade.27 In 1994, the 
Goldstone Commission uncovered ‘a horrible network of criminal activity’ in-
volved in gun-running, hit-squad activity on trains, and hostel-related violence.28 
Two of de Kock’s closest Vlakplaas colleagues had implicated him along with 
IFP leaders Themba Khoza and Victor Ndlovu, two police generals, and security 
force members from C-10, East Rand Murder and Robbery, the Durban Security 
Branch, and the KwaZulu Police.    
In July 1990, de Kock had begun working with Themba Khoza, chairman of 
the Inkatha Youth Brigade in the Transvaal, to sell arms to Inkatha hostels on the 
Transvaal Reef.29 Khoza was arrested in September 1990, when arms were found 
in his vehicle near the scene of an IFP attack on Sebokeng Hostel in which 43 
people died. Having given him the vehicle beforehand,30 C-10 also paid for his 
bail and legal fees.31 De Kock later revealed that police falsified evidence to 
secure Khoza’s acquittal. Referring to his gun-running endeavours, De Kock 
admitted that he undertook some actions of this kind on his own initiative and 
others under direct orders.32 As these admissions show, there were tensions in the 
                                                            
24  Ellis, ‘The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force’, p. 269.  
25  Ibid.  
26  Murray, The Revolution Deferred, p. 80.  
27  Ellis, ‘The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force’, p. 285.  
28  The Goldstone Commission, ‘Interim Report on Criminal Political Violence by Elements within the 
South African Police, the KwaZulu Police and the Inkatha Freedom Party’, 18 March 1994.   
29  Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness, p. 124.  
30  Africa News, ‘Cracks in the Boipatong story’, 22 January 1999.  
31  The Goldstone Commission, ‘Interim Report on Criminal Political Violence by Elements within the 
South African Police, the KwaZulu Police and the Inkatha Freedom Party’, 18 March 1994.   
32  Ellis, ‘The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force’, p. 284.  
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term ‘third force’. In its original sense, it referred to illegal, covert state ini-
tiatives to destabilise opposition. In another, it referred to renegade right-wing 
elements within the security forces, seeking to dismantle negotiations. These 
tensions speak to ongoing discrepancies over the degree of state complicity in 
political violence: How far up the state hierarchy did it go and to what extent was 
it endemic to security force culture? These questions became increasingly perti-
nent after negotiations deadlocked, and took on even greater currency after the 
Boipatong massacre. 
Negotiated deadlock 
After assuming leadership of the NP in 1989, de Klerk committed himself to 
achieving majority support for the party among all of South Africa’s ethnic 
groups.33 De Klerk’s envisaged Christian democratic alliance of moderate multi-
racial forces would draw the bulk of its support from rural areas, recruiting 
traditional chiefdoms and churches to muster droves of voters.34 However, it 
would also need to make substantial inroads into the ANC’s urban support base. 
A survey conducted as early as March 1989 showed that such aspirations were 
less than quixotic. South African research institute Markinor put De Klerk and 
then President P.W. Botha second in popularity (22 percent) to Mandela (41 
percent) among urban blacks.35 De Klerk’s parliamentary address in February 
1990 served to bolster such support. Later that day, Anglican Archbishop Des-
mond Tutu admitted, ‘What he has said has certainly taken my breath away’.36 
Tutu acknowledged that it was time to give de Klerk credit. In an unannounced 
visit to Soweto in September, de Klerk found himself surrounded by township 
residents crowding in to touch him. Some chanted ‘Viva de Klerk’ and ‘Com-
rade!’37  
De Klerk’s rising popularity was countered on two fronts, by the white right-
wing on the one and the ANC and its leftist allies on the other. The white right-
wing was bitterly opposed to de Klerk’s reforms. The pro-Apartheid Conserva-
tive Party (CP) complained that his actions had no electoral mandate. Indeed, he 
made no mention of such reforms during the 1989 campaign. He even repri-
manded the Democratic Party (DP) for its links with ANC ‘terrorists’.38 By early 
                                                            
33  Die Burger, 19 February 1989 in Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer, From Apartheid to 
Nation-Building, Oxford University Press (Cape Town, 1989), p. 199.  
34  Ottoway, Chained Together, p. 259.  
35  The sample constituted a stratified selection of 550 black adults living in the major metropolitan areas 
of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging region, Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. Giliomee 
and Schlemmer, From Apartheid to Nation-Building, pp. 199-200, and 205.     
36  Ottoway, Chained Together, p. 79.  
37  Keller, ‘De Klerk’s Gorbachev Problem’, New York Times, 31 January 1993.  
38  Ottoway, Chained Together, p. 79. 
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1992, persistent political violence and a string of by-election defeats to the CP 
had reduced de Klerk’s standing amongst white South Africans.39 In February, 
the CP won a by-election in the hitherto secure NP constituency of Potchef-
stroom, where de Klerk had graduated. Looking to galvanise support in the face 
of growing adversity, he responded by holding a referendum the following 
month. Whites were asked to vote for or against continued negotiations toward a 
multi-racial democracy. A majority of 68.7 percent on a turnout of 86 percent of 
the white electorate voted ‘yes’, dealing a crushing blow to the conservatives.40 
Emboldened by his victory, de Klerk turned his attention to negotiations with the 
ANC at CODESA II.  
De Klerk’s most explicit promise to the white electorate prior to the refer-
endum had been that he would prevent majority rule. This promise became his 
mandate at CODESA II, where the key question in drafting an interim consti-
tution was whether South Africa should be ruled by majority or power sharing.41 
CODESA II became deadlocked over the issue in May 1992. After the NP 
advanced a proposal for minority powers that clearly betrayed de Klerk’s post-
referendum victory giddiness, ANC Secretary General and key negotiator Cyril 
Ramaphosa responded with a proposal that the NP would never accept.42 
Journalists interviewing de Klerk after the suspension of talks were puzzled to 
find him in a buoyant mood. He was confident that compromise would come 
from the ANC, and that an NP-led alliance would beat the ANC in a democratic 
election.43 De Klerk and Mandela met soon thereafter and resolved to keep 
                                                            
39  Tom Lodge, Mandela: A Critical Life, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2006), p. 176.  
40  Patti Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa, 
W.W. Norton and Company (New York, 1997), p. 199. 
41 This question revolved around how an elected constituent assembly would operate, whether decisions 
would be taken by a simple majority or a more substantial majority. The more substantial the ma-
jorities required, the more powerful the white minority vote, and thus the stronger the leaning toward 
power sharing. 
42  The NP proposed that a two-thirds vote would be sufficient to pass most constitutional clauses in the 
assembly. Those clauses dealing with a bill of rights, devolution of power, multi-party democracy, 
and minority rights would need a three-quarters majority. These terms would let the white minority 
resist unfavourable amendments to the interim constitution. The NP also wanted to ensure that the 
interim constitution would be favourable and worth protecting. It proposed that a senate representing 
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into stalemate. See Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, pp. 200-202, and Anthony Butler, Cyril Rama-
phosa, Jacana (Johannesburg, 2007), p. 294.  
43  Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle, p. 203.  
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negotiations on track.44 Yet the next month would see their collaboration break 
down, and the tides of fortune turn against de Klerk.  
A call to mass action  
Negotiations saw national politics become increasingly abstracted from township 
life and the ANC ever more estranged from the street politics to which it was 
accustomed. Delegates in suits and ties discussed a new dispensation at the 
World Trade Centre in Kempton Park on the East Rand, a far cry from the 
neighbouring township complex of Kathorus where internecine violence was 
protracted. The stark contrast between these contiguous political spaces was 
indicative of a broader context in which the ANC was fast shedding its popular 
movement skin and becoming more of a political party. As a political party 
caught up in negotiations, the ANC was out of touch with a membership that was 
yet to reveal itself in the electoral medium. After the CODESA II deadlock, the 
ANC sought to tighten control over disjointed politics on the ground whilst 
bringing an overconfident de Klerk back down to earth. It hoped to galvanise its 
membership under a unifying programme, which would lay bare its political 
brawn. As Ramaphosa later explained, ‘The breaking off of talks marked an 
important return for the ANC to the politics of mass mobilisation. It served to 
remind the regime that they were negotiating with a political movement which 
had the support of the majority of South Africans.’45 Ramaphosa’s retrospection 
likely exaggerated the confidence of the ANC leadership during a period of 
uncertainty. Indeed, while the ANC seemed unable to stop IFP-ANC conflict, it 
was also beset by internal divisions.  
The ANC had formed Self Defence Units (SDUs) in late 1990 to protect 
communities from Inkatha and security forces. However, numerous SDUs be-
came the focus of localised struggles between established ANC structures and 
MK cadres returning from exile.46 Conflict between MK cadres and local leaders 
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was reported during the first half of 1992 in both Natal and the Transvaal.47 As 
negotiations faltered, ANC leaders became more attentive to discord within local 
party structures. In early June, Mandela met trade union leaders and ANC 
regional officials to address internal clashes. SACP leader Chris Hani led a 
delegation to Sebokeng to seek a truce between warring ANC factions. The ANC 
noted publicly that its principal worry was that the state might take underhand 
advantage of internal divisions if they were not healed promptly. As COSATU 
education officer Shele Papane warned, ‘The most obvious area of concern is that 
these divisions will ensure that the state will start killing the one side ... and we 
won’t know who is attacking whom anymore.’48 While Papane’s concern was not 
unfounded, its articulation was part of a broader ANC initiative to draw the gaze 
of its membership outward toward an identifiable enemy. The call to mass action 
became the focus of this initiative. It would be a testing of political muscle, and 
what better time to test it than on June 16th, the anniversary of the 1976 Soweto 
uprising.49 
On Tuesday the 16 June 1992, commuter trains ran almost empty through 
Johannesburg. Taxi ranks in the surrounding townships were desolate, while bus 
                                                            
47  In Transvaal, conflict was documented in the Kathorus squatter camp of Phola Park, as well as 
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companies halted their services to townships. According to the Johannesburg 
Chamber of Commerce and Industries, more than 89 percent of city employees 
stayed away from work.50 Similar occurrences prevailed throughout the country’s 
commercial centres, particularly in Pretoria where at least 80 percent of black 
workers stayed away. In Soweto, Nelson Mandela led a march of 2000 people to 
the Regina Mundi Church in Orlando, where he unveiled a memorial tombstone 
symbolising the death of Hector Pietersen.51 Speaking at the ceremony, ANC 
national chairman Oliver Tambo said that the Soweto uprising ‘unleashed a 
vortex of popular anger and victory is now in the offing.’52 Later in the day, 
Mandela addressed a rally of 30,000 supporters in Orlando Stadium. He 
cautioned, ‘The people should observe absolute discipline and should resist 
pressure for the armed struggle to be reinstated.’53 He dismissed suggestions 
from ANC supporters that violence be carried into white neighbourhoods, claim-
ing that such actions would result in disaster of the ‘first magnitude’. ‘One 
cannot stop the violence by killing innocent people.’ Mandela emphasized that 
mass action was a legitimate method of protest in democratic nations. His pacifist 
oratory reflected a complex of tensions around the meaning of mass action.   
Not only had the ANC been troubled by localised internal conflict over the 
control of SDUs, its leadership was also deeply divided between moderates and 
hardliners. Since his release, Mandela had come increasingly to blows with party 
radicals, who were sceptical of a negotiated transition. In March 1990, Mandela 
returned to Robben Island to persuade 25 prisoners to accept an amnesty offer 
from government, rather than await news of its fall before the ANC in civil war.54 
In August, government and the ANC signed the ‘Pretoria Minute’, which 
proclaimed the ANC’s immediate suspension of all armed actions. In return, 
government agreed to release political prisoners and indemnify exiles for poli-
tical offences. In Mandela’s view, the armed struggle ‘had a popularity out of 
proportion to what it had achieved on the ground’.55 Younger, more militant 
leaders found a ceasefire in exchange for minor concessions to be an outrage. At 
a December ANC conference in Johannesburg, Tambo argued that the ANC 
should modify its support for total sanctions. Western countries were already 
withdrawing sanctions, and the ANC was at risk of being marginalised abroad.56 
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The conference rejected Tambo’s call. Hardliners were increasingly disappointed 
with Mandela, who reminded the conference of Tambo’s laudatory leadership. 
Mandela was no longer the brooding revolutionary jailed as leader of the MK.57 
Mindful of the ANC’s somewhat obliging participation in negotiations, delegates 
criticised Mandela for not consulting with them during his talks with govern-
ment. The CODESA II deadlock in 1992 saw party radicals toying ever more 
with the idea of mass insurrection. The swashbuckling Ronnie Kasrils called the 
idea ‘the Leipzig Option’, after a 1989 protest march in East Germany which saw 
70,000 people stomp defiantly though the centre of Leipzig, causing Soviet po-
lice to flee and bringing the communist regime to its knees. Mandela’s resistance 
to party radicals would soon weaken, much to the detriment of the country’s 
stability. For the time being, opposition between moderates and hardliners was 
manifested in a mass action campaign that was by and large peaceful yet spurred 
by ominous rhetoric.58  
While the ANC was itself divided over the meaning of mass action, it had also 
to compete with the views of government and the IFP. All three jostled for 
position on the political stage by blaming any violence that might occur during 
the mass action on their opponents. Government held that the ‘ANC’s avowed 
intention to proceed with the mass action campaign, which it well knows could 
end in violence, bloodshed and suffering for its own people, casts serious doubt 
over its good faith as a negotiator.’59 The ANC charged that government’s ex-
tensive deployment of security forces was aimed at creating ‘a false sense of 
alarm and panic around the proposed programme of mass action’.60 The SAP 
embarked on an advertising campaign, tacitly promoting the idea that political 
violence was ‘black-on-black’. One advert displayed a photograph of a ‘neck-
lace’ victim, and warned of the possible consequences of mass action.61 Another 
quoted Martin Luther King’s ‘I have a dream’ speech and called for peaceful 
change. The ANC pointed out that police had confiscated weapons from IFP 
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supporters in Soweto on Sunday the 14th before returning them on Monday, just 
in time for the beginning of the mass action.62 The IFP retorted that police had 
returned cowhide shields and knobkerries, but not illegal firearms, axes and 
pangas.63 Themba Khoza highlighted SABC TV news footage of policemen 
jubilantly showing off the impounded weaponry to a crowd of alleged ANC 
supporters. The Weekly Mail called the occasion ‘a high profile media show’.64  
Inevitably, debate honed in on the course of June 16th and whether the day’s 
violence could be linked to mass action. The Human Rights Commission (HRC), 
known to have ANC-sympathisers in its ranks, reported that 22 politically-related 
deaths occurred on Tuesday, but said that few could be attributed to mass 
action.65 It noted that 10 of the fatalities were identified as ANC supporters, 
while the affiliation of the other fatalities was unknown. According to the HRC, 
63 had died in political violence during the course of the week, whereas 54 had 
died in the previous week. IFP monitors claimed ‘more than 40’ deaths occurred 
on Tuesday, many of which were allegedly linked to mass action. Commissioner 
of Police, General Johan van der Merwe, said the campaign’s first day passed 
without serious incident. He was contradicted by Minister of Law and Order 
Hernus Kriel, who announced a police investigation into possible links between 
mass action and the murder of at least 34 people in Reef townships since the 
previous day. Kriel claimed it was indisputable that the mass action contributed 
to a climate of violence. His claim was believable, yet narrow in its apportioning 
of blame. As the University of the Witwatersrand’s Project for the Study of 
Violence (PSV) argued, ‘government, political interest groups and the mass 
media actively contribute to a climate of violence by continually referring to 
violence instead of peace.’66 In blaming their opponents for the violence whilst 
portraying themselves as ‘advocates of nonviolence’, parties contributed to a 
mood of mutual suspicion that encouraged people on the ground to pre-empt 
violence against themselves by unleashing it upon others. On Tuesday the 16th, 
the struggle to lay blame for the violence was hotly contested. The odds would 
change the following day.  
Politics on the eve of the Boipatong massacre 
On the eve of the Boipatong massacre, South Africa’s dislocated social fabric lay 
undone along many of its seams, yet taut with tensions, as meanings were pulled 
in opposing directions. The struggle for a new political order with new political 
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identities seemed as though it could go either way. De Klerk’s reputation in 
South Africa and abroad was not far from earlier peaks. As the politician who 
had heralded the new era of negotiation, he continued to enjoy broad recognition 
as a great South African reformist. His referendum victory over the conservatives 
had reinforced this status. Furthermore, his groundbreaking reforms had taken 
wind out of the revolutionary sails of the ANC. Yet, not all was well for de 
Klerk. The country’s embattled economy was in desperate need of capital-
inflows and a return to growth. The NP’s insistence on excessive minority 
powers had been instrumental to the deadlock in negotiations, and was likely to 
tarnish the President’s standing among the country’s majority. The escalation of 
violence, along with mounting evidence of third force involvement, posed a 
further threat to his reputation. However, the popular notion of third force 
violence remained vague, with many revelations still to come. Government had 
significant leeway to finger the ANC as an impediment to a peaceful, negotiated 
transition. The airing of hawkish ANC sentiments and the call to mass action 
appeared at odds with the prevailing spirit of dialogue. Debilitated by internal 
national and local power struggles, the ANC was also at pains to defuse conflict 
with the IFP. Nevertheless, the return to mass politics also threatened to revive 
the ANC to its pre-negotiations position of strength, gained through the broad-
based mass democratic movement repeatedly forcing the hand of government. 
The call to mass action raised the stakes and intensified mutual suspicion. 
National politics were brought down from their floating heights, back toward the 
ground, where struggles over meaning would assume more physical forms. 
  
  
3 
The politics of the Boipatong  
massacre: 18th – 22nd June 1992 
I can no longer explain to our people why we keep on talking peace to men who are con-
ducting a war against us, men of corruption who kill innocent people.  
Nelson Mandela reacts to the Boipatong massacre, ANC rally in Evaton, 21 June 19921 
 
There are only two conclusions which we can draw from this statement: Either he genuinely 
believes his accusation to be true or he is strategically using the Boipatong tragedy as an 
excuse to break off negotiations and to sweep up support for the ANC’s campaign of mass 
action, with the intention of making the country ungovernable and of pursuing the uncon-
stitutional seizure of power.  
Minister of Constitutional Development Roelf Meyer responds to Mandela, 22 June 19922 
 
This chapter is concerned with narratives that arose in the days after the Boi-
patong massacre. In examining this immediate moment, it is not so concerned 
with aftermath, as with the making of an aftermath. The Boipatong massacre left 
in its wake a new opening, an empty metaphor waiting to be infused with 
symbolism. Interested parties plunged into this opening, colliding with each other 
on the political stage in a bid to saturate it with their own meanings. My focus 
here lies primarily with the ANC, quick to take the upper hand. Like many 
massacres before and after, the Boipatong massacre could very easily have faded 
into insignificance. The ANC decided otherwise. Even if the truths it posited 
were contentious, ANC manoeuvrings in the days after the massacre gained the 
organisation massive political capital, with pronounced political consequences.    
Early allegations 
Reporters arriving in Boipatong on the morning of June 18th stumbled upon a 
resurrection of the previous night’s horror. An estimated 300 KwaMadala ‘impi’ 
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(armed Zulu men) had advanced on Boipatong in broad daylight, wielding 
spears, shields, pangas, axes and firearms.3 Boipatong SDU members had re-
grouped during the night and were threatening to retaliate.4 Anticipating a 
counterattack, the ‘impi’ came to meet them, only to find themselves in a tense 
standoff with security forces. Several hundred police and troops lined up next to 
the road leading to Slovo Park as terrified residents scrambled to get behind 
them. The Star reported that a woman was seen rooted in a pool of her own urine, 
crying ‘God help us! God help us!’5 After several minutes the road was deserted, 
with the exception of the two armed forces facing each other 50 metres apart. The 
Star’s reporter on the scene was transfixed, ‘The impis crept up and down the 
pavement, walking about 10 paces before sitting down once more in complete 
silence.’6 Unable to match the firepower of the security forces, the frustrated 
‘impi’ withdrew to their hostel soon thereafter. The dynamics of the stand-off, of 
township residents scurrying behind a protective police cordon to flee advancing 
hostel marauders, was hardly suggestive of police complicity in the Boipatong-
KwaMadala conflict. Years later Rian Malan wrote that in light of the standoff, 
the previous night’s ‘massacre initially appeared to be “black-on-black”. As 
such, it was of little use to ANC spin doctors.’7 Tellingly, the incident went 
considerably underreported. The Star’s firsthand account published on the 19th 
was supplanted days later by The Sunday Star, which downplayed the protective 
role the security forces had adopted. The Sunday Star claimed pithily that there 
had been a standoff between impi and ‘hundreds’ of township residents, before 
police instructed the impi to go home.8 Foremost amongst newspaper headlines 
on the 19th was the allegation that the massacre had not been ‘black-on-black’.   
The ANC was quick to take control of the media’s interaction with the people 
of Boipatong. On the morning of the 18th, ANC officials went around Boipatong 
instructing residents not to talk to police or outsiders.9 Those wishing to make 
statements were asked to report to a local school, where they found repre-
sentatives of the HRC and Peace Action. Both organisations monitored township 
violence and included ANC-supporting members. Journalists arriving in Boipa-
tong were guided around the township and introduced to witnesses, including 
witnesses who backed claims of police complicity. The ANC made its first public 
statement regarding the massacre to the South African Press Association (SAPA) 
at around midday. Spokesperson Ronnie Mamoepa moved decisively to shape 
popular perceptions of the massacre to ANC advantage, even if the allegations he 
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made were contentious at best. In a patent display of ignorance, he put the death 
toll at five.10 The gist of his statement was strongly accusatory, resolute in its 
condemnation of the state for playing a pivotal role in the massacre, 
 
The attackers were brought into the township in police casspirs. There is evidence that the 
police also assisted in the attack. The SAP had ignored warnings that Boipatong was about to 
be ransacked. They helped the impi by blasting self-defence units off the streets with tear-gas 
and live ammunition. Shortly thereafter, police were seen escorting groups of armed men 
from KwaMadala hostel into the township. Later they were seen off-loading armed men at 
various points ... In those homes where the attackers could not gain entry, police used 
casspirs to break down walls and enable the attackers to assault residents and loot their 
furniture and other valuables ... The attackers were seen loading their loot on to police 
vehicles or vehicles belonging to the Vaal Commando of the SADF.11    
 
Police later acknowledged that the Powerville riot squad had dispersed the 
township SDU, ‘the Boipatong Boys’, on the evening of the 17th. However, the 
SAP also alleged that the squad had been attacked three times before retaliating 
with birdshot.12 Rather than actively seeking to disperse the SDU, police were 
allegedly forced to defend themselves from petrol bomb attack.13 The Indepen-
dent Board of Inquiry (IBI), another monitoring organisation with ANC sup-
porters among its membership, published a statement from an SDU member 
which corresponded loosely to the police version of events. Johannes Nakedi 
held that police in a Nyala approached him and other youths in Boipatong soon 
after 8pm. When the police asked why they were patrolling, the youths said they 
were worried about an Inkatha attack. Police answered scornfully that they 
should go to bed since they had no firearms. The youths took offence and threw 
stones at the police, who responded with birdshot and teargas.14 According to 
SDU members, the police squad then moved around the township using birdshot 
and teargas to disperse other SDU patrols. Five additional incidents were re-
ported.15 Whether one side could be held singly responsible for the clashes 
remained inconclusive. 
The SAP received at least three warnings prior to the massacre. The first two 
came from concerned Vaal resident Watch Mathibedi and Reverend Paul Verryn 
of the Soweto Methodist Church. Both called the SAP before 8 pm on the 
evening of the 17th, reporting that Vaal residents had told them violence was 
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imminent.16 Verryn heard there might be violence that night. Ramaphosa later led 
a 1000-strong march to police offices in Braamfontein, demanding to know why 
police took no action on Verryn’s warning.17 Police were quick to point out that 
the given location had not been Boipatong. Mathibedi had warned of an 
impending Inkatha attack on Sebokeng, 10 km north of Boipatong. Verryn’s 
informants singled out Sebokeng, as well as Bophelong, 5 km west of Boipatong. 
The third warning was more serious. Meshack Theoane, a petrol attendant 
working at a filling station between Boipatong and KwaMadala on the night of 
the massacre, had seen a large contingent of armed men cross the main road 
between the township and the hostel at around 9:30 pm.18 Theoane rang an alarm 
connected through a security company to the Vanderbijlpark SAP. Police arrived 
promptly but allegedly showed little interest in what Theoane had seen. He was 
removed from the station, purportedly for his own safety. Sounds of gunfire and 
looting could be heard in the distance as he was taken away. Theoane was sacked 
two days later.19 He later testified to the Goldstone Commission that his em-
ployer fired him because he had given information about what he had seen to the 
ANC. His employer, Jannie van Zyl, held that Theoane dismissed himself by not 
coming to work after picking up his wages two days after the massacre.20 While 
Theoane’s testimony called police motives into question, it was not clear whether 
their futile response could be ascribed to conspiracy, indifference or the timid 
caution of a handful of men ill-equipped to stop 300 armed impi.     
In the days following the massacre, testimonies of named witnesses alleging 
police complicity filtered into the press. The IBI produced a summary of witness 
statements. ANC advocates Nicholls, Cambanis, Koopasammy and Pillay, in pre-
paration for the Goldstone Commission, compiled an outline of the event based 
upon witness testimonies. Together, these documents reproduced 44 testimonies 
suggesting police complicity.21 Testimonies ranged from sightings of police in 
the vicinity of attacks to direct participation. The documents named 18 witnesses 
who allegedly saw police or white men attacking residents during the massacre. 
While the press named far fewer witnesses, images of white skin and sounds of 
white men speaking Afrikaans abounded in the media. Novuyo Makheleni said 
she heard men kick open the door and come into her house, ‘I peeped through 
and I saw a white man who had his face painted black. He had a revolver with 
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him while two blacks had a panga and a spear each ... The white man kicked the 
kitchen unit behind which I was hiding and said “is klaar” and they walked 
out.’22 Simon Moloi said he awoke to gunshots and the screams of a woman. He 
and his wife Elizabeth followed the cries outside, where they saw two black men 
hacking his neighbour and her two children with axes. Further in the distance 
stood two camouflaged white men who shouted in Zulu, ‘Let us kill the dogs!’ 
before opening fire with R-5 rifles. The couple ran to the back of their property 
where they tried to escape through a barbed wire fence. Simon made it through 
the fence and was helping Elizabeth, who was eight-months pregnant, when a 
hail of gunfire forced him to take off. He fled in his underpants to a nearby 
swamp, where he spent the night. He returned the next morning to find Eliza-
beth’s dead body wrapped in a blanket next to the fence.23  
Some allegations were less convincing. Tuis Matope and his wife were hiding 
under the bed in their shack when they allegedly heard a white man saying 
‘Moenie praat nie, skiet net.’24 Asked how he knew it was a white man, Matope 
answered that he ‘just knew’.25 Wilson Moloi said he heard white men when his 
house was attacked, but later claimed that he saw them when he climbed onto his 
roof. His adult daughter said it was too dark to identify anyone, and that during 
the attack he had locked himself in a bedroom.26 Weeping over her cousin’s 
body, Martha Hlengete insisted she ‘saw white skin.’27 Five men burst through 
her door. Four were black Zulu-speakers with spears and machetes; the fifth was 
a white Afrikaans-speaking man with a gun. Martha Hlele survived an attack by 
gunmen with AK-47s, ‘among them a white man disguised in a balaclava’.28 Her 
two grandsons were killed in the attack. In addition to US News’ ‘Martha 
Hlengete’ and The Star’s ‘Martha Hlele’, the IBI’s ‘Martha Hlehledi’ saw a 
white man among five attackers wearing balaclavas, all of whom could speak 
Zulu.29 While accounts seemingly drawn from the same testimony disagreed, 
accounts taken from different testimonies were often at pains to fare any better.   
The IBI and Nicholls et al documents outlined 30 testimonies alleging the 
presence of security force vehicles in Boipatong during the massacre, nine of 
which also claimed that police or whites were seen attacking residents. Only six 
of the 30 aforesaid testimonies claimed to have seen security force vehicles 
offloading men. By contrast, The Star reported that it could find nobody in 
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Boipatong who had seen men dropped off by security force vehicles.30 The 
Saturday Star only named Johannes Mokonya, who allegedly saw armed men 
clambering out of a casspir driven by a white man.31 If casspirs had transported 
200-300 attackers into Boipatong, as Mamoepa said they had, residents would 
have woken to the portentous rumble of between 10 and 15 armoured personnel 
carriers trundling into their neighbourhood. Some residents would not have been 
asleep, as it was only the late evening. More than a handful of people would have 
noticed the legion of armoured vehicles arriving, and their subsequent testimo-
nies would have substantiated one another extensively. Of the six aforementioned 
testimonies reproduced by the IBI or Nicholls et al, only Moses Mathibela’s IBI 
testimony identified some of the men offloaded as impi. The remaining five 
referred to ‘police’,32 ‘attackers’,33 ‘people’,34 ‘many men ... including whites’,35 
and ‘armed men’36. Mathibela explained that he had been watching television 
when he heard casspirs. Gazing out of his window, he saw a casspir turn out of 
the corner of Amatolo Street and come to a halt close to his house near the 
corner. He watched about 20 black men wearing white headbands climb out of 
the casspir, together with 10 camouflaged policemen. The casspir was joined by 
another, which flooded the area with light to assist the attackers.37 Mathibela 
most likely exaggerated the number transported in one casspir, designed to hold a 
crew of two plus 12 additional soldiers and associated gear.38 More importantly, 
in light of other alleged casspir sightings in and around Amatolo Street, Mathi-
bela’s account betrayed a key flaw in ANC accusations against the state. Witness 
allegations did little to corroborate one another, and sometimes appeared at odds.  
Charles Mofokeng said he and other SDU members were patrolling Amatolo 
Street at the time of the attacks, when two casspirs drove up and opened fire with 
teargas and birdshot.39 The casspirs then moved eastward toward Slovo Park. 
Mofokeng made no mention of black men with white headbands. Joseph Sello 
also claimed to see two casspirs moving along Amatolo around the same time. 
He held that the casspirs picked up ‘a group of armed men’, before moving on 
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towards Slovo Park.40 His account made no suggestion that these ‘armed men’ 
might not have been police. While Mofokeng and Sello’s accounts undermined 
Mathibela’s assertion that casspirs had offloaded impi along Amatolo, so too did 
accounts from elsewhere in Boipatong. By charting houses with broken windows 
and collating testimonies, Nicholls et al held that attackers entered Boipatong 
along Lekoa Street, before splitting into two groups.41 Amatolo was on the 
opposite side of the township to Lekoa, and neither group appeared to have 
travelled along it. Furthermore, no testimony in either of the two documents 
reported any attack upon Amatolo households. It seemed that only policemen had 
travelled by casspir along Amatolo towards Slovo Park, perhaps disembarking 
along the way to disperse an SDU. Some of the police onboard these vehicles 
may well have been black, possibly fuelling the belief that impi had been off-
loaded. On the other hand, Mathibela may have anticipated that the offloading of 
black policemen would absolve him from any charge of bad faith should his 
allegations be disproved.  
The issue of security force vehicles in Slovo Park presented another bouquet 
of discordant accounts. Isaak Modika claimed he saw three hippos behind Slovo, 
offloading ‘people’ who then advanced toward Bakoena Street.42 Diamond Lata 
saw casspirs at the back of Slovo shooting teargas at local youths, presumably 
SDU members, before offloading ‘men ... including whites’.43 ‘Ndandwe’ saw 
‘men’ emerging from mini-bus taxis on Bakoena.44 Edison Themba Koti alleged 
that ‘armed men’ got out of a casspir on Bakoena, before helping black men with 
headbands attack nearby households.45 Later he saw two casspirs following men 
carrying televisions and other looted items back towards KwaMadala. Koti was 
one of the few witnesses that gave evidence of conspicuous police collaboration 
with black men identifiable as impi. His accusations hardened at the Goldstone 
Commission, where he held that the black men with headbands had climbed out 
of the casspir.46  
Mamoepa implied there were a number of incidents in which casspirs broke 
down walls to allow attackers access to houses. Yet there was only one reported 
case. Abednego Mabuza, Jacob and Maria Mokoena, and Jerry Monatisa held 
that a few minutes after Flora Moshupe had been murdered in an attack on her 
Lekoa Street house, a casspir reversed over its fence. The casspir allegedly 
parked in the yard, and white men in camouflage were seen loading it with a 
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television, a hi-fi and other property before it departed.47 On the other hand, 
Moshupe’s family and her neighbour Zulu Ngwenya told The Saturday Star that 
the casspir had reversed over the fence so that warring impi could enter the house 
and murder her.48 Reporters for The Weekly Mail later attested to seeing ‘deep 
track marks on the grass’, but failed to pose the crucial question of when these 
marks were left.49 At the Goldstone Commission, Abednego Mabuza was asked 
to reconcile his testimony with evidence that at 22:30 he had flagged down a 
police casspir investigating reports of shooting in progress. Mabuza allegedly 
directed the vehicle to Moshupe’s house. Asked why he would take such action 
when under the impression that police were complicit, he ‘lapsed into sullen 
silence and refused to say anything at all.’50 The casspir was piloted by Sergeant 
Schlebusch of the Internal Stability Unit (ISU), tasked with maintaining stability 
in townships, and had been joined by a municipal police casspir. Schlebusch took 
heavy criticism from Nicholls et al after it was found that he reversed clumsily 
into Moshupe’s yard to investigate the attack rather than pursuing its perpetrators 
whom Mabuza told him had ‘just been there’.51   
ANC charges of police complicity were for the most part questionable, and in 
some instances plainly flawed. Boipatong consisted of two township complexes, 
lying adjacent to each other along a north-south axis. The impi had rampaged 
through the northern complex, roughly a square kilometre in size and slightly 
larger than the southern complex. In 1990, the population of Boipatong was 
estimated to number approximately 27,000.52 More than half of this population 
was compressed into the northern complex. According to Nicholls et al, the impi 
entered the northern complex through Lekoa Street on the south side, before 
dividing into two groups. One group moved eastward along Moshoeshoe toward 
Slovo Park, while the other moved northward up Lekoa before turning eastward 
along Bapedi and then Batsoana toward Slovo.53 The impi then moved back 
across the entire breadth of the northern complex and exited on its west side, 
along Bafokeng and Tugela. While Nicholls et al maintained that almost every 
house along these routes was attacked ‘in some way or another’, they also noted 
that other houses elsewhere in the township were attacked. It appeared thus ‘that 
smaller groups of attackers made isolated sorties off the major routes before 
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rejoining their fellow attackers’.54 That Boipatong could be subjected to such a 
far-reaching and thorough attack, yet produce such a thin and incoherent body of 
testimonies alleging police complicity was indicative of the weak foundation 
upon which ANC accusations were based. And yet, these accusations quickly 
developed into popular conviction, in Boipatong, South Africa, and around the 
world.  
Pilgrimages to Boipatong 
The open metaphor left in the wake of the Boipatong massacre, into which 
interested parties plunged and collided, was also a space to which many inte-
rested public figures travelled. Here in this space, once a small and unnoticed 
shanty town far off the beaten track of national politics, the stage was set for a 
medley of performances that would bring the etchings of a new political order 
much closer to realisation.  
After a three hour tour of Boipatong on Thursday the 18th with veteran SACP 
leader Joe Slovo, Cyril Ramaphosa told reporters, ‘It is becoming clear that 
government’s agenda is that they want to negotiate with an ANC that is 
powerless and has no following.’55 He claimed that police and the IFP sponsored 
the massacre, hoping to spread terror in the townships and discredit the ANC’s 
mass action campaign. Prior to the massacre, Kriel, his spokesperson Craig 
Kotze, Buthelezi and Khoza had all warned that mass action would result in 
violence.56 Ramaphosa countered accusingly, holding that violence fulfilled both 
their predictions and political agendas. Renewed attempts to attribute the vio-
lence to mass action would now hold little sway over popular sentiment. Adding 
to Ramaphosa’s condemnation, Slovo exclaimed, ‘We have just been through a 
warzone. People have been murdered in their beds, not by people in uniform, but 
we have absolutely no doubt that those who sent them wore police uniforms.’57 
Slovo and Ramaphosa appeared to withdraw tacitly from Mamoepa’s earlier 
accusations. Police had not perpetrated the attack, but together with Inkatha they 
had supervised and subsidised its perpetration. These subtle retractions would do 
little to defuse burgeoning popular anger toward police and Inkatha. However, 
the SAP and IFP were large, amorphous bodies with diverse elements. Rama-
phosa’s cunning was to tie them to an enemy with a legible face, ‘We charge 
President F W de Klerk with complicity in this slaughter.’58 Complicity went all 
the way up to the highest echelon of government. The effects of the Boipatong 
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massacre would not be confined to one township and its immediate surrounds. It 
was a tragedy that would have ramifications on a national and global scale.   
The following day, Friday the 19th, Desmond Tutu was in Boipatong to 
console its residents. ‘You can say “God where are you? Where are you when 
these things happen?” But we have a God and God will answer for us. Don’t let 
them drag you down into the mud. Don’t allow them to turn you into animals. 
God will answer for us.’59 The following week he told a congregation at St. 
George’s Cathedral in Cape Town that he had not recovered from what he saw in 
Boipatong. Talking about the incident where a casspir had reversed over a fence 
to allow impis access to Florence Mashope’s house, he said, ‘In Boipatong the 
people are not sophisticated people and it is unlikely they would have sat down 
and concocted the story.’60 Tutu’s views ignored the fallibility of eyewitness 
accounts. A key consideration would have been ‘hindsight bias effect’,61 whereby 
memory of an event is shaped by subsequent exposure to information about that 
event. Exposure to rumours circulating the township or to Mamoepa’s midday 
statement, for example, may well have shaped later recollections of the massacre. 
A further consideration was the possibility that witnesses had been asked 
‘leading questions’.62 After the massacre, they had sat down with ANC officials 
and monitors sympathetic to the ANC. Stories may not have been concocted, but 
the wording of questions may have guided narrators to different endings.63 Pastor 
Ray Macauley of the Rhema Church also visited Boipatong on the 19th, before 
publicising growing concerns about state complicity in the violence to congre-
gational audiences. In an open letter to de Klerk, he noted ‘a growing perception 
among moderate whites and blacks that allegations of police/Inkatha collusion 
are not wild political propaganda, but are in fact true and the Government is, in 
fact, party to promoting the violence.’64 
It would take President de Klerk a powerful gesture of conciliation to counter 
the weight of accusations against him. His activities on June 16 would only 
reinforce these charges of complicity. He had spent the day in talks with the IFP-
dominated KwaZulu Legislative Assembly in Ulundi.65 Criticising the ANC and 
its allies, he told the Assembly, ‘What we are not prepared to do is to exchange 
one form of domination with just another form of domination.’66 He went on, 
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‘Too many politicians are playing political games around the issue of violence 
and its underlying causes’, oblivious to the impending import of his words. This 
was the second time de Klerk had visited Ulundi. He made his first visit in May 
1991, two days before the Swanieville Massacre on the West Rand. On that 
occasion, a group of 1000 alleged IFP members killed 27 people, injured 30 
others, and razed 112 shanty houses in a two-hour dawn attack. Witnesses 
claimed that the attackers were backed by white balaclava-clad men who 
refrained from using the firearms they carried.67  
After receiving news of the massacre, de Klerk issued a statement expressing 
his shock and revulsion, and resolved to visit Boipatong on Saturday the 20th. 
Plans for the visit were leaked to the press the preceding evening, giving the 
ANC time to react. The ANC released a statement before the visit, denouncing it 
as ‘a cynical public relations exercise’, warning that de Klerk was not welcome 
in Boipatong, and demanding ‘action, not de Klerk’s crocodile tears’.68 On 
Saturday, de Klerk and Kriel flew by helicopter from Pretoria to a police depot 
near Boipatong. They then drove to the township in an armoured Mercedes, 
accompanied by a security car, several Nyala armoured personnel carriers, and a 
bus carrying members of the press. A police helicopter circled overhead. Glimps-
ing the approach of de Klerk’s entourage, Boipatong residents could be forgiven 
for expecting an invasion rather than a conciliatory visit. Peering through the 
bullet-proof windows of the Mercedes, de Klerk saw the surrounding crowd 
grow increasingly dense and menacing. People waved placards with statements 
such as, ‘To Hell with De Klerk and Your Inkatha Murderers’, ‘We Want Police 
Protection Not Murders’, and ‘De Klerk Kill Apartheid, Not Us’.69 Youths en-
circled his car, hammering on its roof, kicking its sides, and shouting ‘Go away, 
murderer!’70 Women leaned out of windows and yelled. The Mercedes came to a 
standstill where de Klerk had planned to get out and address the community. No 
sooner had the door been opened for him, than his security men pushed him back 
into the car and ordered the driver to vacate the area.71 Dodging makeshift 
barriers in the streets, De Klerk’s fleeing car hurtled over sidewalks, ‘scattering 
rubbish bins and sending chickens flying’.72 
The situation in Boipatong intensified when, after de Klerk’s retreat, police 
gunned down a youth. Residents later told reporters that a policeman on top of a 
Nyala shot the youth in the neck from 80 metres away. Police claimed that the 
youth had hacked a crippled old man with a machete before turning on a 
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policeman who had called on him to stop.73 Residents said the machete found 
beside him had been placed by police. After the youth was shot, residents tried to 
retrieve his body but were met with a blockade of policemen. A tense standoff 
ensued on the dusty soccer field where the youth had fallen. The crowd became 
increasingly angry and provocative, yelling abuse and throwing stones at the 
police.74 One man was seen prodding a stick into the face of a policeman, who 
took a step back and cocked his shotgun.75 Women bared their breasts, hoping to 
embarrass the police into withdrawing so the body could be retrieved.76 Some 
individuals tried to push through the cordon. Each time they were shoved back, 
the uproar escalated. When a mortuary van appeared close by, it was attacked 
and a sergeant on board shot in the hand.77 When the lieutenant in charge of the 
van fired several warning shots into the ground with an R-5 rifle, the police 
blockade nearby reacted spontaneously with a volley of fire at point blank range. 
Journalist Alistair Sparks had been standing to the side of the faceoff,  
 
I dropped flat to the ground. ... I saw the face of a man only two or three yards away dis-
integrate. Beyond, people were falling and rolling in the dust. ... When the shooting stopped 
there was an eerie silence. I lifted my head and saw a field of carnage. ... The police were 
still in a line, down on one knee in their firing positions. Ten paces away one of them rose to 
his feet and began yelling in Afrikaans. “Who told you to shoot?” ... “I told you not to shoot 
without orders.”78     
 
Responding to the incident, police claimed brashly that since no casualties 
could be traced, television images of casualties must have been fabricated by 
members of the crowd feigning injury or death.79 The Star reported that two 
people had been killed and at least 29 injured in the shooting.80 Police failed to 
acknowledge the onset of a climate in which residents viewed them with intense 
distrust. Residents would likely have withdrawn with their wounded and dead, 
with no intention of confirming with police the casualties that they had inflicted.  
Later in the day, the arrival of Winnie Mandela revived a beleaguered crowd 
into brusque cheering. Giving voice to heightening ANC militancy, she exclaim-
ed before a crowd of residents, ‘We accept the challenge from de Klerk, from the 
government and the police. We are going to defend our people. We never said we 
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wanted peace at any price.’81 Yet the ANC’s finale was still waiting in the wings. 
Less than 24 hours after de Klerk’s retreat, ANC leader Nelson Mandela was in 
Boipatong.  
Mandela’s visit on the 21st was particularly distressing for him. In the forlorn 
spaces through which the massacre had moved, the sorrow of the afflicted 
became acutely tangible to him. As he walked through Slovo Park, a crowd of 
supporters followed. Their voices rising rhythmically in time to the stamping of 
their feet, they chanted, ‘People were killed here. Tell the truth.’82 Some called 
intermittently, ‘Bring us guns!’ Microphones were hastily erected for Mandela on 
the township soccer field, where police had opened fire on residents the previous 
day. The weight of their anger upon him was palpable in his words to them, ‘I am 
convinced we are no longer dealing with human beings but animals ... We will 
not forget what Mr de Klerk, the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party 
have done to our people. I have never seen such cruelty.’83 Later in the day, 
Mandela addressed a rally of 20,000 people in Evaton, next to Sebokeng. He saw 
banners reading ‘Mandela, give us guns’ and ‘Victory through battle not talk’.84 
He heard the crowds calling to him, ‘You are acting like lambs while the enemy 
is killing our people.’85 He responded with words that were vehement, but like 
Slovo and Ramaphosa before him, he backed away from Mamoepa’s earlier 
claims. Boipatong innocents, he exclaimed, ‘were not exempt from the bullets 
and spears of the faceless murderers who work closely with the regime and its 
security services.’86 The perpetrators were not part of the state, but they worked 
with it.  
There were misapprehensions in Mandela’s response to the Boipatong mas-
sacre. In Evaton, he contradicted Sparks’ eyewitness account of the shootings 
that followed de Klerk’s retreat. According to him, de Klerk was still in Boi-
patong at the time. An order to shoot had been given, most likely with de Klerk’s 
approval,    
 
An officer, in his [de Klerk’s] presence gave an order to shoot people without any 
provocation. It is not likely that an officer would give such an order in his presence without 
getting his permission. We are back to Sharpeville days and the gulf between the oppressed 
and the oppressor has overnight become unbridgeable.87 
 
In his autobiography, he remembered the massacre as a breaking point,     
 
                                                            
81  Reuters, ‘Angry crowd chases de Klerk from massacre scene’, 20 June 1992.  
82  Patrick Laurence, ‘Township pivotal in political war’, The Star, 22 June 1992. 
83  Ibid.  
84  Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, Abacus (London, 1994), p. 724.  
85  Business Day, ‘Comment – Day of mourning’, 24 June 1992.   
86  Mandela, Nelson Mandela Speaks, p. 174.  
87  Ibid, p. 177.  
34 
 
Most of the dead were women and children. It was the fourth mass killing of ANC people 
that week. People across the country were horrified by the violence and charged the govern-
ment with complicity. The police did nothing to stop the criminals and nothing to find them; 
no arrests were made, no investigation began. Mr de Klerk said nothing. I found this to be 
the last straw and my patience snapped. The government was blocking negotiations and at 
the same time waging a covert war against our people. Why then were we continuing to talk 
to them?88  
 
As we have seen, de Klerk did say something. And as we shall see, a police 
investigation was conducted and arrests were made. It seemed rash to posit the 
Boipatong massacre as a case of state-supported violence, when evidence of 
security force complicity was inconclusive. However, what rang true in Mande-
la’s response was his exasperation over the neglect of black people.  
‘Mr. de Klerk and his regime,’ Mandela told the Evaton crowd, ‘bear full 
responsibility for the violence in the country, and in these townships in parti-
cular.’89 As he explained, government had not moved to quell political violence, 
particularly rife in Vaal townships, even though it had the capacity to do so. In 
time-honoured fashion, police had maintained minimal presence in Boipatong, 
abdicating their duties of maintaining security and order, and allowing a mas-
sacre to pass through the township unhindered.90 Mandela wondered whether 
such ineptitude was deliberate. He maintained it was dubious that de Klerk 
should move so resolutely to express his upset over a massacre, when it was 
preceded by a series of massacres over which he had remained conspicuously 
mute. Not only had the state allowed violence to continue unabated, its actions 
had also promoted conflict. Mandela criticised government for bowing to IFP 
wishes by legalising the carrying of traditional weapons in public, for provo-
catively foreboding that mass action would end in violence, for de Klerk’s June 
16 visit to Ulundi where he had brazenly castigated the ‘democratic movement’, 
and for neglecting an earlier undertaking to curb violence emanating from hostels 
whilst phasing them out into family units. He repeated a damning analogy that he 
had used in May, before a committee of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU), ‘just as the Nazis in Germany killed people not because they were a 
threat to the security of the state, but because they were Jews, the National Party 
regime is killing our people simply because they are black.’91 ‘With his involve-
ment and that of his party in the violence,’ Mandela continued, de Klerk ‘had the 
temerity to visit an area where people’s feelings have been inflamed because 
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their beloved one’s were massacred with the same weapons of death which he 
had legalised.’92  
Mandela’s moral indignation over the Boipatong massacre reflected a some-
what nuanced consideration of state complicity. The state could be complicit 
either through acts of commission or omission.93 Third force activity fell over-
whelmingly into the acts of commission category, and there was little evidence of 
it in the Boipatong massacre. Allegations that security forces participated in, 
supervised or subsidised the attack were highly inconclusive. Mandela did little 
to moderate convictions that said otherwise; some of his statements even en-
couraged them. However, he did highlight the massacre as a glaring example of 
the state’s continued neglect of townships during a time of supposed transition. 
Deliberate failure to adequately police townships was complicity through omis-
sion. Later investigations into police activity in and around Boipatong on the 
night of the massacre ascertained that policing had been ‘woefully inadequate’.94 
The ANC was compelled to ask what motives lay behind such neglect, and 
whether such motives might lend more credibility to allegations of complicity 
through acts of commission. Indeed, if security forces were inclined to police 
townships inadequately so as to destabilise them, then what else were they 
capable of? 
Drawing to the end of his oration, Mandela extended a broad appeal for 
international intervention. He called on the anti-Apartheid movement overseas to 
strengthen its campaigns, and place renewed pressure on governments to delay 
the lifting of sanctions against South Africa. He said he found it disturbing that 
the international community had remained so silent about ongoing massacres in 
the country, whilst western governments continued to cooperate with de Klerk. In 
April, Mandela had tried in vain to obtain United Nations (UN) intervention.95 
He would try again, ‘I am going to request the Secretary General of the UN to 
call a special session of the Security Council on the massacres committed by Mr. 
de Klerk and his regime. I will address that session.’96 Finally, Mandela proposed 
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the establishment of a disaster fund for victims of violence in the country. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross would administer the fund. The ANC 
had already made an initial donation of R100,000. Mandela added that he hoped 
government would contribute more than it had given to Inkatha.  
A three-pronged strategy 
In an interview some days after Mandela spoke in Evaton, Professor Tom Lodge, 
who later became a biographer of Mandela, told The Citizen that ‘Mandela’s 
speech was not that of a statesman.’97 Lodge held that the ANC should have 
maintained a dignified silence about de Klerk’s violent reception in Boipatong, 
rather than making political capital out of it. But while Mandela may have 
disappointed Lodge, his behaviour was the product of circumstances bearing 
down upon him. Despite the CODESA II deadlock, de Klerk had seemed as 
confident as ever. The president’s sights were firmly set on winning ANC con-
cessions over minority rights, and ultimately leading a right-of-centre alliance to 
victory in the country’s first democratic polls. Troubled by de Klerk’s aspira-
tions, the ANC was also sensitive to an array of possible underhand methods he 
might use to realise them. While ANC leaders were not as certain of state 
complicity in the Boipatong massacre as they professed to be, the massacre still 
raised disquieting questions.  
It was common cause that the bulk of the attackers were KwaMadala resi-
dents, but how had some of them come to carry AK-47s and other firearms? 
Years later, an incarcerated Eugene de Kock told journalist Jacques Pauw that 
while C-10 had not been involved at Boipatong, its weapons may well have been 
used by the attackers. De Kock noted that the massacre took place during a 
period of increased weapons supply to Inkatha. Most of these weapons were 
distributed to hostels.98 Arming the impi was just one of many possible avenues 
of third force complicity. It was quite possible that security forces were more 
directly involved. Three months before the Boipatong massacre, five policemen 
had been found guilty of murder in the 1988 Trust Feeds Massacre, wherein 11 
people had been killed at a funeral vigil. Working with Inkatha and the KZP, 
SAP members had attempted to disrupt the Trust Feeds community in Natal and 
oust its residents’ association, thereby allowing Inkatha to gain control of the 
area.99 The month before the Boipatong massacre, Transkei leader Bantu Holo-
misa leaked to the press a 1985 top secret military intelligence document in 
which the incumbent chief of military intelligence requested the ‘immediate re-
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moval from society’ of several Eastern Cape activists, all of whom were murder-
ed two weeks later.100  
What of police in the Vaal area? Two days after the Boipatong massacre, ANC 
Youth League member Mosotho Tsotetsi claimed in a sworn statement that in 
May he had been abducted to KwaMadala. While he was held at the hostel, he 
allegedly saw Warrant Officer Thys Nolte in a planning session with Inkatha 
members, plotting to kill local ANC leaders.101 Tsotetsi claimed that another 
white man present had offered him money to attack ANC leaders’ houses and 
bomb schools. A week after the massacre, Nicholls et al submitted a memo-
randum to Goldstone, arguing that the SAP had failed to conduct effective in-
vestigations, ‘after countless reports to them by the Vaal Council of Churches of 
ongoing abductions, kidnappings, rape, assaults, intimidation and murders con-
nected to the KwaMadala Hostel.’102 The memo provided a comprehensive list of 
such incidents. It did not acknowledge the likelihood that the ‘random incidents 
of violence’ it reported were part of a cycle of violence arising in July 1990. Yet, 
that a cycle of violence existed did not prove the state’s innocence. In this in-
stance, police were accused of allowing violence to continue unabated. That 
Tsotetsi’s statement may have been fabricated, and that only a weak body of 
testimonies alleged police involvement in the Boipatong massacre did not prove 
state innocence either. Security force members were not unused to covering their 
tracks. The ANC lacked the time and resources to implicate them through private 
investigations, and the state had little reason to try and catch out its own 
personnel. What if the state, or right-wing elements within the state, had plans for 
more Boipatong massacres? With each massacre, the ANC would appear less 
capable of protecting its people. And as long as the notion of ‘black-on-black’ 
violence retained strong currency, government could continue to hold the ANC 
responsible. Indeed, if the ANC had mistaken suspicions, the politics of the early 
1990s justified them.  
Blaming the government for the Boipatong massacre was a matter of tactical 
expedience. Firstly, regardless of the degree of state complicity, laying compre-
hensive blame at its doorstep would likely encourage the deterrence of future 
complicity. If the commanding heights of the state had sanctioned third force 
activity or ineffective policing of townships, the accusations levelled would bring 
about pressure for change. If complicity did not travel so far up the state 
hierarchy, ANC leaders were adamant that the higher echelons still had the 
capacity to exert change. Curbing the debilitating effects of third force activity 
and township violence upon the ANC might not be in the interests of govern-
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ment, unless failure to do so posed a severe threat to its public standing. 
Secondly, the relationship between government and Inkatha posed a grave threat 
to the ANC. The ANC desperately needed to discredit this relationship. Other-
wise, government support would continue to embolden Inkatha militancy. Third-
ly, the ANC had just begun a mass action campaign that could not afford to lose 
momentum. It was imperative that the ANC convince government, the people of 
South Africa and the world that it had the mass support needed to bring it to 
power following political settlement. To this end, the Boipatong massacre was 
precisely what the ANC needed. It provided an indispensable means of gaining 
popular legitimacy whilst discrediting government, of leaping forward off the 
back of a staggering opponent.  
The ANC had been divided over the meaning of mass action. The hawks 
among its leadership pressed for mass insurrection, whereas the doves described 
mass action as activism that would be permissible within the legal confines of an 
established democracy. In the days after the Boipatong massacre, support for the 
hawks increased. The growing conviction that the state was complicit propagated 
a hawkish stance, for it promoted the idea of a ruthless, underhand government 
that would need transformation forced upon it. Engulfed by a crescendo of 
anguish and enmity, rising from party radicals and followers on the ground, 
Mandela changed his irenic tune so it could be heard above the clamour of his 
audience. He moderated his change of tune to an extent, imploring the Evaton 
crowd to maintain ‘the strictest discipline’. ‘Do not allow yourselves to be pro-
voked into violence.’103 However, his capitulation to party radicals lay in his 
condemnation of the state with uncharacteristic vitriol. Now that the movement’s 
peaceable leader had validated their anger, ANC members would prove more 
susceptible to the whims of the radicals. Bowing further to the hardliners, 
Mandela moved to call off negotiations. He announced that a bilateral meeting 
between the ANC and the NP on 23 June would be cancelled. In its place, the 
ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) would hold an emergency meeting. 
‘The voice of our people is coming out strong and clear. Their demand is: no 
more contact with the regime.’104 
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4 
Aftermath: 
23rd June – 26th September 1992 
Pop singer, Brenda Fassie penned the lyrics for ‘Boipatong’1 
 
Male vocal: 
Thula, thula mama, everything is gonna be alright 
Brenda Fassie: 
These are the people that have no food, no shelter and nowhere to go 
Oh no! They set up homes wherever they go, but it’s not easy oh no 
 
Chorus: 
They call them squatters, look what they go through, they don’t deserve this no no! 
Boipatong we give you hope and sympathy 
Boipatong may your loved ones rest in peace 
 
They were attacked and brutally killed 
I’m talking about babies and old people too 
No we must help them to get back on their feet 
We can’t allow this to happen again 
 
[Chorus x 2] 
May God help the people, help the people 
 
Male vocal: 
We gotta stop all this violence 
We gotta mission and peace is the word 
We gotta help each other survive 
Lets group together and unite as one 
 
[Chorus] 
 
Within days, the Boipatong massacre had become a popular symbol of unre-
mitting injustice, of crushing adversity. It represented the dashing of hope, the 
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distress of transition in collapse. Under the watchful eye of ANC officials, stories 
of Inkatha and police brutality in the massacre diffused outward from Boipatong. 
Politicians travelled to the township to pay homage to its dead, heralding its new 
eminence as a shrine of South African politics. The people of Boipatong and its 
surrounds were sure to have their say. Welcoming some and shunning others, 
their interaction with outside politics was decisive. Boipatong was a microcosm 
for a nascent yet endangered democratic nation, and its people had spoken. On 
Tuesday June 23, the ANC NEC sat to consolidate its new capital, to translate the 
symbolic value of the Boipatong massacre into policy. The NEC presented its 
demands, and as a wave of international intervention welled in response, South 
Africa teetered increasingly on a brink that would bring government to gradual 
submission.   
ANC NEC demands  
In line with Mandela’s June 21 assurances, the ANC NEC voted to break off both 
CODESA and bilateral talks with government. In a statement of the emergency 
meeting, the NEC described the Boipatong massacre as ‘one of the most chilling 
instances of the consequences of the actions of the FW de Klerk regime. Before 
the people of South Africa and the bar of international opinion it cannot escape 
culpability.’ The NEC accused the government of pursuing ‘a strategy which 
embraces negotiations, together with systematic covert operations, including 
murder, involving its security forces and surrogates.’ Tacitly acknowledging that 
it would be at pains to successfully implicate security forces, the NEC com-
plained that the NP’s control of the state apparatus allowed it ‘the space to deny 
and cover up its role in fostering and fomenting the violence.’2 Turning to the 
question of negotiations, the NEC held that the deadlock could be ascribed to the 
NP’s dogged refusal to prioritise democratic change over white minority veto 
powers. Emphasizing that democratic change was paramount, the NEC listed a 
broad range of demands that the state would need to work towards if negotiations 
were to reconvene.    
The NEC demanded that government agree to the creation of a demo-
cratically-elected and sovereign Constituent Assembly to draft and adopt a new 
constitution, as well as the establishment of an Interim Government of National 
Unity. It demanded that the state end ‘its campaign of terror against the people 
and the democratic movement.’ To this end, it called on government to terminate 
all covert operations including hit squad activity, to demobilise all special forces 
as well detachments made up of foreign nationals, to suspend and prosecute all 
officers and security force personnel involved in violence, and to end all re-
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pression in the self-governing and ‘so-called independent states’. The NEC 
claimed that between July 1990 and April 1992, there had been 261 attacks on 
township residents by ‘hostel inmates’, leading to 1 207 deaths and 3 697 in-
juries. It urged government to honour agreements relating to hostels reached with 
the ANC almost a year before, in particular that they be fenced, guarded per-
manently by security forces, monitored by ‘multilateral peace structures’, cleared 
of illegal occupants, searched regularly with the participation of multilateral 
monitors, and gradually phased out into family units. The NEC demanded further 
that the carrying of all dangerous weapons in public, including ‘so-called cultural 
weapons’, be completely banned. In resisting hostel reforms and the banning of 
traditional weapons, government had protected the interests of the IFP’s pre-
dominantly migrant membership in the Transvaal. Its hesitations now faced 
growing scrutiny. Regarding the Boipatong massacre, the NEC insisted that 
government agree to the establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry 
into the massacre. This Commission should also investigate all other acts of 
political violence, as well as the state of international monitoring. Finally, the 
NEC demanded the release of all political prisoners, and the repeal of all re-
pressive legislation 
In addition to demands aimed at government, the NEC appealed to both South 
Africans and the international community. It challenged South Africans ‘to unite 
in a broad movement for democracy, peace and justice now. We all, black and 
white together, share the responsibility to stop the regime from plunging our 
country into chaos and anarchy. ... Unity and disciplined struggle remain the 
surest basis for realising peace and stability.’ It called for a National Day of 
Mourning in solidarity with the victims of the Boipatong massacre on 29 June, 
the day that its dead would be buried. It asked the international community to 
observe the Day of Mourning, in particular to all workers across the world to 
avoid handling South African goods on the day. It also urged the international 
community to place renewed pressure on ‘the de Klerk regime to bring violence 
to an end and to commit itself to solutions based on internationally accepted 
democratic principles.’ Lastly, it appealed to the United Nations Security Council 
‘to convene as a matter of urgency to undertake measures which will help stop 
the violence and reinforce our efforts aimed at bringing about a democratic 
order.’ 
International intervention  
As the NEC voted to break off talks, President de Klerk was out of the country 
on a diplomatic visit to Spain. Cutting short his visit, he was back in South Africa 
two days later, hoping to stem the tide turning increasingly against him. His 
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thwarted outing to Boipatong had been labelled his Waterloo.3 His embittered 
claims that the ANC had fomented the township’s violent reaction to his arrival 
did little to disarm the invective against him. As TV images of the bungled visit 
and the casualties left in its trail flashed around the world, diplomats began 
anticipating foreign demands for international monitoring and sanctions.4 Both 
Mandela and the NEC emergency meeting worked to encourage such sentiments 
by calling for international intervention. Two days after Mandela proposed the 
establishment of a disaster fund for victims of the violence, which the ANC 
donated R100,000 to, the US Embassy in Pretoria announced a donation of 
R700,000.5 The Embassy’s gesture signalled the swift impact of Mandela’s call 
for intervention. Appeals for international monitoring of the transition process in 
South Africa had first emerged in early 1992. A delegation of church leaders led 
by Desmond Tutu met with de Klerk in March, urging government to ‘recognise 
the value of an international monitoring mechanism’ in coping with instability.6 
Riding high on his referendum victory, de Klerk haughtily dismissed the pro-
posal as an infringement of South African sovereignty and a challenge to the 
legitimacy of his government.7 Languishing in the wake of the Boipatong mas-
sacre, he began to signal his acquiescence.  
Faced with heightened instability and a groundswell of international reaction, 
de Klerk moved to relinquish a modest amount of control before losing much 
more. In a meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, he acknow-
ledged that South Africa needed international support to stimulate the process of 
negotiations. Official Spanish sources reported that he was willing to accept 
international mediation as long as there was no interference with the republic’s 
internal affairs.8 His hasty return to South Africa coincided with the arrival of 
Chief Emeka Anyaoku, Secretary General of the 50-nation Commonwealth, who 
sought talks with both de Klerk and Mandela. Anyaoku’s visit came amid reports 
that both the Commonwealth and the European Community (EC) were consid-
ering sending observers to the country.9 Anticipating Britain’s assumption of the 
presidency of the 12-nation EC on 1 July, the British foreign Office invited UN 
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Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to London to discuss the South African 
crisis with John Major’s government.10 Within days of de Klerk’s return to South 
Africa, it was reported that Boutros-Ghali had accepted a government invitation 
to visit South Africa on a fact-finding mission.11 
In consenting to international monitoring, de Klerk hoped to appease the ANC 
whilst alleviating a global chorus of condemnation. In addition to accepting 
foreign ‘fact-finding missions’, he showed partial deference to the NEC’s insist-
ence on an international commission of inquiry into the Boipatong massacre. He 
mooted the idea of a suitably qualified person of ‘international repute’ to assess 
the Goldstone Commission’s pending inquiry into the massacre, as well as ‘one 
or two experts of international standing’ to evaluate police investigations into the 
massacre.12 Government later appointed the former chief justice of India P. N. 
Bhagwati to assess Goldstone’s inquiry. Dr. P.A.J. Waddington, Director of 
Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Reading in England, and two Lon-
don metropolitan police officers were appointed to evaluate police investigations. 
But as both de Klerk and his opponents were aware, there were different degrees 
of consent and condemnation. And while de Klerk sought to placate international 
opinion, the ANC moved to rouse it.    
Fortuitously for the ANC, the Council of Ministers of the OAU was meeting 
in Dakar in late June. Mandela attended, appealing for international intervention. 
In response, the OAU agreed to call for the ‘urgent convening’ of the UN 
Security Council ‘to examine the issue of violence in South Africa and to take all 
appropriate action to put an end to it.’13 It also mandated a ministerial delegation 
to take the South African case to New York. While Boutros-Ghali was rumoured 
to be averse to a Security Council meeting addressing the Boipatong massacre 
and the breakdown of negotiations,14 he now accepted the need for Security 
Council debate and expressed himself in favour of UN intervention.15 On 15 July, 
Mandela addressed the UN Security Council in New York, as he had promised in 
Evaton. ‘An extremely critical situation has arisen,’ he told his audience, ‘We 
have been confronted with an escalating cycle of violence.’16 He warned, ‘Re-
presentatives of the South African government will also address you. However 
sweet-sounding the words they may utter, they represent a system of white-
minority rule to which the United Nations is opposed.’ At a news conference the 
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same day, Mandela said the ANC ‘would like sanctions to be re-imposed’, and 
chided President Bush for lifting them prematurely.17 After listening to a 
comprehensive list of allegations of state complicity in violence, the 15-member 
Security Council voted unanimously to send a representative of the Secretary-
General to South Africa to investigate the violence. Former Secretary of State in 
the Carter administration, Cyrus Vance, was appointed to this position. Con-
cerned that the mass action might result in violence before Vance could report 
back to the Security Council, Boutros-Ghali sent a provisional 10-member team 
to South Africa to observe developments. 
Even if minor, the novel presence of the UN’s provisional observer team in 
early August effectively demonstrated the function of ‘preventative deployment’ 
for which UN observer missions were intended.18 In Meadowlands, UN monitor 
Shola Omoreigi helped resolve a potentially violent confrontation between police 
and a 1,500-strong crowd of ANC supporters surrounding the police station. 
After tense negotiation, an ANC delegation was allowed into the station to 
present their demands.19 Head of the provisional team, Hisham Omayad, attended 
an ANC rally at a football stadium in Daveyton where some 2,000 people 
gathered. Tensions were high after police shot dead an ANC member the 
previous week, allegedly because he had tried to stab a policeman. Police had 
also refused to grant the ANC permission for a locally-held march. Standing 
before the crowd, Omayad was accompanied by Colonel Simon Tshabalala, one 
of South Africa’s highest ranking black policemen. As the crowd chanted, 
Tshabalala translated dolefully for Omayad, ‘You ugly thing, Tshabalala, we’re 
going to kill you tonight! You ugly thing, we’re going to cut off your private 
parts!’20 Omayad defused the situation by securing permission from the officers 
present for the march to go ahead. To the crowd’s jubilation, he also arranged for 
Tshabalala’s departure from the stadium.  
As the presence of the UN’s provisional observers began to take effect, Cyrus 
Vance was already in the country. Arriving in late July, he set up office in 
Johannesburg’s august Carlton Hotel. He had planned to attend a Sunday mor-
ning church service in Boipatong, but cancelled after senior officials in govern-
ment warned him it would be unsafe. When Vance met with Judge Goldstone to 
discuss his commission, the Judge voiced a different opinion. As Goldstone 
wrote in his autobiography, ‘I told him he should make a point of being seen in 
black townships and not give the impression that his visit to South Africa 
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consisted only of meetings in a city hotel.’21 With Vance’s approval, Goldstone 
arranged for regional ANC leader Tokyo Sexwale to accompany the two of them 
to Boipatong. Showing the prudence he was renowned for, Goldstone also ar-
ranged with Themba Khoza to visit Crossroads, a nearby Inkatha-supporting 
shanty settlement. Goldstone avoided informing government of the visits, thereby 
obviating government efforts to send large armed police contingents along with 
them. The journey had a strong effect on Vance,    
 
The visit to Boipatong and Crossroads was remarkable for Vance – or so he has told me on 
more than one occasion since then. Within minutes of our arrival, word spread that we were 
there. Thousands of people converged on us, and at both stops the friendship and appre-
ciation of the people was palpable. ... Following closely upon the Vance visit, a report he 
submitted to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and to the Security Council commended the 
work of my commission. His comments were reflected in Resolution 772 of the council, 
dated 17 August 1992.22  
 
Resolution 772 urged Boutros-Ghali to assist in strengthening structures set up 
under the September 1991 National Peace Accord, aimed at ending violence and 
facilitating socio-economic development and reconstruction in South Africa.23 
These structures included the National Peace Secretariat, tasked with resolving 
conflict through the coordination of Regional and Local Dispute Resolution 
Committees,24 and the Goldstone Commission, formally the Commission of 
Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation. UN 
Resolution 772 endorsed Vance’s proposal that the UN support and help to 
implement Goldstone’s recommendations regarding the banning of dangerous 
weapons in public, the security of hostels, and the management of mass de-
monstrations. It also endorsed Vance’s suggestion that Goldstone undertake to 
investigate all armed forces in South Africa, including the SADF and SAP, MK, 
the PAC’s armed wing the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA), the 
KwaZulu Police, and other private security firms. That the UN resolved to work 
alongside already established South African structures was crucial in eliciting 
government’s cooperation. UN officials knew it was important that the South 
African government not be given the impression that its authority was being 
undermined. To this end, Vance called for ‘early and detailed discussions’ with 
Pretoria on ‘practical arrangements’. 25 Furthermore, Boutros-Ghali emphasized 
that conducting negotiations was ‘uniquely the responsibility of South Africans 
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themselves’.26 The Security Council authorised the Secretary-General to deploy 
UN observers in the country ‘as a matter of urgency’ to help put an end to the 
violence.27 Boutros-Ghali initially planned to send 30 observers, but later raised 
this number to 50. Resolution 772 also called upon international organisations 
such as the OAU, the Commonwealth and EC to deploy their own observers in 
South Africa with the UN and the NPA structures. The UN Observer Mission in 
South Africa (UNOMSA) arrived in mid-August, and over the ensuing two 
months was followed by missions from all three of the aforesaid organisations.        
Staring into the abyss  
The period between the Boipatong massacre and the burgeoning of international 
monitoring in August saw the country balanced precariously on a knife’s edge. 
The Star’s editorial spoke despairingly of staring into an abyss.28 South Africa 
appeared cut adrift from the prospect of negotiated transition, floating toward 
some unfathomable place. Leaders in both government and the ANC recognised 
the volatility of the new status quo. Both sides trod carefully. In a press release 
on June 25, de Klerk invoked pious sentiments to soothe a worried nation, ‘It is 
the government’s sincere prayer that the atrocious events at Boipatong will 
finally cause all South Africans to reflect and that the almighty God, in whose 
hands the destiny of peoples and nations is, shall provide for a speedy end to the 
violence.’29 The same day, the ANC-aligned Vaal Council of Churches (VCC) 
held a memorial service at a Dutch-Reformed Church on the Vaal. The PAC held 
a memorial service the following day at an Anglican church in Johannesburg, 
after donating R20 000 to the ANC’s proposed disaster fund.30 The period of 
public mourning would culminate on Monday the 29th when the Boipatong 
massacre’s victims would be buried at a mass funeral. In anticipation of the 
funeral, de Klerk announced that all government employees would be given time 
off to attend this and other related mourning services. He called upon the private 
sector to make similar arrangements.  
The ANC declared June 29th a national day of mourning, calling the occasion 
‘a time to bury the dead with dignity ... a time to say: Not one more death! ... a 
time for all to commit themselves to move rapidly towards democracy, peace and 
justice.’31 The ANC noted that there would be a stay-away in the Vaal as a tribute 
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to the local community’s loss. Workers in Vereeniging and Vanderbijlpark had 
been on strike since the 24th, insisting the strike would continue until Iscor agreed 
to demolish KwaMadala and pay compensation to the victims of the Boipatong 
massacre.32 While refusing to pay compensations, Iscor quickly announced its 
intention to close KwaMadala. However, it maintained that new accommodation 
would first have to be found for KwaMadala’s inhabitants. It proposed that they 
be moved to KwaMazisa Hostel, the ANC stronghold from which many of them 
had fled after July 1990. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) rejected 
this inadequate proposal and continued with plans for the strike. Despite the Vaal 
stay-away, the ANC asserted that there would be no national stay-away. Instead, 
locally organised prayers, lunchtime services, and demonstrations would be 
taking place throughout the country. It called upon the international community 
to observe the day by not handling South African goods or carriers. It also 
appealed ‘to all our people to remain calm, and ensure that the dead are buried in 
a disciplined and dignified manner.’33 Despite heartfelt pleas for calm from both 
government and the ANC, Boipatong’s day of mourning would deepen the dark-
ness of the abyss.     
The prevailing atmosphere in and around the neighbouring townships of 
Boipatong and Sharpeville on Monday the 29th was a far cry from the reposeful 
observances to which the ANC had appealed. Crowds of mourners gathered in 
Boipatong for a mass procession to the Sharpeville Cemetery, where 37 of the 
Boipatong massacre’s victims were to be buried. They looked on as youths 
hacked, stabbed and set alight a suspected Inkatha supporter.34 The streets of 
Boipatong had taken on the appearance of a warzone. Metre deep trenches had 
been dug, fully-grown trees felled with chainsaws, and metre-high barricades 
constructed out of boulders. Piles of rubbish lay smouldering after being burnt at 
night to light up the township’s streets.35 ANC supporters paraded with AK-47s, 
R-1 rifles, shotguns and pistols, many of them wearing camouflaged military 
attire.36 That the media would have a field day was clear well before the funeral 
had started. However, the day’s reporting opportunities would leave many 
members of the press visibly afflicted.    
Several foreign and local photographers and reporters became unwilling parti-
cipants in the mayhem they had come to observe. Sipa-Press photographer Johan 
Kuus was surrounded by youths wearing PAC T-shirts. One knocked him to the 
ground with a stick, before others began stoning him. Kuus reported that black 
photographers and another PAC supporter nearby came to his rescue. The PAC 
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supporter was attacked afterwards ‘for helping a white man’.37 Kuus escaped 
with an injury leaving him with partial sight in his right eye, after a stone hit him 
in the head.38 Joao Silva was photographing youths in PAC T-shirts when one of 
them came up and kicked him in the head. Guy Adams, who accompanied Silva, 
had his hair pulled and a shotgun shoved in his face. British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) journalist Tom Carver was attacked by a man chanting the 
PAC slogan ‘One settler, one bullet’. As Carver recalled, ‘He hit me with a club 
across the head above the ear. When I went down he got me again on my hand. 
My hand is fractured.’39 Unidentified youths were involved in a number of other 
incidents. Two other journalists were attacked, including Nic Erasmus from The 
Citizen who was dragged from his car on his way to the funeral. As 20 or so 
youths surrounded Erasmus, he was struck in the face, amid shouts of ‘Kill the 
white pig’. The youths fled when they saw a police vehicle approaching. In 
Vanderbijlpark nearby, youths chased white commuters, and a white man sitting 
on his veranda was struck in the foot when shots were fired from a passing 
minibus taxi. Conflict encompassing KwaMadala and its black township sur-
rounds had exhibited a spill-over effect. But not only had violence spread, it had 
been directed explicitly at whites, at whites attending the funeral and whites in 
their nearby suburb. The PAC’s Africanist underpinnings had been manifested in 
malevolent form. The racism of the PAC had overshadowed the non-racialism of 
the ANC at a high-profile event.   
An estimated 40,000 people attended the funeral.40 The ceremony brought 
together the ANC, the SACP, the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) and 
the PAC in a show of unity, with the PAC pledging itself to the mass action 
campaign.41 Aggressively opposed to negotiations, the PAC was able to align 
itself with the ANC’s growing hawkish tendencies. Numerous notables attended, 
including former Zimbabwean President Canaan Banana, leader of the London-
based Anti-Apartheid Movement Archbishop Trevor Huddleston, and the Trans-
kei’s military ruler Bantu Holomisa. These dignitaries looked about uneasily as 
the cemetery reverberated with gunfire. Rather than running for cover, crowds 
responded with ululations and toyi-toying. Some youths danced around and upon 
graves, firing at random. Older women shouted at them to quieten down, 
‘Thula!’, while younger men roared their approval.42 A police helicopter moni-
toring the event was fired at. A boy of less than 12 was seen strutting around with 
                                                            
37  The Star, ‘Photographers assaulted’, 30 June 1992.  
38  Recalling a previous incident in which AWB members had assaulted him, Kuus remarked that he now 
considered himself ‘beaten up equally’.   
39  SAPA-Reuter, ‘Mandela condemns attacks on journalists’, 1 July 1992.  
40  The Saturday Weekend Argus, ‘A militant mood in the Vaal’, 2 July 1992.  
41  South African Consulate General, ‘Black groups pledge unity at funeral’, This Week in South Africa, 
30 June 1992.  
42  David Greybe, ‘Comment on Boipatong’, SAPA, 30 June 1992. 
49 
 
a Makharov pistol in his belt. The crowd’s reception of different speakers was 
further indication of heightened mass militancy. As journalist Themba Khumalo 
remarked, speeches couched in diplomatic language, such as Ramaphosa and 
Tutu’s, received a lukewarm response. SACP leader Chris Hani and COSATU 
General-Secretary Jay Naidoo ‘emerged as the darlings of the mourners with 
their ultra-hardline speeches’.43 ‘De Klerk has declared war on our people,’ 
Naidoo exclaimed, ‘we gather here to bury victims of this war.’ ‘Remember de 
Klerk,’ he thundered, ‘we are not your kitchen maids, we are not your garden 
boys. Every time we try to negotiate, the government tells us to go to hell. We 
will take them to hell with us.’44 ‘These killings give us no option but to fight to 
the end,’ said Hani.45 He called upon the crowds to be prepared ‘for rolling mass 
action ... until we defeat de Klerk’ and his ‘government of vampires’.46  
The mass funeral deepened trepidation that the country’s stability was seri-
ously at risk. Journalist David Greybe observed ominously that ‘Boipatong, 
Sharpeville, Sebokeng and Bophelong have, more than any other area in the 
country, come to represent the new face of militant politics.’47 A local ANC 
leader interviewed on the day insisted that ‘CODESA means nothing here. We 
have our own agenda.’ Tellingly symbolic of changing times, the police station 
where the Sharpeville Massacre had occurred in 1960 was now unable to operate. 
‘When we see a policeman in the streets nowadays, we disarm him.’48 As The 
Weekly Mail’s editorial recognised, the new militancy had more to do with 
people on the ground than the orators they came to applaud,    
 
Anyone who attended the funeral of the Boipatong massacre this week would have been left 
in no doubt: the mood in the townships is fierce, a mixture of disappointment and anger 
urgently seeking an outlet. The message of the day was expressed more passionately by the 
crowd than any of the podium speakers: President F W de Klerk is no longer trusted, the 
security forces are blamed for the escalation in violence and there is no tolerance for 
meaningless game-playing negotiations.49 
 
After the funeral Archbishop Huddleston warned, ‘The Boipatong massacre is 
a sign of the danger, horrific danger for the future.’ He urged ‘the international 
community to take notice and to act, to act very speedily because of the immense 
dangers that the Boipatong massacre has thrown up’.50 The funeral made South 
Africa’s descent into a state of war more conceivable. Would it be a fragmentary 
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upheaval of localised conflicts tearing at the national fabric? Or a mass in-
surrection spearheaded by an ANC capable of galvanising a revolutionary mass 
through the articulation of a common purpose? Would the sheltered lives of 
whites be exposed? Few South Africans had any idea what might happen, and 
found themselves staring ever more into the gloom.  
Record of Understanding  
South Africa’s deepening chasm would become the genesis of a new politics of 
conciliation. In the wake of the funeral, government began to signal its capi-
tulation. In a statement on 1 July, de Klerk bemoaned that the occasion had been 
‘exploited to whip up emotions and to harden attitudes against negotiations and 
reconciliation’.51 He emphasized that allegations of state complicity in the 
Boipatong massacre were ‘devoid of truth’, and that police investigations pointed 
with increasing certainty to KwaMadala as the sole springboard of attack. The 
following day de Klerk warned the ANC against the forcible overthrow of 
government. But in the same statement, he proposed a minimum three-year term 
for an interim constitution, and acknowledged that government was willing to 
discuss the case for international monitoring with the ANC.52  
A month later, on 5 August, Mandela stood on a makeshift platform in front of 
the Union Buildings in Pretoria, before an estimated crowd of 90 000 people, 
‘basking in the glow of a successful two-day, ANC-sponsored general strike’.53 
Jonathan Manthrope of The Ottawa Citizen saw the event as a watershed. As 
backroom negotiations had ground on over the previous weeks, the ANC had 
increasingly lost control of its supporters in the townships, where violence 
continued unabated. The two-day strike had re-consolidated the authority of 
ANC leaders. Four million workers had stayed at home.54 Some chose to, others 
had no choice. Regardless, the ANC demonstrated that it could bring the entire 
country to a halt. According to Manthrope, the occasion set the stage for the 
renewal of constitutional negotiations between Mandela and de Klerk. Indeed, 
this massive gathering in the gardens of the South African President’s office 
could not have happened without his blessing.55 Sensing the ANC’s changing 
fortunes, Ramaphosa exclaimed that it would not be long before Mandela was at 
work in the presidential quarters in the Union Building’s left wing. Addressing 
the rally, Mandela warned government of more mass action to come if it did not 
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meet the demands set out in the wake of the Boipatong massacre. While there 
were 14 demands, he said, these really boiled down to just three: government 
action to end township violence, agreement to move swiftly to an appointed 
multi-racial interim government of ‘national unity’, and a commitment to move 
from there to a freely-elected constituent assembly.  
Three weeks later, government announced sweeping reforms to the police 
force. A third of the white-only top command was compulsorily retired, paving 
the way for the country’s first black generals.56 Several black officers would 
begin a special month-long training course and be promoted to major-generals if 
they passed. Furthermore, a permanent board of inquiry headed by a judge would 
be set up to investigate charges of police misconduct. These reforms followed a 
peak in the ANC’s mass action campaign, as well as a string of damning 
disclosures on security force conduct. In late July Dr. Waddington released a 
scathing report on the SAP’s response to and investigation of the Boipatong 
massacre. Several days later, prominent independent pathologist Dr. Jonathan 
Gluckman released files concerning more than 200 deaths in police custody, 90 
percent of which he attributed to police negligence or misconduct. Gluckman 
called police ‘out of control’.57 In late August, head of military intelligence in the 
Ciskei homeland Gert Hugo came forward with allegations of third force activity. 
‘The third force,’ said Hugo, ‘is out of control, and de Klerk and his ministers 
don’t know even half of what is going on today.’58 After being court-martialled 
for the theft of $7000 of Ciskei government funds, Hugo became the most senior 
security force member to allege the existence of a third force. He provided 
Newsweek with a confidential memo from January 1991, outlining a plan to 
defeat the ANC ‘enemy’ with the assistance of surrogate black groups referred to 
as ‘force multipliers’.59 State credibility was crumbling. A September opinion 
poll indicated that de Klerk’s approval ratings amongst urban blacks had fallen 
from 60 percent in August 1991 to 27 percent.60    
In late September, government and the ANC met to discuss the resumption of 
negotiations. Both sides had been deeply rattled in mid-September when Cis-
keian security forces shot dead more than 28 people, after ANC hawk Ronnie 
Kasrils led a mass of ANC supporters across the Ciskei homeland border toward 
its capital Bisho. The Bisho Massacre rekindled fears of the South African abyss. 
Government and the ANC now moved decisively to resume negotiations. The 
outcome of their discussions, the Record of Understanding, signified a turning 
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point. Signed by de Klerk and Mandela on 26 September, the Record of Under-
standing made provision for an elected constitution-making body. This consti-
tution-making body would act as an interim government of national unity, 
operate in terms of an interim constitution, and would ‘have adequate deadlock-
breaking mechanisms’.61 All political prisoners whose release could ‘make a 
contribution to reconciliation’ would be freed.62 Government undertook to im-
plement security measures such as the fencing and policing of hostels associated 
with violence. Its progress would be reported to the Goldstone Commission, the 
National Peace Secretariat, and UN observers. It undertook further to ban the 
carrying of dangerous weapons on all public occasions, subject to exemptions 
based upon guidelines prepared by the Goldstone Commission. The granting of 
exemptions would be entrusted to one or more retired judges.  
The three-pronged strategy, employed by the ANC after the Boipatong 
massacre, had proved an outright success. Firstly, the ANC had created and 
effectively harnessed the symbolic power of the massacre to add significant 
momentum to its mass action campaign. As the Boipatong massacre funeral 
showed, the ANC sometimes lost control of this momentum. But while both 
sides trod carefully in the face of the abyss, it was government that was brought 
to its knees. The abyss eventually played to the advantage of ANC brinkmanship. 
The mass action campaign culminated at the Union Buildings, drawing numbers 
that had not seemed possible prior to the Boipatong massacre. Secondly, the IFP 
had been effectively sidelined, relegated rightward, as government took increas-
ingly to cooperation with the ANC. Soon after September 26, the IFP announced 
its withdrawal from negotiations, citing the bilateral nature of the Record of 
Understanding. In October, Buthelezi co-convened a ‘Conference for Concerned 
South Africans’ with president of Bophuthatswana Chief Lucas Mangope and 
Ciskei’s military ruler Brigadier ‘Oupa’ Gqozo. Delegates included representa-
tives of the Conservative Party. The conference called for an abolition of Codesa 
and its replacement by a more representative forum, as well as for a halt in the 
implementation of the Record of Understanding.63 Thirdly, in the face of height-
ened international scrutiny, government had moved decisively to end the vio-
lence. Hostels were fenced and the carrying of traditional weapons checked, 
much to IFP chagrin. Extensive reform to security forces was put in progress, 
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gradually stymieing so-called third force activity.64 New rules had been created, 
paving the way for a new democratic order.   
Less than a year later, in August 1993, Zulu ‘impi’ ran amok through Tembisa, 
an ANC township north-east of Johannesburg, killing at least 30 people.65 The 
ANC called for an immediate independent investigation into eyewitness reports 
that police had transported attackers away from the scene. There was no need to 
take the matter any further, no need to accuse government of complicity or call 
for mass action.66 The only notable pilgrimage to Tembisa was de Klerk’s, and 
no one chased him out. The date for South Africa’s first democratic elections had 
already been set. 
Speaking to context  
The Boipatong massacre was an event, but more importantly it was an idea, 
comprised of myriad narratives. These narratives interacted, as conversations 
between many narrators. Struggles over meaning arose, and as they progressed, 
aberrant meanings were shed. A dominant narrative solidified, a story with a 
moral, with protagonists and antagonists, victims and perpetrators. This story 
gave rise to more assertive ANC policies, to global censure and national panic, 
contributing ultimately to government reform. How had the ANC made so much 
political capital out of the Boipatong massacre when the truths it posed were so 
contentious? The performances of both ANC leaders and members in the wake of 
the massacre did much to secure its meaning. Yet, the ANC’s fortunes were also 
intimately tied to the context in which the event had occurred. Seized upon as a 
symbol of a broader picture in which the state, in collaboration with the IFP, 
sought to destabilise the ANC’s support base, Boipatong accentuated those 
contextual facets that discredited de Klerk’s rule. However, while this bigger 
picture was credible, it drew focus away from the truth of the Boipatong mas-
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sacre itself. As investigations and hearings set about dissecting the massacre, the 
ANC’s dominant narrative began to lose credibility.       
  
5 
Bones of contention: 
17th June 1992 – 24th November 2000 
... it was Tutu, weeping after the [National] Party’s submission, who declared: How can de 
Klerk say he did not know? ‘I personally met with him so many times to tell him that simple 
people, people with no reason to lie, are talking about how white people were involved in the 
massacre at Boipatong.’ 
‘You can’t give up,’ I plead with Tutu in my head. ‘If you give up, then all is lost.’ 
And I ask: ‘Are you saying you need the National Party?’ 
‘It hurts me,’ says Tutu, ‘when I think of the quiet strength and resilience and magnanimity 
of the victims, that there is just no response from their side. And for reconciliation we need 
everybody.’ 
Antjie Krog, Country of My Skull, 19981 
 
The Boipatong question was subjected to a series of investigations, hearings and 
reports, which together extended over a period of more than eight years. During 
this period, its meaning was repeatedly contested. New narratives arose, some-
times fading quickly, sometimes lasting longer. New characters lifted their heads. 
Old personae changed face. The Boipatong massacre became more detailed as a 
narrative, but also more obscure, as more and more questions were asked but left 
unanswered. This chapter examines areas of contention, where contestation over 
the massacre has been the sharpest. While these pockets of competing repre-
sentations may obfuscate attempts to reveal the forensic truths underlying the 
massacre, they provide a mosaic of windows into the politics of truth that has 
defined the transition. These bones of contention suggest duplicity on the part of 
both the state and the ANC. Certain revelations have cast renewed suspicion 
upon the state and call for further investigation. Some suggest that the ANC has 
repeatedly sought closure over Boipatong, whilst concealing the fact that it has 
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never had the evidence at its disposal to justify closure. Close inspection of these 
politics of truth also reveals important interactions on the ground, in many ways 
distinct from the loftier performances that so often misconstrued them.  
Early investigations 
Allegations of Koevoet involvement     
On Wednesday 24 June 1992, the day after the NEC broke off negotiations, a 
special police task force swooped in on the privately-owned Greenside Colliery 
in Witbank, north east of Johannesburg. The Goldstone Commission authorised 
the snap raid after counsel for the ANC informed it of ‘suspicious people’ housed 
separately at the mine. It was alleged that these people were armed, carried 
radios, and spoke a foreign language.2 ANC sources suspected these ‘people’ of 
participating at Boipatong. Searching their barrack-like living quarters, the task 
force discovered trunks containing R-1 rifles, pistols, and ammunition. It was 
soon revealed that the 40 or so occupants were ex-members of the notorious 
counter-insurgency unit Koevoet.  
At an emergency meeting convened the following day, the ANC informed the 
Goldstone Commission of a man staying at the mine who had allegedly admitted 
to being involved in the Boipatong massacre. In the words of ANC lawyer 
Matthews Phosa, the man had told ANC members he was ‘sick and tired of what 
was happening as we were expected to kill nine-month old babies and mothers’.3 
The Commission heard the testimony of Mandla Mngomezulu, a security guard 
at the mine and an ANC and Numsa member. Mngomezulu explained that 
Jeremiah Shikongo, an ex-Koevoet member from Ovamboland Namibia, had 
confided in him after being ‘asked by his employer’ why he had refused to shoot 
at Boipatong.4 Instead of participating in the killings, Shikongo had waited and 
kept watch beside the Volkswagen Kombi that transported them to the township. 
Fearing that his reluctance to participate had put his life in danger, he approached 
Mngomezulu in the hope that either the ANC or Numsa could help him. How-
ever, Shikongo denied these allegations, casting doubt on the ANC’s version of a 
repentant accomplice in third force violence. Shikongo said he barely knew 
Mngomezulu and had never been to Boipatong. He had come to South Africa in 
1990 because ex-Koevoet members struggled to find employment in post-
independence Namibia. His work in South Africa involved ‘following the tracks 
in stock theft’, as well as preventing the theft of copper wire from Post Office 
installations.5 While Mngomezulu claimed Shikongo and his colleagues went out 
                                                            
2  The Star, ‘Koevoet link to massacre’, 26 June 1992.  
3  Ibid. 
4  New Nation, ‘Denials are put to test’, 3 July 1992.  
5  John Perlman, ‘Massacre: police implicate hostel’, The Saturday Star, 27 June 1992.  
57 
 
at night with their weapons wrapped in blankets, only to return the following 
morning, Shikongo denied that they ever carried weapons. Goldfields, the com-
pany that owned the colliery, stated that the manager of Greenside and the SAP 
had arranged for members of the police to be temporarily housed ‘while such 
members were busy with crime prevention activities in the area’.6  
On Friday 26 June, as the Goldstone Commission sat for a second day to hear 
evidence of Koevoet involvement, Police Commissioner Johan van der Merwe 
held a press conference several blocks away at the SAP’s Pretoria Headquarters. 
‘A fairly clear picture’ of what happened at Boipatong had emerged, he said. The 
interrogation of some 600 KwaMadala residents had revealed that between 200 
to 300 men from the hostel attacked Boipatong the previous Wednesday night. A 
search of the hostel had uncovered 276 spears, 44 bars and other dangerous 
weapons. Forensic testing revealed traces of blood on some of the weapons.7 
Allegations of Koevoet involvement were ‘flagrant lies aimed at discrediting the 
SAP’.  
 
Beating an offensive retreat  
While Goldstone sat to consider the possibility of security force complicity, the 
SAP and ANC appeared equally resolute over the matter. The SAP argued that 
evidence pointed unambiguously to KwaMadala residents as the sole perpe-
trators, whereas the ANC charged the state with direct complicity all the way up 
to the office of President. While both stances seemed premature, it was the 
probity of ANC rhetoric that Goldstone questioned in a statement on 6 July,    
 
No evidence has been submitted to the Commission which in any way justifies allegations of 
any direct complicity in or planning of current violence by the State President, any member 
of the Cabinet or any highly placed officer in the South African Police or Defence Force.8   
 
Goldstone regarded public statements that made competing claims as ‘unwise, 
unfair and dangerous’. Evidence suggesting otherwise would be subjected to 
‘thorough investigation’. 
There were straw men in the ANC’s hurried rejoinder. Firstly, the ANC inter-
preted Goldstone’s announcement as a finding that those mentioned were not 
directly involved, rather than a statement of fact that the commission had re-
ceived no evidence of their direct involvement.9 The ANC ‘found it odd’ that the 
Commission could ‘make so conclusive a determination without evidence being 
laid before it.’10 Predictably, de Klerk’s government saw no advantage in cor-
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recting such distortions. It welcomed Goldstone’s announcement, and accused 
the ANC of reckless propaganda. Government ignored a string of comments in 
the same statement, criticising it for ignoring Goldstone’s recommendations con-
cerning hostel reform, the bearing of dangerous weapons in public, and the use of 
32-Battalion on the East Rand.11 While unsure of the veracity of allegations 
linking ex-Koevoet members to the Boipatong massacre, Goldstone was assured-
ly scathing of their deployment in Witbank,  
 
Whether or not groups of former Koevoet members employed by the South African Police 
are involved in incidents of violence, the infamous reputation of Koevoet is such that the 
very existence of such a group in South Africa in 1992 is calculated to cause yet further 
distrust and suspicion of the Security Forces. The wisdom of employing such a group or 
groups must be open to serious question.12  
 
Ignoring any favours Goldstone’s announcement might have done it, the ANC 
constructed a second straw man, accusing the Commission of limiting its terms 
of reference to direct complicity, or acts of commission.13 Yet, just three para-
graphs after discussing evidence of ‘direct complicity in or planning of the 
violence’, the Goldstone Commission assured the public it would ‘investigate 
any allegations concerning the unwillingness or inability of the Security Forces 
to prevent violence and those relating to the adequacy or sufficiency of steps 
taken by them to do so.’14 Acts of omission were well within Goldstone’s pur-
view.  
While the ANC misconstrued Goldstone’s terms of reference, the criticism it 
levelled at the Commission signalled the beginnings of another tacit step back-
ward. In the week after the Boipatong massacre, Slovo, Ramaphosa and Mandela 
had subtly retreated from Mamoepa’s claim that security forces participated in 
the killing of residents at Boipatong. While equally condemnatory in tone, their 
rhetoric suggested rather that security forces had played collaborative, super-
visory and financially supportive roles in the massacre. Thus, the state was 
directly complicit, but through acts of commission that excluded the actual 
enactment of violence. After Goldstone’s announcement, the ANC emphasized 
the importance of investigating the state for complicity through acts of omission. 
Touted as a criticism, this emphasis marked the precaution of an ANC in-
creasingly sensitive to the possibility that the state would not be found directly 
complicit in the Boipatong massacre. 
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Dr. Waddington’s account of police operations in Boipatong 
Having overlooked Goldstone’s commitment to investigations of complicity 
through acts of omission, the ANC also seemed unaware that Dr. Waddington 
and his team had already been in the country for almost a week, conducting an 
inquiry into ‘actions taken by the SAP to maintain law and order in and around 
Boipatong both immediately before and during 17 June, and subsequently’, as 
well as the SAP’s ‘investigation into the massacre itself’.15 Waddington’s 49-
page report was released on 23 July. It gave a damning indictment of police 
conduct, identifying a host of flaws in procedure and judgement, which showed 
the SAP to suffer from ‘serious organisational problems’.16 Among its chief 
criticisms, the report noted ‘an insufficient awareness of community relations’. 
Waddington’s account of SAP activity in Boipatong after the massacre suggested 
that the intransigence of white policemen, the endangered heirs of a crumbling 
apparatus of oppression, had done much to rouse the tides of accusation that soon 
welled against the state.   
Sergeant Schlebusch of the ISU was allegedly the first policeman to arrive on 
the scene at Boipatong. Whilst investigating the home of the slain Florence 
Moshupe, several other residents purportedly approached him, saying they had 
also been attacked and that the assailants were from KwaMadala. There were 
young men amongst these residents who threatened to take revenge against the 
hostel. These youths were reportedly ‘highly excitable, but not hostile towards 
the police’.17 Two ISU vehicles were withdrawn from the township to patrol the 
highway so as to prevent a counterattack. By 3:00am, young township men 
armed with axes and other weapons were gathering on street corners around fires, 
but showed no hostility to police or the detective taking photographs of crime 
scenes.18 However, as the early morning drew on, township youths became 
increasingly aggressive, shouting abuse at police on patrol. The youths told them 
to leave Boipatong, asking why they had been so conspicuous after the event and 
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so absent before it. Just before daybreak, they began throwing stones at SAP 
vehicles. By 7:30am, three additional vehicles had been ordered to reinforce 
police patrols, bringing the total to seven. Township hostility responded in kind. 
Soon, police were firing tear gas, rubber bullets and birdshot at disorderly 
groups.  
The detective who had photographed 11 bodies before leaving Boipatong at 
3:00am was summoned again at 7:30 am to photograph bodies in Slovo Park. He 
was forced to withdraw after being fired upon. Reverend Verryn arrived in the 
township at around 9 am and pleaded with police to leave. They refused to 
discuss their deployment with him, later claiming that they could not pull out of 
an area where riots were taking place.19 Yet the police were themselves the 
objects of animosity. Had they taken a more accommodating approach toward 
Verryn, at least being open to discussing the situation with him, they might have 
been able to calm unruly tempers with his mediation. As it stood, the purpose of 
their presence was questionable. They were not protecting the crime scenes. 
Beyond guarding the detective, they were not advancing the investigation or 
associating themselves with it. As Waddington lamented, the ISU did not regard 
the investigation as its responsibility, and made no effort to interview witnesses 
about the horrors that had befallen their neighbourhood.20 Waddington believed 
that a different approach, one that showed ‘a conspicuously serious interest in the 
massacre’, might have pre-empted the unrest that ensued. ‘Instead the ISU 
perceived their task as one of containing the passions aroused by the massacre 
and did so by methods which inflamed the very emotions they sought to con-
trol.’21 At 11:30 am, the local police station on the edge of Boipatong came under 
petrol bomb attack. Reinforcements continued to arrive in the afternoon. Patrols 
continued to come under attack. In the mid-afternoon, a local policeman’s car 
and house were set alight.22  
Recalling later police efforts to negotiate with KwaMadala, Waddington sug-
gested that the SAP had taken ‘a more accommodating approach’ toward the 
Inkatha hostel residents,  
 
Boipatong residents might justifiably conclude that whereas their understandable anger and 
resentment was met with tear smoke, rubber bullets and birdshot, a similarly forceful attitude 
was not adopted towards the hostel-dwelling suspects.23         
 
The day after the Boipatong massacre, KwaMadala was surrounded and de-
clared an unrest area, allowing police to confine its occupants. After entering 
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forcefully, police seized a number of weapons and were busy marking them 
when they were surrounded by a mob of residents wielding sticks and assegais. 
The detectives withdrew, before beginning negotiations with the residents over 
the handover of weapons. Agreement was reached that hostel residents would 
throw their weapons onto a pile for police collection. This arrangement obfus-
cated attempts to identify the owner of each weapon.  
 
The erasure of tapes   
An important window into SAP operations in Boipatong before, during and after 
the massacre was the log of police radio transmissions recorded at the ISU’s 
Vereeniging control room. Major Christo Davidson, tasked with investigations 
into police complicity, dropped a bombshell at the Goldstone Commission in 
August when he admitted that the recordings had been taped over because of ‘a 
technical problem I am unable to explain’.24 Waddington had been informed of 
the tape erasures, but had not addressed the issue in his report.25 Davidson 
explained to an exasperated Commission that 13 hours of telephone and radio 
conversations had been deleted. The conversations, from 2 pm on June 17 to 3 
am the next day, included ISU communication with its patrols, other SAP units 
and the SADF.26 The officer in charge of the control room, Sergeant Ilse 
O’Reilly, explained to the Commission that the taping equipment had been used 
incorrectly since its installation in March. The equipment used ordinary com-
mercial tapes, but only one side could be used, otherwise recordings would be 
taped over. O’Reilly had herself turned the tapes over on June 18, a mistake 
allegedly repeated since 24 March. She said the ISU had not realised this over-
sight because only on one occasion did it have reason to play a tape back; in that 
particular instance, the required information had not yet been taped over.27 Seven 
tapes recorded on and after 17 June were handed over to the Commission. 
O’Reilly said she could not produce affected tape recordings made before June 
14, as these tapes had been sent to the Vereeniging Crime Intelligence Service 
(CIS) for ‘cleaning’.28 
After the seven tapes were subjected to a number of analyses by different 
experts, the Commission posited a likely sequence of events. Before the evening 
of June 17, two tapes were put into the machine, which was then left on 
automatic operation. The first tape recorded until it was filled at 3:09am on June 
18, when the second tape came into operation. Both tapes were turned over 
shortly after midday on June 18. The first tape was recorded over first, wiping 
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out vital information from the previous evening up until 3:09 am. It was filled by 
about 7:10 pm on June 18, before the second tape came back into operation for 
approximately an hour, after which it was removed from the machine.29 Because 
the second tape was removed after just an hour, conversations from 3:09 am were 
not recorded over, leaving the Commission with over 600 pages of transcribed 
communication. The Commission was unable to uncover any foul-play in the 
tape erasures, even if the ISU’s mishap seemed too convenient to be accepted at 
face value. A finding by British experts that the tapes contained suspicious 
‘masking sound’ led to embarrassment after it transpired that the British had 
played back the tapes at the wrong speed.30 Regardless, the 600 pages that did 
survive added to Waddington’s suggestion that uncompromising, reactionary 
police attitudes had helped foment the unrest that awoke in Boipatong on the 
18th. As the Commission reported,  
 
It may be remarked in general that the conversations recorded in these transcripts reveal a 
good deal of indifference, sometimes callous, to the lot of the people of Boipatong and the 
extent of the massacre, with no great zeal in moving against the Inkatha members of the 
hostel. There appear to be no expressions of outrage at the events of the night. The only 
occasion during the night ... when any sense of urgency was apparent from the recorded 
exchanges arose in the context of apparent threats to the white people of Vanderbijlpark.31 
 
Just before 6 am, it was reported that blacks were on Donges Street, Vander-
bijlpark, throwing stones at passing cars. Sergeant Smith responded, ‘Hoor hier, 
my ou maat, dit is nou blanke woongebied.’32 The unrest had spread to white 
areas, and was now cause for grave concern. Just after 6am, a captain remarked 
portentously, ‘laas nag was hier by Boipatong voorvalle gewees waar die nuwe 
Suid-Afrika mekaar uitgeroei het’.33 The previous night in Boipatong had seen 
the new South Africa turn upon itself, as its most powerful forces rose up to 
destroy each other. The duty of the ISU was to stop the ensuing ruination from 
spilling over into white suburbia. At 7 am it was reported that Boipatong resi-
dents were accusing police of bringing the Inkatha attackers into the township. In 
response, the captain in charge ordered police to ignore residents’ claims, but to 
monitor them and prevent them from going into white areas. The ISU’s officers 
appeared impermeable to the existential catastrophe of the Boipatong massacre. 
Its survivors emerged from their homes, many of which were now murder 
scenes, struggling to gather their shattered thoughts. Reeling from shock and 
grief, they encountered police sent to contain them, with the use of force if 
                                                            
29  The Goldstone Commission, ‘Memorandum on the Boipatong Tapes’, 30 December 1992.  
30  Rian Malan, ‘A question of spin’, Frontiers of Freedom, second quarter 1999.  
31  The Goldstone Commission, ‘Memorandum on the Boipatong Tapes’, 30 December 1992. 
32  Translated directly as ‘Listen here, my old friend, this is now white neighbourhood.’ 
33  Translated directly as ‘Last night there were incidents here in Boipatong where the new South Africa 
destroyed each other.’ 
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necessary. Few policing gestures could have turned distress to anger more 
effectively. While Waddington was clear that ‘no evidence had been found of 
direct police complicity in the massacre itself’, the behaviour of policemen in the 
hours after the event greatly encouraged the popular belief that they were directly 
complicit. Their behaviour was deeply reminiscent of Apartheid policing, a far 
cry from any true promise of change.   
The trial 
With Dr. Waddington’s help, Judge Goldstone investigated the Boipatong mas-
sacre until the end of 1992. Concurrent police investigations led to the trial of 47 
KwaMadala residents in May 1993.34 The role of police in the massacre became 
a crucial issue at the trial. In a twist of irony, IFP lawyers argued that it was not 
the accused who had attacked Boipatong, but members of the security forces. 
The IFP defence’s strategy was in line with shifting political alignments. The 
signing of the Record of Understanding in September 1992 had seen a break-
down in government-IFP relations. The IFP gravitated increasingly rightward, as 
was evidenced in its co-convening of the Conference for Concerned South 
Africans.   
 
Eyewitnesses  
Much to ANC chagrin, the IFP defence cited earlier testimonies from Boipatong 
residents. State prosecutors began building their case on the testimonies of three 
men who took part in the massacre. These testimonies denied police complicity. 
Crucially, an additional 120 witnesses from Boipatong also denied police in-
volvement.35 These witnesses included ‘someone from almost every house where 
death or serious injury was recorded’.36 Principal witnesses testifying to police 
complicity, Joseph Sello and Abednego Mabuza were unable to explain several 
material inconsistencies and contradictions in their evidence.37 Judge J M C Smit 
found Sello to be particularly ‘dishonest and unreliable’.38 Mabuza was less 
obviously a liar but, in similar vein to his testimony before Goldstone, proved 
less than credible. Rian Malan’s 1999 article ‘A question of spin’ vividly recalled 
Mabuza’s testimony.39 Mabuza was walking a friend home after a drink at his 
house, when they encountered a young boy ‘running from some unspeakable 
                                                            
34  BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘South Africa: charges against 27 suspects in Boipatong case 
withdrawn’, 14 April 1993.   
35  Anthea Jeffery, The Truth about the Truth Commission, South African Institute of Race Relations 
(Johannesburg, 1999), p. 140.   
36  Rian Malan, ‘A question of spin’, Frontiers of Freedom, second quarter 1999.  
37  Jeffery, The Truth about the Truth Commission, p. 140.  
38  Ibid.  
39  Rian Malan, ‘A question of spin’, Frontiers of Freedom, second quarter 1999. 
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terror’. Mabuza led the boy to his grandmother’s home on Hlubi Street. Glimps-
ing the attackers approaching in the distance, he slipped into the old woman’s 
garden, and ‘watched in disbelief as a Hippo glided by at walking pace, escorting 
a host of armed men who were attacking innocents as they passed down the 
street.’ Yet, the boy’s grandmother allegedly looked outside as her windows were 
shattered and saw only Zulus. Eight residents on Hlubi Street corroborated her 
testimony. One resident supported Mabuza’s testimony, but was contradicted by 
his neighbour.      
Mabuza was one of several ANC witnesses at the Goldstone Commission 
whom IFP Advocate Vic Botha later asked to testify at the trial. Having arrived 
at court, these witnesses resisted participation after realising that Botha was with 
the IFP. The shifting political landscape had gotten ahead of them. The politics of 
truth had changed since the period of early investigations into the Boipatong 
massacre, such that implicating security forces might benefit Inkatha. Mabuza 
told the court that after the massacre ANC lawyers had ordered them to talk only 
to the ANC. Further evidence of ANC efforts to stifle eyewitness transparency 
emerged when prosecutors caught wind of a key witness under ANC care. 
Eugenius N Mnqithi, a teenager from Small Farm, had fled to KwaMadala 
several days before the Boipatong massacre. A young woman had been murdered 
on her way home from a drinking party at his parents’ house.40 The local 
‘people’s court’ had necklaced a suspect, and set fire to the house. Having taken 
refuge at KwaMadala, Mnqithi was forced to participate in the Boipatong attacks. 
When police surrounded KwaMadala the following day, he escaped and fled to 
Evaton where he was taken into ANC custody. After prosecutors threatened to 
issue a subpoena, the ANC brought Mnqithi forward. Mnqithi swore he had 
provided ANC lawyers with a signed statement, identical to what he placed 
before the prosecutors. While ANC lawyer Caroline Heaton-Nicholls denied that 
such a statement existed, Judge Smit found it ‘highly unlikely that attorneys 
would not have taken a statement’.41 Mnqithi took the stand in September 1993, 
with devastating effect,       
 
That is the induna whose ‘Zulu recitations’ whipped the impi into a fighting mood, Mnqithi 
declared, pointing to the guilty party. That is the man who administered the battle medicine. 
That is the man who brandished an AK-47, and so on. Mnqithi insisted that no whites were 
involved, and that no police were present. The only armoured vehicle he saw was an SADF 
Buffel that showed up as the impi was withdrawing toward the hostel, blood-spattered and 
laden with loot – a beer crate of longplaying records, in Mnqithi’s case.42  
 
                                                            
40  Ibid.  
41  State v Zulu and others, transcript of judgement delivered by Mr Justice J M C Smit, Transvaal Pro-
vincial Division of the Supreme Court, 30 March 1994 in Rian Malan, ‘A question of spin’, Frontiers 
of Freedom, second quarter 1999.  
42  Rian Malan, ‘A question of spin’, Frontiers of Freedom, second quarter 1999.  
65 
 
In his March 1994 judgement, Smit bemoaned that ‘certain people and 
organisations’ with ‘a direct political interest in the outcome’ had interfered with 
investigations. He was particularly scathing of the ANC, which appeared to 
withhold Mnqithi ‘from the Goldstone Commission because he failed to support 
their case.’43 The ANC offered no rebuttal to this statement. Smit concluded that 
security forces had not in any way participated in the killings. He attributed the 
ISU’s erasure of tapes to ‘incompetence rather than a deliberate attempt to hide 
evidence of police complicity’.44 He came to similar conclusions regarding eight 
bullet shells, evidence that the SAP alleged it had inadvertently destroyed. In his 
view, culpability lay entirely with 18 of the accused, whom he convicted on 45 
counts of murder, count of public violence, and 14 counts of attempted murder.45 
Sentences ranged from 10 to 18 years. The convicted applied successfully for 
leave to appeal, and were granted bail pending their appeals. In October 1994, 
the Goldstone Commission released its Final Report, but continued to postpone 
its findings on the Boipatong massacre. The Commission regarded it inappro-
priate to submit a report on its Boipatong massacre Inquiry while the matter was 
still sub judice.46 Goldstone’s findings on the massacre would never surface. 
 
The life and death of Victor ‘Khetisi’ Kheswa 
While Judge Smit’s findings dealt the ANC a heavy blow, the death in police 
custody of an important witness in July 1993 had cast further doubt upon police 
innocence. The death of Victor ‘Khetisi’ Kheswa prompted street parties in 
Sharpeville, Sebokeng and Boipatong. Reviled as the ‘Vaal Monster’, the 28-year 
old had been at the centre of spiralling violence in the region. Responding to 
news of Kheswa’s death, an ANC spokesman in Sebokeng exclaimed, ‘We hope 
that the trail of blood left by faceless gunmen working for Kheswa will now stop 
flowing.’47 Violence in the Vaal diminished markedly after Kheswa’s death.48 By 
the time of his demise, Kheswa’s notorious Khetisi Gang was based at Kwa-
Madala, a refuge from which it struck at surrounding Vaal communities. His 
allegiance to the IFP was common knowledge. Yet it was not always thus.  
Kheswa’s rise to infamy in the Vaal began as a turf war between rival gangs in 
Sebokeng. In December 1990, the Khetisi Gang were called before a local ANC 
‘people’s court’ and accused of fighting with another local gang, the Cameroon 
                                                            
43  State v Zulu and others in Rian Malan, ‘A question of spin’, Frontiers of Freedom, second quarter 
1999.   
44  State v Zulu and others, p. 3740 in Jeffery, The Truth about the Truth Commission, p. 140.  
45  Buthelezi en andere v S [1999] JOL 5366 (A).  
46  The Goldstone Commission, ‘Final Report’, 27 October 1994.  
47  Fred Bridgland, ‘South African Nazis adopt black “martyr”’, The Sunday Telegraph, 18 July 1993.  
48  Johannes Mutshutshu Rantete, The African National Congress and the Negotiated Settlement in South 
Africa, van Schaik (Pretoria, 1998), p. 107 in Padraig O’Malley, ‘Boipatong’, unpublished manu-
script, April 2000, Witwatersrand University Historical Papers Archive, p. 36.  
66 
 
Squad, which included ANC activists. A ruckus broke out after Kheswa was 
found to be armed. The gang managed to escape, but not without Kheswa 
sustaining a bullet wound.49 At the time, Kheswa was known to be in a feud with 
a member of the people’s court, Christoper Nangalembe. The two had allegedly 
fought over a woman, whom Kheswa later poisoned to death with acid. 
Nangalembe was rumoured to have called for the Khetisi Gang to be put to 
death.50 According to the TRC Report, the two grew up together. However, 
Kheswa ‘had a long history of criminal involvement’ and eventually came into 
conflict with a local ANC ‘anti-crime campaign’.51 Yet, in an anonymous inter-
view with an executive member of the Khulumani Support Group52 in Sebokeng, 
I was told that both men ‘were hijacking cars, stripping the cars.’53 The inter-
viewee was not sure why they had started fighting, but suggested it had been a 
squabble over ‘shares’. 
Days after the Khetisi Gang’s escape, gang-member Daniel Mabote’s cousin 
suggested the gang seek help from Inkatha. Mabote’s cousin was the son of IFP 
official Bhula Khubeka, whose home had been burnt as she hosted the ill-fated 
IFP rally in Sebokeng on 22 July 1990. Soon thereafter, Kheswa’s neighbour 
noticed that eight men in grey overcoats had moved into the Kheswa household. 
When the neighbours turned their lights on at night, the men in overcoats came 
out and ordered them to turn the lights off.54 Kheswa’s younger brother told the 
neighbours the men were IFP members, guarding the house from ANC attack. 
They had a stash of AK-47s under a blanket in one of the bedrooms. In early 
January 1991, comrades came under AK-47 fire in a drive-by shooting. One of 
the cars belonged to Kheswa, recently discharged from hospital. Comrades went 
immediately to Kheswa’s house, where they again came under fire from the 
convoy, allegedly accompanied by a police vehicle. One of the comrades alleged 
he was abducted that night by policemen accompanied by the Khetisi gang, and 
taken back to the police station where gang members beat him up in front of 
police. The following day, Kheswa and his mother were arrested after police 
found AK-47s and ammunition in his car. They were released four days later. 
The next day, Christopher Nangalembe was found strangled to death on a rubbish 
dump outside Boipatong.  
                                                            
49  Daniel Reed, Beloved Country: South Africa’s Silent Wars, Jonathan Ball (Johannesburg, 1994), p. 60.   
50  Gary Kynoch, ‘Crime, Conflict and Politics: An Historical Account of Township Violence in Transi-
tion Era South Africa’, wiserweb.wits.ac.za/PDF%20Files/wirs%20-%20kynoch.pdf (last accessed: 25 
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51  TRC Report, Vol. 3, Ch. 6: ‘Regional Profile Transvaal, 1990-1994’, para. 564.   
52  The Khulumani Support Group was formed in 1995 by survivors and families of victims of political 
conflict during the Apartheid era. While the group’s founding premise has been to speak out about 
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53  Anonymous interview, Braamfontein, 17 April 2008. 
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A night vigil was held for Nangalembe on 12 January. Despite police promises 
to send a unit to the vigil, a large group of men were able to approach the 
gathering, open fire upon the marquee and lob three grenades into it, killing 39 
mourners and injuring 26.55 Men in overcoats were seen among the attackers. 
Comrades burnt down Kheswa’s house the following afternoon. Kheswa and ten 
others were arrested and charged with involvement in the massacre. There were 
allegations of torture. They were later acquitted due to lack of evidence. Most of 
the gang fled to KwaMadala. In the wake of the night vigil massacre, Kwa-
Madala turned increasingly into a militant IFP stronghold, while Vaal townships 
saw the rise of heavily-armed SDUs. From this point on till April 1992, Kheswa 
was linked to shootings at the Sebokeng beer-hall and the Erika Tavern in 
Sebokeng, the murder of six members of the ANC-aligned Lefheidi family in 
Sharpeville, and the murder of ANC official Ernest Sotsu’s wife, daughter and 
grandson in Boipatong.56 Remarking on the period, Sotsu told BBC journalist 
Daniel Reed, ‘Anyone associated with Inkatha became an enemy. There was a 
cycle of revenge of killings.’57 Sotsu was also adamant that police were involved 
in the murder of his family, together with Kheswa. According to the TRC Report, 
Kheswa was ‘known to have watched the proceedings of the funeral of ANC 
leader Ernest Sotsu's family from a police Casspir, despite the fact that he was 
widely believed to be the perpetrator of their killing.’58 The circumstances of 
Kheswa’s death would fuel speculation about his alleged links with police.    
Kheswa died a day after being arrested near Boipatong. His death gave rise to 
a curious flurry of allegations, as different political groupings continued to vie 
for ground. Leader of the right-wing World Preservatist Movement (WPM)59 
Koos Vermeulen claimed publicly that Kheswa had been a member.60 Vermeulen 
also claimed to have links with the IFP, which he said had summoned him to 
check Kheswa’s body. The WPM distanced itself from government, with Ver-
meulen citing the death of another member in police custody two years before. 
Vermeulen was not happy with the state of Kheswa’s body. According to sources 
allegedly close to him, ‘two streams of mucus ran from the dead man’s nostrils to 
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his eyes, consistent with his being hung upside down.61 Vermeulen’s claims 
suggested a desire on the part of the far-right to elevate its status in South African 
politics. ‘You must remember,’ he warned, ‘that in this struggle, people like me 
are just cannon fodder. But there are many big land mines who lie hidden and 
who will control what happens.’62 While the IFP opposed the ANCs growing 
ascendancy in negotiations, it nevertheless sought to ensure the viability of a 
future IFP-ANC settlement. It denied any relationship with the WPM, accusing 
state intelligence agents of attempting to implicate it in the violence. Along with 
the ANC, it alleged that the WPM had links with the South African intelligence 
community.63 After hours of police questioning, Vermeulen retracted his claim 
that Kheswa was a WPM member. ANC spokesman Carl Niehaus rejected this 
retraction, arguing that ‘The Kheswa saga points to one of the clearest examples 
of so-called “third force” complicity in township slayings.’64 The ANC hinted 
that police may have killed Kheswa to prevent him from disclosing links between 
security forces and township violence.65 It hoped to encircle all of its opponents, 
ensnaring the IFP, the state and the right wing in the same web of culpability.  
According to a state pathologist’s post mortem, Kheswa had died of virally-
induced heart failure. Yet, a later private post mortem commissioned by the IFP 
and Kheswa’s family found that he had died of ‘conditions including acute 
suffocation, electrocution, hypothermia and occult toxic substances’.66 The Attor-
ney-General declined to hold an inquest, on the grounds of the first post mortem. 
At the time of his death, Kheswa was in the custody of Sergeant Gerhardus 
‘Pedro’ Peens. Peens was one of three policemen suspended after Kheswa’s 
death, pending results of an investigation that never transpired. The following 
month, Daniel Mabote died while allegedly trying to escape from a moving 
police vehicle. According to police reports, he jumped from the window of a 
police van, only to be run over by a second van. Sergeant Peens had been in the 
second vehicle.67 In the early 1990s, Peens was implicated in several cases of 
torture and death in police custody, including the death of MK member Tsepo 
Lengwati.68 Despite informing his attorney of his fear that Peens planned to kill 
him, Lengwati was removed from Leeuhof Prison by Peens for purposes of 
‘investigation’, and later gunned down in an alleged escape attempt. Peens left 
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the police force in 1994 to work as a private investigator. Over more than 20 
years of service, he was investigated on no fewer than 60 charges of illegal 
conduct, without ever being convicted.69 His name would come up again in 1999 
at the TRC’s hearings into the Boipatong massacre. 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
Premature findings  
While the 18 KwaMadala convicted waited for their appeals to be heard,70 pro-
mulgation of the 1995 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 
allowed them to apply for amnesty. All 18 did so, and were granted further bail 
pending the outcome of their applications.71 The Promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation Bill had been tabled before South Africa’s first democra-
tically-elected parliament in December 1994. Justice Minister Dullah Omar ex-
plained that the purpose of a truth and reconciliation commission, which would 
be established under the bill, was not to conduct a witch hunt or charge violators, 
but to ‘enable South Africans to come to terms with their past on a morally 
acceptable basis and advance the cause of reconciliation’.72 According to the Bill, 
the commission would comprise South Africans who were ‘impartial and res-
pected’, and would ‘function without political or other bias or interference’.73 
The Boipatong massacre would prove the sore point of such laudable aspirations. 
TRC hearings into the massacre began in July 1998, with two applicants 
withdrawing from the process at the outset. October 1998 saw publication of the 
first five volumes of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa 
Report.74 Volume 3 made findings on the Boipatong massacre, even though 
amnesty applications were still pending. As a TRC researcher associated with the 
TRC’s report on the massacre later confided to Padraig O’Malley, ‘I would never 
have supported the findings on Boipatong. They are far too categorical and 
reflect the bias of a particular commissioner.’75  
As early TRC hearings into the Boipatong massacre continued through late 
1998, with Judge Sandile Ngcobo’s November 2000 final decision nowhere in 
sight, the TRC determined to make conclusive findings in its Report,     
 
The Commission finds that forty-five people were killed and twenty-two severely injured in 
Boipatong on 17 June 1992 in an attack perpetrated by residents of the KwaMadala Hostel, 
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who were primarily supporters of the IFP. The Commission finds that KwaMadala residents, 
together with the police, planned and carried out an attack on the community of Boipatong. 
... The Commission finds that the police colluded with the attackers and dropped them off at 
Slovo Park. ... The Commission finds that white men with blackened faces participated in the 
attack. ... The Commission finds that the police were responsible for destroying crucial evi-
dence in that they erased the tapes of transactions in the control room of the ISU.      
The Commission finds the KwaMadala residents together with the SAP responsible for 
the massacre. ... The Commission finds the Commissioner of Police, the Minister of Law and 
Order and the IFP responsible for the commission of gross human rights violations.76   
 
In her book The Truth about the Truth Commission, Jeffery delivers a perti-
nent critique of the TRC Report’s findings on the Boipatong massacre.77 The 
Report did not explain why it rejected Waddington and Smit’s conclusions that 
police had not been involved in the killings. Nor did it explain why it rejected 
Smit’s finding that police elimination of evidence was due to incompetence 
rather than complicity. It cited allegations of police involvement taken from the 
testimonies of witnesses, most of whom were unnamed. It posited these alle-
gations as evidence, without explaining if and how they had been tested or 
substantiated.78 It made no reference to the lengthy list of witnesses who had 
testified against police complicity at the trial, nor to the fallibility of testimonies 
that had asserted otherwise. The Report failed to produce any substantial new 
evidence. Jan-Ake Kjellberg, a Swedish policeman working with the TRC, told 
Rian Malan that the Commission had conducted no investigation into the 
Boipatong massacre.79 As Malan discovered, the TRC Report had taken much of 
its evidence from a June 1992 ‘Area Repression Report’, compiled by the HRC. 
Some of the evidence was copied verbatim.80 
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Quoting Volume 1 of the TRC Report, Jeffery points out that the Commis-
sion’s obligation, when confronted with different versions of events, was to 
decide which version of the disputed facts was ‘the more probable, reasonable, or 
likely, after taking all the available evidence into account’.81 Instead, the Com-
mission uncritically accepted the version of a violence monitoring organisation 
with ANC supporters among its ranks. This version had been compiled within 
weeks of the massacre, before such allegations had been put to any thorough test. 
‘The Commission was specifically enjoined,’ Jeffery continues, ‘to probe the 
motives and perspectives of all perpetrators of gross violations.’82 The TRC 
Report ignored the ongoing cycle of violence in which both KwaMadala and 
Boipatong were caught. Indeed, Judge Smit had declined to give the accused a 
death penalty on the mitigating grounds that they had been provoked. The homes 
of IFP members and their families had been burnt down; they themselves had 
been ‘murdered and mutilated and driven from their communities’.83    
 
Cycles of violence  
Victor Mthandeni Mthembu, Vice-Chairperson of the IFP Youth League in Kwa-
Madala at the time of the Boipatong massacre, was the first of the 18 convicted at 
the trial to apply for amnesty. He was also the first to take the podium at the 
subsequent TRC hearings. Mthembu denied police involvement outright. Several 
of his disclosures seemed to water down the likelihood that the veracity of his 
testimony was tainted by political allegiance. He implicated Sipho Lukhozi, one 
of the two fellow applicants who had withdrawn from the amnesty process. 
Lukhozi withdrew on the grounds that he had not been present in Boipatong 
during the attack. Mthembu testified to seeing him armed and amongst the crowd 
of attackers that left KwaMadala for Boipatong.84 Rian Malan pointed out further 
disclosures,   
 
Perhaps the strongest indicator of Mthembu’s credibility was the reaction of his co-con-
spirators, who initially accused him of disloyalty. He had implicated Prince B V Zulu, a 
minor Zulu royal who lived in KwaMadala. He had named IFP leader Themba Khoza as an 
accessory. He had even disclosed the presence inside the hostel of a 50-strong ‘Msinga 
contingent’ – clan brothers of an induna from Abatenjeni, sent to strengthen the hostel’s 
defences.85      
 
These disclosures were not so straightforward. According to Mthembu, Vana-
na Zulu had been the hostel’s most senior leader. He was in charge of weapons at 
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KwaMadala, and once instructed all working residents to contribute R800, after 
police confiscated firearms from the hostel. Yet, Zulu did not take part in the 
decision to attack Boipatong. Mthembu maintained that a statement in his affi-
davit, signed two years prior, that Zulu had decided to attack ‘the Vaal commu-
nity’ referred to the Vaal region in general.86 The two who took the decision were 
Mkhize, a fellow applicant, and Chonco, the Msinga contingent’s deceased 
leader. An Iscor co-worker of Zulu’s, who lived in Boipatong, allegedly saw the 
prince on the night of the massacre. Mthembu claimed Zulu had taken a taxi to 
Nongoma the preceding afternoon. Mthembu held that the Msinga contingent 
was a ‘self-protection unit’, not a ‘hit squad’. That the affidavit called it the latter 
was due to a ‘typing error’. He kept mum over the affidavit’s statement that the 
‘hit squad of Umsinga also went out several times on their own initiative to shoot 
members of the ANC’, as the matter had ‘nothing to do with the reason why we 
are here.’87 Themba Khoza had come to KwaMadala after the massacre and told 
residents to burn stolen goods and hide blood-stained weapons and clothing. But 
Mthembu could not remember whether Khoza had been at a KwaMadala meeting 
the Sunday before the massacre. The affidavit stated that Khoza had. Moreover, 
it held that Khoza was ‘angry at the killing of his people and said if the people 
came and attack you, you are supposed to fight back and kill them.’88 Confronted 
with the contents of his affidavit, Mthembu admitted to remembering that Khoza 
was present, but still could not remember what was discussed at the meeting. 
Indeed, Mthembu’s penchant for appealing to his own forgetfulness brought his 
testimony to the brink of untenability on more than one occasion. Not least of all, 
he claimed to have no idea that Khoza had been head of the IFP Youth League in 
Transvaal, even though he had been Vice-Chair of the IFP Youth League in 
KwaMadala during the same period.  
Mthembu’s evasive testimony suggested that political pressure had come to 
bear, perhaps with mounting intensity after he had made his applicatory state-
ment to the TRC. In the face of a three-day grilling at the hands of Advocate 
Danny Berger, representing the residents of Boipatong, Mthembu appeared to 
shield IFP leaders. Neither Zulu nor Khoza were implicated in the decision to 
attack Boipatong. Indeed, both Khoza and IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi had 
condemned the Boipatong massacre, Buthelezi claiming that 10 of the Boipatong 
residents killed were IFP members.89 But while there were inconsistencies be-
tween Mthembu’s affidavit and his cross-examination, some convictions were 
constant. The Boipatong massacre had been an act of embittered vengeance, and 
the police had nothing to do with it. Mthembu invoked the vengeful spirit of the 
                                                            
86  Amnesty Hearing, Victor Mthandeni Mthembu (Application # AM 1707/96), 13 July 1998. 
87  Ibid.  
88  Ibid. 
89  Kaiser Nyatsumba, ‘10 IFP members died in massacre, says chief’, The Star, 3 July 1992.  
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massacre whilst under cross-examination. He did so with just one sinister adage, 
perhaps the most infamous remark in the history of the Truth Commission. 
Asked to justify the murder of children in Boipatong, when the attackers were 
allegedly targeting the ANC, Mthembu responded, ‘What you should understand, 
Mr Berger, is that a snake gives birth to another snake.’90 Popular reaction to 
such vitriol has been one of disgust and condemnation. However, there is need to 
place Mthembu’s sentiments in context. As Bonner and Nieftagodien argue, the 
TRC’s mandate to make clear findings on victims and perpetrators precluded 
adequate social explanation.91 Isolating victim and perpetrator at the point of 
violence obscured underlying patterns of causation and motivation that often 
blurred the victim-perpetrator binary. 
After fighting broke out on the Vaal in July 1990, Mthembu fled KwaMazisa, 
along with every other Zulu resident. As he told his cross-examiner, IFP mem-
bers in the Vaal continued to be victimised, long after the Zulu exodus from 
KwaMazisa and Sebokeng Hostels. KwaMadala residents entering Boipatong to 
shop or catch taxis were regularly attacked. Sometimes they were necklaced. 
Mthembu could remember two necklace victims, Bongani Mbatha and one Gazu. 
Fellow applicant Mkhize had been sole proprietor of beer in the hostel, when 
comrades cut off his supply by threatening to kill his supplier in Boipatong.92 
Mplupeki Tshabangu, another applicant, whose father survived being attacked 
and burnt by comrades, told the Commission of a woman named Masabata from 
neighbouring Sharpeville, who was ‘raped, her muscles cut, a bottle inserted in 
her vagina – only because she was an IFP member’.93 Both the anonymous Khu-
lumani interviewee and Abraham Mzizi, an IFP leader on the East Rand, told me 
the story of a pregnant woman who was slit open, the foetus removed from her 
womb. Mzizi told me she was a township woman who fell in love with a man 
from KwaMadala, before becoming pregnant with his child. ‘[S]he was actually 
slit open. And then [they] took the foetus out in the street and said that this is the 
offspring of umdlwembe.’94 The anonymous Khulumani interviewee translated 
umdlwembe, an insulting expression reserved for Zulus, as ‘sell-out’, while Mzizi 
told me it meant ‘a stray wild dog’.95 ‘But what is still stick on my mind,’ re-
called Moses Mthembu, Victor’s uncle and fellow applicant who together with 
                                                            
90  Amnesty Hearing, Victor Mthandeni Mthembu (Application # AM 1707/96), 13 July 1998.   
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92  Amnesty Hearing, Victor Mthandeni Mthembu (Application # AM 1707/96), 13 July 1998. 
93  Amnesty Hearing, Mplupeki Tshabangu (Application # AM 7391/97), 13 August 1998. 
94  Interview with Abraham Mzizi, Alberton, 18 April 2008.  
95  Ibid.   
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Mkhize was an induna96 at KwaMadala, ‘“umdlwembe”, that is something that 
any person is allowed to kill it as an ant, not as a human being.’97 Moses had 
particular reason to be afraid. He and Vanana Zulu were marked men, ‘Even in 
taxis, there were two photos of me and Vanana Zulu, that these are the main 
targets.’98 Vanana Zulu had lived on Majola Street in Boipatong, the same street 
as Ernest Sotsu. His house was burnt down in 1990. Sotsu’s family was mas-
sacred in their home the following year, though Victor told Berger he had no 
recollection of the event.  
During his hearing, Mthembu’s legal representative, Advocate Cynthia Pre-
torius, drew upon a small body of journalism from late June 1992, which put it to 
the public that KwaMadala residents had been victims of provocation. Three 
people linked to KwaMadala or Inkatha had been killed in Boipatong the 
weekend before the massacre. 99 Police had confirmed the death of a woman 
known as Nomvula, necklaced for consorting with an IFP man. David Mbele, a 
Zulu Boipatong resident and schoolmaster, was shot in the back whilst trying to 
flee after his house was set on fire. Police discovered the charred body of Inkatha 
member Mr. B.L. Khumalo in his burnt out car. Two other Inkatha homes were 
set alight that weekend, one in Boipatong and another in nearby Bophelong. 
KwaMadala residents told journalist Patrick Laurence that over the past two 
months numerous Inkatha families had fled to the hostel after their homes were 
burnt down. In the last week of April, the houses of 18 presumed Inkatha sup-
porters were reportedly set alight.100 Injured Inkatha members had allegedly been 
turned away from hospitals. Moses Mthembu told Laurence, ‘Our children can 
no longer go to school in the townships. We cannot shop there. The houses of 
Inkatha supporters are burnt down. Our girlfriends are necklaced. What are we to 
do?’101 Laurence, Malan and Denis Beckett also pointed out that two April 1992 
massacres in IFP townships near Alberton had not been met with the same public 
outcry as the Boipatong massacre. Crossroads was attacked on 3 April, and 
nearby Zonkisizwe 3 days later. The combined death toll exceeded 30 and 
included women and children.102 The attackers were allegedly Xhosa-speaking 
ANC members. Residents complained that police were slow to react. No arrests 
had been made in connection with Crossroads. Furthermore, police had allegedly 
‘searched and disarmed’ Crossroads residents the day before the massacre.103    
                                                            
96  The term induna refers to an official functionary of a king or chief in Zulu society. In this case of IFP 
hostels, it referred to a senior leader in residence.  
97  Interview with Moses Mandla Mthembu, Sharpeville, 16 May 2008.  
98  Ibid.   
99  Patrick Laurence, ‘Doubts deepen over Boipatong killers’ motives’, Irish Times, 29 June 1992.  
100  Rian Malan and Denis Beckett, ‘On the inside looking out’, Saturday Star, 28 June 1992.  
101  Patrick Laurence, ‘Doubts deepen over Boipatong killers’ motives’, Irish Times, 29 June 1992. 
102  Rian Malan and Denis Beckett, ‘On the inside looking out’, Saturday Star, 28 June 1992. 
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It became very evident during Mthembu’s hearing that the Boipatong mas-
sacre was part of a manifold cycle of violence, which flared up at Inkatha’s 
inaugural Vaal rally in July 1990.  The massacre’s perpetrators were also victims, 
even if their retaliation seemed out of proportion to the attacks inflicted upon 
their own. Tensions contributing to the cycle of violence were primarily local in 
nature. Competition over employment, housing, business opportunities and 
women, gang rivalries and ethnic tensions were all phenomena able to exist 
independently of outside politics. That the ANC was itself suffering from internal 
conflict on the Vaal over the control of SDUs was further evidence that national 
politics was subsidiary. Kynoch’s study of violence in the East Rand townships 
of Thokoza and Katlehong during the transition presents similar findings,  
 
[D]ecades of social and economic deprivation, combined with punitive policing, criminal 
predation and a corresponding reliance on vigilantism, had produced environments in which 
violence frequently became a normative means of pursuing material interests, resolving 
conflicts and seeking ‘justice.’ In other words, politicised rivalries found fertile ground for 
escalation partly because a culture of violence was already ingrained ... Different conflicts 
were often sparked by parochial concerns that only acquired an overtly political dimension 
when state forces, the ANC or the IFP became involved, sometimes at the behest of com-
batants who recognized the advantages of such an association.104  
 
Closer observation of violence and its myriad interactions suggests that too 
much emphasis is placed upon the agency of political parties and the state. 
Jeffery’s recent work likely exaggerates the centrality of ANC initiatives taken 
toward conducting a so-called ‘People’s War’.105 Though, the most common 
excess has been fixation upon ‘the ubiquitous third force, particularly its ability 
to control the incidence of township violence’.106 At the TRC hearings into the 
Boipatong massacre, the likely role of a third force diminished steadily with each 
applicant’s testimony, until the surprise appearance of Andries Matanzima 
Nosenga.    
In January 1999, Nosenga stood before the amnesty committee and claimed to 
have played a leading role in the Boipatong massacre, killing ‘eight or nine 
people’.107 He had allegedly filed an amnesty application in 1997, which the TRC 
had lost and then found again. A three-page affidavit, faxed, unsworn and un-
signed was presented to the committee. Similar to Mnqithi’s, his story was one of 
shifting political allegiances. Having started out as a comrade, he fell out with 
ANC members and defected to KwaMadala. He participated in a number of 
attacks alongside the Khetisi Gang. After falling out with Inkatha, he walked into 
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Vereeniging police station and admitted to murder. He was subsequently jailed 
for participating in drive-by shootings.108 He had two amnesty applications 
pending for these offences when it was revealed that he had also applied for 
participating in the attack on Boipatong. While his co-applicants denied that he 
had been present during the massacre, claiming that he had only come to live in 
KwaMadala after the event, Nosenga provided a firsthand account of the 
massacre which implicated Sergeant Pedro Peens as its mastermind. Peens had 
allegedly supplied arms, arranged for the presence of casspirs, and brought white 
colleagues along to participate. That Peens had admitted to running errands in 
and around Boipatong on the night gave substance to these claims.109 Yet, 
Nosenga’s testimony proved so unreliable that his application was refused. Judge 
Ngcobo wrote in his final decision that given ‘the numerous contradictions and 
the inherent improbabilities in the evidence of Mr. Nosenga and the unsatis-
factory nature of his evidence, we have no hesitation in rejecting his evidence as 
untruthful.’110 Ngcobo held that while it could not be proven that police did not 
participate, evidence that they did was ‘fraught with difficulties’. He accepted the 
testimonies of the other applicants, who denied police complicity outright. He 
granted amnesty to all but two of them, who denied participating and thus could 
not be given amnesty for offences not committed.   
Laying the bones to rest  
Matters pertaining to security force complicity in the Boipatong massacre, 
particularly the dubious erasure of tapes, the death of Khetisi Kheswa, and the 
activities of Sergeant Peens, begged for further investigation. Furthermore, as 
TRC investigator Piers Pigou noted in 1999, only three Vaal policemen applied 
for amnesty.111 Officers Conradie, van der Gryp and Jacobs were forced to apply 
because Eugene de Kock had implicated them for falsifying evidence in 1990 to 
secure Themba Khoza’s acquittal. Each of these officers came from a different 
police section,112 yet they worked in unison to support the IFP, thus suggesting 
that Vaal police loyalties to Inkatha were far-reaching.  
Yet, the ANC’s position on the Boipatong massacre had also become more 
suspect. Its 1992 allegations of Koevoet involvement based upon the purported 
disclosures of one allegedly repentant ex-member were quickly brought into 
doubt. That the ANC had mistakenly accused Judge Goldstone of failing to 
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consider complicity through acts of omission suggested uncertainty over the 
convictions that it had previously aired with such assurance and political success. 
The course of the Boipatong massacre trial had revealed on more than one 
occasion, most plainly in the case of Mnqithi, that the ANC had defeated the 
ends of justice by stifling witness testimonies. Furthermore, a host of witness 
testimonies went against it. The TRC Report betrayed a clear ANC bias in 
making findings on the Boipatong massacre that were premature and distinctly 
unbalanced. The testimonies of applicants at the TRC hearing painted the picture 
of a localised cycle of violence, whereas the ANC had made capital out of the 
massacre by placing massive emphasis on the role of national politics. This 
emphasis seemed overstated. Events in Boipatong suggested that the most likely 
forms of state complicity in the violence were acts of omission, as evidenced by 
the lax attitudes of ISU officers tasked with policing the township. Judge 
Ngcobo’s acceptance of the testimonies of all the applicants except that of 
Nosenga, whom the IFP accused the ANC of deploying, was a crucial blow to 
the credibility of the ANC’s dominant narrative. Yet, the only newspaper which 
covered Ngcobo’s decision in November 2000 was Die Burger, an Afrikaans 
paper published not in Gauteng but the Cape.113 The ANC had steered a widely-
celebrated democracy toward an extensive period of economic recovery. While 
Boipatong had provided a key narrative upon which ANC powers were con-
structed, its bones of contention would be left to smoulder beneath the strata of a 
new landscape. Boipatong would be kept dormant, so that overlying structures 
could remain in place.  
  
 
 
                                                            
113  Email interview with Rian Malan, 29 December 2008.  
  
6 
Conclusion 
I know it is the fashion to say that most of recorded history is lies anyway. I am willing to 
believe that history is for the most part inaccurate and biased, but what is peculiar to our own 
age is the abandonment of the idea that history could be truthfully written.  
George Orwell, 1938.1 
 
On 24 July 2009, the Mail & Guardian reported that Constitutional Court ‘dark 
horse’ Judge Sandile Ngcobo had taken the lead in the race to succeed current 
Chief Justice Pius Langa.2 Judges and legal commentators had privately suggest-
ed that Ngcobo was the most credible of those candidates ‘politically palatable’ 
to President Jacob Zuma and the ruling ANC. Sources close to the succession 
process had informed the Mail & Guardian that Minister of Justice Jeff Radebe 
favoured Ngcobo as the ‘head of an envisaged new-look judiciary’. That the 
same decade had seen Judge Ngcobo decide against the ANC’s version of the 
Boipatong massacre at the TRC seemed to make no difference. The Boipatong 
metaphor lay buried, scattered in decay, fading from popular recollection. In the 
previous week, South Africa had celebrated Soweto Day on June 16, comme-
morating a watershed moment in the history of the country’s liberation. No such 
remembrance had been set aside for June 17.  
Had the ANC succeeded in gaining favourable closure over what happened in 
Boipatong, the country may have chosen to commemorate June 17. Instead, the 
meanings the ANC once successfully attached to the massacre have been 
whittled down by repeated contestation. Much of this contestation has come from 
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people never aligned with ANC opponents, including independent investigators 
from abroad, more than a hundred Boipatong residents in court, and the man 
favoured as the next Chief Justice. In contrast, the story of the Soweto uprising, 
of resolute black youths defying white persecution with momentous effect, has 
remained steadfast. Even though the Boipatong massacre has faded from popular 
memory, research into the transition tends to acknowledge the pivotal importance 
of the event. Yet, while cursory in its attention to the event’s details, this research 
also tends to tow the ANC line, citing the massacre as evidence of a third force. 
It appears thus that such scholarship is embedded in the discursive processes it 
set out to study.  
The Boipatong massacre occurred a day after the ANC began its mass action 
campaign, with negotiations deadlocked and national and local politics increas-
ingly entwined. In this context, the massacre provided a symbolic opening 
through which the rules of a new order could be brought much closer to fruition. 
Political actors seized upon this moment, hoping to reconstitute those social 
structures which the transition’s dawning had left dislocated. Certain performan-
ces were decisive. ANC leaders gestured to the residents of Boipatong, to the 
country, and to the world with great effect. Boipatong’s people were not a 
passive audience. Their anger with police was manifest hours before their leaders 
sought to rouse it. Whether or not the accusations they levelled were true, their 
call for change reverberated across the country, through the authoring of testi-
monies, the stamping of feet, the singing of songs, and throwing of stones. South 
Africa and the world stopped to listen. Ensuing struggles over the meaning of 
Boipatong saw the gap it had opened expand ominously into a darkening chasm, 
threatening to force the pieces of South Africa’s torn landscape further and 
irrevocably apart. It was de Klerk who chose to relent. The swirling mass anger 
that animated the abyss was aimed at him and his government, as was the brunt 
of international reproach. Before Boipatong, he had fought tenaciously to retain 
minority powers, all the while seeking majority support. After the massacre, he 
resigned himself to the new role of benefactor to the ANC’s inevitable rise. The 
NP would no longer pursue the retention of power through collaboration with the 
IFP, nor would it stand idly by as violence continued unabated.  
The Boipatong massacre gives a vivid picture of the discursive struggles that 
brought the South African transition to its culmination. Here in this moment, 
subjects were successfully interpellated into a new discursive order. This process 
of interpellation was vast and multi-faceted, a complex of diverse interactions 
among the South African public, political leaders, academics and the media, as 
well as their equivalents around the globe. Some made decisions about structure. 
Many chose to accept those decisions. Others were forced to accept them. These 
decisions spoke to something much bigger than Boipatong. While evidence of 
80 
 
third force involvement was scant, there was nevertheless a degree of justice in 
the massacre’s reception. Popular reaction spoke to a broader context of re-
pression, wherein the state repeatedly sought to undermine the ANC, using 
underhand, often violent methods. This broader context continues to hold em-
phasis in both popular memory and scholarship, thereby diverting focus from 
consideration of Boipatong’s forensic details. Indeed, knowledge of the event can 
never be seen as distinct from the discursive struggles that continue to define it. 
 
  
References 
 
 
Primary sources 
Articles and press releases (in chronological sequence) 
Vaal Weekblad, ‘Khetisi: Feared “Vaal Monster” says he is innocent’, 26 July 1991. 
Philippa Garson, ‘The perfect gentleman at the centre of a battle’, The Weekly Mail, 5 June 
1992. 
John Battersby, ‘Internal ANC fights add to S. African Strife’, The Christian Science Monitor, 
15 June 1992. 
Raphael Banda, ‘First day largely successful as most blacks observe stayaway call’, SAPA, 16 
June 1992. 
Craig Doonan, ‘We promise to force you to resign – ANC memorandum’, SAPA, 16 June 1992. 
Frans Pienaar, ‘Mandela unveils June 16 memorial tombstone’, SAPA, 16 June 1992.  
SAPA, ‘ANC calls on citizen force members to defy call-up’, 16 June 1992. 
SAPA, ‘Illegal arms “not returned”’, 16 June 1992. 
SAPA, ‘NP calls on ANC to abandon mass action’, 16 June 1992.  
SAPA, ‘Opponents’ responses contributing to climate of violence’, 16 June 1992.  
Reuters, ‘ANC charges government complicity in massacre’, 18 June 1992. 
The Star, ‘ANC probes return of weapons’, 18 June 1992. 
The Star, ‘FW’s visit to Ulundi on June 16 under fire’, 18 June 1992. 
The Star, ‘Violence not linked to mass action’, 18 June 1992. 
New Nation, ‘Night of terror’, 19 June 1992. 
Ray Nxumalo, ‘Statement adds fuel to WM exposé of covert operations’, The Weekly Mail, 19 
June 1992.The Independent, ‘Rampage through townships’ 19 June 1992. 
Reuters, ‘Don’t take revenge for the massacre, Tutu says’, 19 June 1992. 
SAPA Wire, 19 June 1992. 
The Star, ‘Policeman puts his gun to his head’, 19 June 1992. 
The Star, ‘The agony of Boipatong’, 19 June 1992. 
The Weekly Mail, ‘Confident NP uses mass action to its own advantage’, 19 June 1992. 
Joe Louw, ‘Anatomy of a massacre’, The Saturday Star, 20 June 1992. 
Reuters, ‘Angry crowd chases de Klerk from massacre scene’, 20 June 1992. 
David Breier, ‘Nats wait for the backlash’, The Sunday Star, 21 June 1992. 
Peter de Ionno, ‘Beasts tear the heart out of Boipatong’ The Sunday Star, 21 June 1992. 
David Ottoway, ‘De Klerk flees from angry mob’, The Washington Post, 21 June 1992. 
Business Day, ‘Comment – Boipatong’, 22 June 1992. 
Patrick Laurence, ‘Township pivotal in political war’, The Star, 22 June 1992. 
Eric Ransdell, ‘Boipatong, South Africa’, US News, 22 June 1992. 
Michael Sparks, ‘Residents’ version of shooting’, The Star, 22 June 1992. 
The Star, ‘Tutu blasts police “collaboration”’, 22 June 1992. 
Kenosi Modisane, ‘ANC, PAC call for day of mourning’, The Sowetan, 23 June 1992. 
South African Consulate General, ‘Roelf urges ANC to resume talks’, This Week in South 
Africa, 23 June 1992. 
82 
 
South African Consulate General, ‘US gives aid to Boipatong victims’, This Week in South 
Africa, 23 June 1992. 
The Citizen, ‘Boipatong: SA mood of gloom, depression’, 23 June 1992. 
The Star, ‘Editorial Comment: Staring into the abyss’, 23 June 1992. 
World News Digest, ‘UN envoy to investigate violence’, 23 July 1992. 
Business Day, ‘Comment – Day of mourning’, 24 June 1992. 
Dirk Hartford and Wilson Zwane, ‘Vaal “faces strike over Boipatong”’, Business Day, 24 June 
1992. 
South African Consulate General, ‘De Klerk “will accept mediation”’, This Week in South 
Africa, 24 June 1992. 
Allister Sparks, ‘Restore police credibility if there is to be any hope’, The Star, 24 June 1992. 
SAPA, ‘Press Release by the State President, Mr. F. W. de Klerk’, 25 June 1992. 
South African Consulate General, ‘Africa’s statesmen may talk peace in townships’, This Week 
in South Africa, 25 June 1992. 
Arthur Gavshon, ‘World moves to defuse deadlock’, The Weekly Mail, 26 June 1992. 
Paul Stober, ‘Was Boipatong an act of vengeance?’, The Weekly Mail, 26 June 1992. 
The Star, ‘FW’s finesse’, 26 June 1992. 
The Star, ‘Koevoet link to massacre’, 26 June 1992. 
Patrick Laurence, ‘Public outrage at township killings has been selective’, Irish Times, 27 June 
1992. 
John Perlman, ‘Massacre: police implicate hostel’, The Saturday Star, 27 June 1992. 
The Star, ‘Boipatong carnage leaves host of riddles in its wake’, 27 June 1992. 
Rian Malan and Denis Beckett, ‘On the inside looking out’, Saturday Star, 28 June 1992. 
African National Congress, ‘Press Release on the 29 June – National Day of Mourning’, SAPA, 
29 June 1992. 
Patrick Laurence, ‘Doubts deepen over Boipatong killers’ motives’, Irish Times, 29 June 1992. 
South African Consulate General, ‘UN Chief in crisis visit to South Africa’, This Week in South 
Africa, 29 June1992. 
Bronwyn Wilkinson, ‘How they hacked my wife to death’, The Star, 29 June 1992. 
David Greybe, ‘Comment on Boipatong’, SAPA, 30 June 1992. 
SAPA, ‘Huddleston on Boipatong massacre’, 30 June 1992. 
Shaun Johnson, Bronwyn Wilkinson and Brian Sokutu, ‘Boipatong mourners slam FW’, The 
Star, 30 June 1992. 
South African Consulate General, ‘Black groups pledge unity at funeral’, This Week in South 
Africa, 30 June 1992. 
The Star, ‘Photographers assaulted’, 30 June 1992. 
SAPA, ‘De Klerk expresses concern at Boipatong funeral; calls for calm’, 1 July 1992. 
SAPA-Reuter, ‘Mandela condemns attacks on journalists’, 1 July 1992. 
The Saturday Weekend Argus, ‘A militant mood in the Vaal’, 2 July 1992. 
Beathur Baker, ‘Where a massacre is a way of life’, Weekly Mail, 3 July 1992. 
New Nation, ‘Denials are put to test’, 3 July 1992. 
Kaiser Nyatsumba, ‘10 IFP members died in massacre, says chief’, The Star, 3 July 1992.  
South African Consulate General, ‘FW calls for three-year interim rule’, This Week in South 
Africa, 3 July 1992. 
The Weekly Mail, ‘A fierce and angry message’, 3 July 1992. 
Themba Khumalo, ‘Gunshots echo a troubled history’, The Citizen Press, 5 July 1992. 
Statement by the Goldstone Commission, SAPA, 6 July 1992. 
Business Day, ‘Judge limited by terms of reference – ANC’, 7 July 1992. 
The Sowetan, ‘Violence: Goldstone clears government’, 7 July 1992. 
Eddie Koch, ‘South Africa: ANC demands international peacekeeping’, Inter Press Service, 8 
July 1992.  
The Star, ‘UN chief “tried to stop mass action”’, 3 August 1992. 
The Citizen, ‘SAP were warned before Boipatong attack: Claim’, 6 August 1992. 
83 
 
Tom Cohen, ‘Man says attackers came in police vehicle’, The Associated Press, 6 August 1992. 
Jonathon Manthrope, ‘Mandela back in charge as stage set for new talks’, The Ottawa Citizen, 6 
August 1992. 
Michael Sparks, ‘UN observers calm hotheads’, The Star, 7 August 1992. 
John Carlin, ‘The good, the bad and the ugly’, The Star, 8 August 1992. 
Peta Thornycroft, ‘Security forces in the dock’, Sunday Star, 9 August 1992. 
Phillip Zoio and SAPA, ‘Sounds of Silence’, The Star, 12 August 1992. 
The Citizen, ‘Why tapes were wiped clean’, 13 August 1992.  
The Sowetan, ‘Experts to hear tapes’, 13 August 1992. 
Bill Keller, ‘Pretoria forces retirement of many officials in police’, The New York Times, 27 
August 1992. 
Joseph Contreras, ‘Charges of a “third force” plague de Klerk’, Newsweek, 14 September 1992. 
UN Chronicle, ‘Deployment of UN Observers authorised for South Africa’, December 1992. 
Keller, ‘De Klerk’s Gorbachev Problem’, New York Times, 31 January 1993. 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ‘South Africa: charges against 27 suspects in Boipatong 
case withdrawn’, 14 April 1993. 
Tom Cohen, ‘Suspected mass killer had links to right-wing group’, The Associated Press, 15 
July 1993.  
Fred Bridgland, ‘South African Nazis adopt black “martyr”’, The Sunday Telegraph, 18 July 
1993. 
John Battersby, ‘Evidence may provide key to third force in South Africa’, The Christian 
Science Monitor, 19 July 1993. 
Africa News, ‘Cracks in the Boipatong story’, 22 January 1999.  
Rian Malan, ‘A question of spin’, Frontiers of Freedom, second quarter 1999. 
Piers Pigou, ‘Boipatong: Uncovering the real conspiracy’, Weekly Mail & Guardian, 21 May 
1999. 
Sello S. Alcock, ‘Concourt dark horse takes the lead’, Mail & Guardian, 24 July 2009, 
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-07-24-concourt-dark-horse-takes-the-lead (last accessed: 
26 July 2009). 
 
Interviews 
Anonymous, Braamfontein, 17 April and 8 May 2008. 
Malan, Rian (Email interview), 29 December 2008. 
Mthembu, Moses Mandla, Sharpeville, 12 and 16 May 2008.  
Mzizi, Abraham (IFP MP), Alberton, 18 April 2008.   
Van der Merwe, Kobus (IFP Chief Whip), Cape Town, 19 May 2008. 
 
Reports and memorandums 
South African Institute of Race Relations, Survey of Race Relations 1980 (Johannesburg, 1981). 
Pauline Morris, ‘Development Bank of Southern Africa Urban Planning Unit Vaal Triangle 
Urban Strategic Perspective’, May 1992. 
Waddington, P.A.J., ‘Report of the inquiry into the police response to, and investigation of, 
events in Boipatong on 17 June 1992’, 20 July 1992. 
Independent Board of Inquiry, ‘Boipatong Massacre: Brief summary of statements taken thus 
far’, 26 June 1992. 
Nicholls, Cambanis, Koopasammy and Pillay, ‘Memorandum: Events of the Boipatong 
Massacre’, 1992.   
Nicholls, Cambanis, Koopasammy and Pillay, ‘Broad outline of argument relating to the terms 
of reference numbered (d) and (e)’, Goldstone Commission, 1992.  
Nicholls, Cambanis, Koopasammy and Pillay, ‘Attempts to prevent the Boipatong Massacre’, 
1992.   
84 
 
Goldstone Commission, ‘Memorandum on the Boipatong Tapes’, 30 December 1992. 
South African Institute of Race Relations, Survey of Race Relations 1991/92 (Johannesburg, 
1993). 
US Department of State Dispatch, ‘South Africa: Human rights practices, 1992’, March 1993.  
Goldstone Commission, ‘Interim Report on Criminal Political Violence by Elements within the 
South African Police, the KwaZulu Police and the Inkatha Freedom Party’, 18 March 1994. 
South African Institute of Race Relations, Survey of Race Relations 1992/93, (Johannesburg, 
1994). 
Goldstone Commission, ‘Final Report’, 27 October 1994. 
TRC Report, Vol. 3, Ch. 6: ‘Regional Profile Transvaal, 1990-1994’.   
TRC Report, Vol. 2, Ch. 7: ‘Political Violence in the Era of Negotiated Transition, 1990 – 
1994’, para. 91.  
 
Resolutions 
Statement of the Emergency Meeting of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, 23 June 
1992. 
UN Security Council, Resolution 772 (1992) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3107th 
meeting, on 17th August 1992.   
African National Congress and National Party, ‘Record of Understanding’, section 2(a), 26 
September 1992, http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/record.html, (accessed 26 June 
2009). 
 
Court cases, hearings and amnesty decisions  
State v Zulu and others, transcript of judgement delivered by Mr Justice J M C Smit, Transvaal 
Provincial Division of the Supreme Court, 30 March 1994 
Amnesty Hearing, Victor Mthandeni Mthembu (Application # AM 1707/96), 13 July 1998. 
Amnesty Hearing, Mplupeki Tshabangu (Application # AM 7391/97), 13 August 1998. 
Buthelezi en andere v S [1999] JOL 5366 (A). 
Amnesty Hearing, Andries Matanzima Nosenga, (Application # AM 2778/96), 5 May 1999. 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission Amnesty Committee, Amnesty Decision (AC/2000/209), 
24 November 2000.  
 
Songs 
Brenda Fassie, ‘Boipatong’, Brenda Fassie [Bonus Tracks], 1994. 
 
Websites  
‘Casspir’, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rsa/casspir.htm (accessed 4 January 
2009). 
Secondary sources 
ADAM, H. & K. MOODLEY (1993), The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-
Apartheid South Africa. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball. 
ALTHUSSER, L. (1971), Ideology and the State. In: L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy. London: 
NLB. 
BAUER, G. & S.D. TAYLOR (2005), Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition. 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
BENNUN, M.E. (1993), Boipatong and After: Reflections on the Politics of Violence in South 
Africa. International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 21. 
85 
 
BONNER, P. & N. NIEFTAGODIEN (2002), The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Pursuit of “Social Truth”: The Case of Kathorus. In: D. Posel & G. Simpson, eds, 
Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press. 
BUTLER, A. (1998), Democracy and Apartheid: Political Theory, Comparative Politics and the 
Modern South African State. London: Macmillan Press.  
BUTLER, A. (2007), Cyril Ramaphosa. Johannesburg: Jacana. 
CAWTHRA, G. (1993), Policing South Africa: The South African Police and the Transition from 
Apartheid, Johannesburg: David Philip. 
COLEMAN, M., ed. (1998), A Crime Against Humanity: Analysing the Repression of the 
Apartheid State. Johannesburg: David Philip. 
DE KLERK, F. W. (2000), The Last Trek – A New Beginning: The Autobiography. London: Pan. 
ELLIS, S. (1998), The Historical Significance of South Africa’s Third Force. Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 24(2). 
FARRED, G. (1992), Unity and Difference in Black South Africa. Social Text, 31/32. 
GILIOMEE, H. & L. SCHLEMMER (1989), From Apartheid to Nation-Building. Cape Town: 
Oxford University Press. 
GLASER, D. (2001), Politics and Society in South Africa. London: Sage Publications. 
GOLDSTONE, R.J. (2000), For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Investigator, 
Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press. 
GUELKE, A. (1993), Political Violence and the South African Transition. Irish Studies in 
International Affairs, 4. 
GUELKE, A. (1999), South Africa in Transition: The Misunderstood Miracle. London: I.B. 
Tauris.  
HARRIES, P. (1993), Imagery, Symbolism and Tradition in a South African Bantustan: 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Inkatha, and Zulu History. History and Theory, 32(4). 
HOWARTH, D.R. (1998), Paradigms Gained? A Critique of Theories and Explanations of 
Democratic Transition in South Africa. In: D.R. Howarth & A. Norval, eds., South Africa in 
Transition: New Theoretical Perspectives. London: Macmillan. 
HOWARTH, D.R. (2000), The difficult emergence of a democratic imaginary: Black 
Consciousness and non-racial democracy in South Africa. In: D.R. Howarth, A. Norval &  
Y. Stavrakakis, eds, Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and 
Social Change. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
HOWARTH, D.R. & Y. STAVRAKAKIS (2000), Introducing discourse theory and political 
analysis. In: D.R. Howarth, A. Norval & Y. Stavrakakis, eds, Discourse Theory and Political 
Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press. 
JEFFERY, A. (1999), The Truth about the Truth Commission. Johannesburg: South African 
Institute of Race Relations. 
JEFFERY, A. (2010), People’s War. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.  
KROG, A. (2002), Country of My Skull. Johannesburg: Random House. 
KYNOCH, G. (2008), Killing and Dying in Thokoza/Katlehong: Narratives of Conflict, 1990 – 
1994. Paper presented to the North Eastern Workshop on Southern Africa, Burlington, 
Vermont. 
KYNOCH, G. (2009), Crime, Conflict and Politics: An Historical Account of Township Violence 
in Transition Era South Africa. wiserweb.wits.ac.za/PDF%20Files/wirs%20-%20kynoch.pdf  
(last accessed: 25 July 2009). 
LACLAU, E. (1990), New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. London: Verso. 
LODGE, T. (1991), Rebellion: The Turning of the Tide. In: T. Lodge & B. Nasson, eds, All, 
Here, and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s, Claremont: David Phillip. 
LOFTUS, E.F. (1975), Leading questions and the eyewitness report. Cognitive Psychology, 7. 
MAMDANI, M. (1996), Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
86 
 
MANDELA, N. (1994), Long Walk to Freedom. London: Abacus. 
MANDELA, N. (1993), Nelson Mandela Speaks: Forging a Democratic, Non-Racial South 
Africa. New York: Pathfinder. 
MURRAY, M.J. (1994), The Revolution Deferred: The Painful Birth of Post-Apartheid South 
Africa. London: Verso. 
O’MALLEY, P. (2000), Boipatong. Unpublished manuscript. Johannesburg: University of 
Witwatersrand Historical Papers Archive. 
O’MALLEY, P. (2001), Boipatong Part II. Second unpublished manuscript. Johannesburg: 
Witwatersrand University Historical Papers Archive. 
OTTOWAY, D. (1993), Chained Together: Mandela, de Klerk, and the Struggle to Remake South 
Africa. New York: Times Books. 
PAUW, J. (1997), Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid’s Assassins. 
Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball. 
REED, D. (1994), Beloved Country: South Africa’s Silent Wars. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball. 
SAMPSON, A. (1999), Mandela, the Authorized Biography. Jeppeston: Jonathan Ball. 
SEEGERS, A. (1996), The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa. London: Tauris 
Academic Studies. 
SISK, T.D. (1995), Democratisation in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract. New Jersey:  
Princeton University Press. 
SPARKS, A. (1994), Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s 
Negotiated Revolution. Sandton: Struik Book Distributors.  
TAYLOR, R. & M. SHAW (1998), The Dying Days of Apartheid. In: A. Norval & D.R. Howarth, 
eds, South Africa in Transition: New Theoretical Perspectives. London: Macmillan. 
WALDMEIR, P. (1997), Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New 
South Africa. New York: W. W.Norton & Company. 
WEITEN, W. (2001), Psychology: Themes and Variations. Stamford: Wadsworth. 
WHITE, L. (2003), The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
WILSON, R.A. (2001), The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the 
Post-Apartheid State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
ASC BOOK PUBLICATIONS 
 
 
Copies of all the publications listed below in the African Studies Collection and  
the earlier Research Reports Series may be ordered from:  
 
African Studies Centre 
Email: asc@ascleiden.nl 
Tel: +31 (0)71 527 3490 
Fax: +31 (0)71 527 3344 
 
For prices, check the ASC website [www.ascleiden.nl] under Publications. 
 
 
African Studies Collection 
 
35 The Boipatong massacre and South Africa’s democratic transition 
James Simpson   (2011) 
34 Travelling hierarchies. Roads in and out of slave status in a Central Malian Fulɓe 
network 
Lotte Pelckmans   (2011) 
33 The Dagara farmer at home and away. Migration, environment and development 
in Ghana 
Kees van der Geest   (2011) 
32 Coping with inadequacy. Understanding the effects of central teacher recruitment 
in six ward secondary schools in Tanzania 
Wilhelm L. Mafuru   (2011) 
31 Facing coal: Changing conceptions of South African coal-based pollution, with 
special reference to the Witbank coalfield, 1906-1978 
Michal Singer   (2011) 
30 Kfaang and its technologies. Towards a social history of mobility in Kom, 
Cameroon, 1928-1998 
Walter Gam Nkwi   (2011) 
29 Participation for local development. The reality of decentralization in Tanzania 
Henry A. Mollel   (2010) 
28 Plurality of religion, plurality of justice. Exploring the role of religion in disputing 
processes in Gorongosa, Central Mozambique 
Carolien Jacobs   (2010) 
27 In search of greener pastures? Boat-migrants from Senegal to the Canary Islands 
Miranda Poeze   (2010) 
26 Researching Africa: Explorations of everyday African encounters 
Mirjam de Bruijn & Daniela Merolla, editors   (2010) 
25 Wartime children’s suffering and quests for therapy in northern Uganda 
Grace Akello   (2010) 
24 Bodies in action. The influence of culture on body movements in post-conflict 
Sierra Leone  
Anneke van der Niet   (2010) 
23 Ghanaian nurses at a crossroads. Managing expectations on a medical ward 
Christine Böhmig   (2010) 
22 Coping with cancer and adversity: Hospital ethnography in Kenya 
Benson A. Mulemi   (2010) 
21 Ominous Calm. Autochthony and sovereignty in Konkomba/Nanumba violence 
and peace, Ghana 
Martijn Wienia   (2009) 
20 Advances in coastal ecology. People, processes and ecosystems in Kenya 
Jan Hoorweg & Nyawira Muthiga, editors   (2009) 
19 Creating space for fishermen’s livelihood. Anlo-Ewe beach seine fishermen’s 
negotiations for livelihood space within multiple governance structures in Ghana 
Marloes Kraan   (2009) 
18 Families in movement. Transformation of the family in urban Mali, with a focus on 
intercontinental mobility 
Janneke Barten   (2009) 
17 Pastoralistes et la ville au Bénin. Livelihoods en questionnement 
Théophile Djedjebi   (2009) 
16 Making decentralization work for women in Uganda 
Alfred Lakwo   (2009) 
15 Food security and coping mechanisms in marginal areas: The case of West 
Pokot, Kenya, 1920-1995 
Anne Kisaka Nangulu   (2009) 
14 ‘Beyond their age’. Coping of children and young people in child-headed 
households in South Africa 
Diana van Dijk   (2008) 
13 Poverty and inequality in urban Sudan. Policies, institutions and governance 
Muna A. Abdalla   (2008) 
12 Dilemmas of Development: Conflicts of interest and their resolutions in 
modernizing Africa 
Jon Abbink & André van Dokkum (eds)   (2008) 
11 Teaching peace, transforming conflict? Exploring participants’ perceptions of the 
impact of informal peace education training in Uganda 
Anika May   (2008) 
10 Plantations, power and people. Two case studies of restructuring South Africa’s 
forestry sector 
Alice Achieng Ojwang   (2008) 
9 Coming back from the bush. Gender, youth and reintegration in Northern Sierra 
Leone 
Janneke van Gog   (2008) 
8 How to win a football match in Cameroon. An anthropological study of Africa’s 
most popular sport 
Arnold Pannenborg   (2008) 
7 ‘Prendre le bic’. Le Combat Spirituel congolais et les transformations sociales 
Julie Ndaya Tshiteku   (2008) 
6 Transnationalism, local development and social security. The functioning of 
support networks in rural Ghana 
Mirjam Kabki   (2007) 
5 Tied to migrants: Transnational influences on the economy of Accra, Ghana 
Lothar Smith   (2007) 
4 “Our way”: Responding to the Dutch aid in the District Rural Development 
Programme of Bukoba, Tanzania 
Adalbertus Kamanzi   (2007) 
3 Transition towards Jatropha biofuels in Tanzania? An analysis with Strategic 
Niche Management 
Janske van Eijck   (2007) 
2 “Ask and you shall be given”: Pentecostalism and the economic crisis in 
Cameroon 
Robert Mbe Akoko   (2007) 
1 World and experiences of AIDS orphans in north central Namibia 
Mienke van der Brug   (2007) 
 
Research Reports 
 
85 Microfinance, rural livelihoods, and women’s empowerment in Uganda 
 Alfred Lakwo   (2006) 
84 Trade liberalization and financial compensation. The BLNS states in the wake of 
the EU-South African trade and development agreement 
 Sam van der Staak   (2006) 
83 The rock art of Mwana wa Chentcherere II rock shelter, Malaŵi. A site-specific 
study of girls’ initiation rock art  
 Leslie F. Zubieta   (2006) 
82 Bibliography on Islam in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa 
 Paul Schrijver   (2006) 
81 Bridging the urban-rural divide: Multi-spatial livelihoods in Nakuru town, Kenya  
 Samuel Ouma Owuor   (2006) 
80 Bleak prospects: Young men, sexuality and HIV/AIDS in an Ethiopian town  
 Getnet Tadele   (2006) 
79 “The angel of death has descended violently among them.” Concentration camps 
and prisoners-of-war in Namibia, 1904-08 
 Casper Erichsen   (2005) 
78 Sahelian pathways. Climate and society in Central and South Mali  
 Mirjam de Bruijn, Han van Dijk, Mayke Kaag & Kiky van Til (eds)   (2005) 
77 Gacaca: Grassroots justice after genocide. The key to reconciliation in Rwanda?  
 Arthur Molenaar   (2005) 
76 The assertion of rights to agro-pastoral land in North Cameroon:  
A cascade to violence?  
 Ruth Noorduyn   (2005) 
75 Urban agriculture in Tanzania: Issues of sustainability  
 Dick Foeken, Michael Sofer & Malongo Mlozi   (2004) 
74 “We’re managing!” Climate change and livelihood vulnerability in Northwest 
Ghana 
 Kees van der Geest   (2004) 
73 Community-based conservation in an entitlement perspective. Wildlife and forest 
conservation in Taita, Kenya  
 James Gichiah Njogu   (2004) 
72 Witchcraft and policing. South Africa Police Service attitudes towards witchcraft 
and witchcraft-related crime in the Northern Province  
 Riekje Pelgrim   (2003) 
71 The solidarity of self-interest. Social and cultural feasibility of rural health 
insurance in Ghana  
 Daniel K. Arhinful   (2003) 
70 Recent advances in coastal ecology. Studies from Kenya  
 Jan Hoorweg & Nyawira Muthiga (eds)   (2003) 
69 Structural adjustment: Source of structural adversity. Socio-economic stress, 
health and child nutritional status in Zimbabwe   
 Leon Bijlmakers   (2003) 
68 Resisting reforms. A resource-based perspective of collective action in the 
distribution of agricultural input and primary health services in the Couffo region, 
Benin  
 Houinsou Dedehouanou   (2003) 
67 Women striving for self-reliance. The diversity of female-headed households in 
Tanzania and the livelihood strategies they employ  
 Anke van Vuuren   (2003) 
66 Démocratisation en Afrique au sud du Sahara: Transitions et virage.  
Un bilan de la littérature (1995-1996)  
 Klaas van Walraven & Céline Thiriot   (2002) 
65 Democratization in sub-Saharan Africa: Transitions and turning points.  
An overview of the literature (1995-1996)  
 Klaas van Walraven & Céline Thiriot   (2002) 
64 Sharing a valley. The changing relations between agriculturalists and pastoralists 
in the Niger Valley of Benin  
 Antje van Driel   (2001) 
63 Pathways to negotiate climate variability. Land use and institutional change in the 
Kaya region, Burkina Faso  
 Mark Breusers   (2001) 
62 “We think of them.” How Ghanaian migrants in Amsterdam assist relatives at 
home  
 Daniel K. Arhinful   (2001) 
61 Pastoralists and markets. Livestock commercialization and food security in north-
eastern Kenya  
 Abdirizak A. Nunow   (2000) 
60 Rural development and agricultural policy in central western Zambia.  
The case of Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme  
 K. Hailu   (2000) 
59 Secrecy and ambiguity. Home care for people living with HIV/AIDS in Ghana  
 Maud Radstake   (2000) 
58 Urban agriculture in Africa: A bibliographical survey  
 R.A. Obudho & Dick Foeken   (1999) 
57 Changing security. Livelihood in the Mandara Mountains in North Cameroon  
 Annette van Andel   (1998) 
56 Catholic mission, colonial government and indigenous response in Kom 
(Cameroon 
 Jacqueline de Vries   (1998) 
55 Eritreo-Ethiopian studies in society and history: 1960-1995.  
A supplementary bibliography  
 Jan Abbink   (1996) 
54 Commodity auctions in Tropical Africa. A survey of the African tea, tobacco and 
coffee auctions  
 John Houtkamp & Laurens van der Laan   (1993) 
53 Land and labour in Myjikenda agriculture, Kenya, 1850-1985  
 Henk Waaijenberg   (1993) 
52 Democratisation en Afrique au Sud du Sahara. Un aperçu de la littérature  
 Rob Buijtenhuijs & Elly Rijnierse   (1993) 
51 Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa. An overview of literature  
 Rob Buijtenhuijs & Elly Rijnierse   (1993) 
50 Women in Bamenda. Survival strategies and access to land  
 Adri van den Berg   (1993) 
49 Pratiques foncières à l’ombre du droit. L’application du droit foncier urbain à 
Ziguinchor, Sénégal  
 Gerti Hesseling   (1992) 
48 Power and privilege in the administration of law. Land law reforms and social 
differentiation in Cameroon  
 Cyprien Fisiy   (1992) 
47 Staatsvorming, rurale ontwikkeling en boeren in Guiné-Bissau  
 H. Schoenmaker   (1991) 
44 Popular Islam in Tunisia  
 Kees Schilder   (1991) 
43 Seasons, food supply and nutrition in Africa  
 Dick W.J. Foeken & Adel P. den Hartog (eds)   (1990) 
42 Socio-economic development of women in Zambia 
 A. Touwen   (1990) 
41 Enduring crisis, refugee problems in Eastern Sudan  
 Henk Tieleman & Tom Kuhlman   (1990) 
40 Marketing policies and economic interests in the cotton sector of Kenya  
 Tjalling Dijkstra   (1990) 
39 The IMF-World Bank's stabilisation and structural adjustment policies and the 
Uganda economy, 1981-1989  
 D.W. Nabudere   (1990) 
38 Economic management in neo-colonial states: A case study of Cameroon  
 N. Jua   (1990) 
34 Aspects of the Apartheid state. A bibliographical survey  
 Ineke van Kessel   (1989/91) 
33 Scenes of change: Visions on developments in Swaziland  
 Henk Tieleman (ed.)   (1988) 
32 State formation, religion and land tenure in Cameroon.  
A bibliographical survey  
 Kees Schilder   (1988) 
30 Irriguer pour subsister  
 Geert Diemer & E. van der Laan   (1987) 
29 Economic management in Cameroon: Policies and performance  
 W.A. Ndongko   (1987) 
28 Leven en werken in een Nyakyusa dorp  
 Nel van Hekken   (1986) 
27 Muslims in Mango  
 Emile van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal   (1986) 
25 West African colonial civil servants in the nineteenth century  
 Kwame Arhin   (1985) 
24 Staatsvorming in Guiné-Bissau  
 J.H. Schoenmakers   (1986) 
23 Producer prices in Tropical Africa  
 Paul Hesp   (1985) 
 
